1. Introduction

   • Tatsuro Ichiishi
   • Tom Marschak

   Original paper Pages: 305 - 309

2. Roy Radner and incentive theory

   • Eric S. Maskin

   Original paper Pages: 311 - 324

3. Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

   • Steven R. Williams

   Original paper Pages: 325 - 342

4. Majority rule with dollar voting

   • James S. Jordan

   Original paper Pages: 343 - 352

5. Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution

   • Charles A. Wilson

   Original paper Pages: 353 - 370

6. Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

   • Jess Benhabib
   • Aldo Rustichini
   • Andrés Velasco

   Original paper Pages: 371 - 396

7. Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?

   • Roger Lagunoff
   • Akihiko Matsui

   Original paper Pages: 397 - 412

8. Trust and social efficiencies

   • Robert W. Rosenthal

   Original paper Pages: 413 - 428

9. Survival and the art of profit maximization

   • Prajit K. Dutta
   • Rangarajan K. Sundaram

   Original paper Pages: 429 - 446

10. Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

    • Sang-Chul Suh

    Original paper Pages: 447 - 460

11. First–price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge

    • Michael Landsberger
    • Jacob Rubinstein
    • Shmuel Zamir

    Original paper Pages: 461 - 480