Abstract
It is a standard understanding that we live in time. In fact, the whole physical world as described in sciences is based on the idea of objective (not absolute) time. For centuries, we have defined time ever so minutely, basing them on finer and finer event measurements (uncoiling springs to atomic clocks) that we do not even notice that we have made an inductive leap when it comes to time—we can measure time, so we experience time. In the current work, I wish to critique this inductive leap and examine what it means to experience time. We are embodied and embedded cognitive agents, constrained by our body as well as in continuous interaction with our environment (mostly in an unconscious manner, e.g., Are you standing or sitting? Are you paying complete attention to each part of your body and posture? etc.). So another way to ask the question of temporal experience would be—how embodied is time? I posit that experience of time spoken of in general literature is a linguistic construct, in that, the idea of experience of time overshadows the actual phenomenal contents of time perception. Moreover, time perception (either as perception of duration or perception of an instant of time) itself comes from a post-facto judgment of events. It has also been observed that the order of events in time can be altered to create an illusion of violation of causality itself. This points to the possibility that events are arranged in a temporal map that can be read off by higher cognitive substrates. In the current work, we go on to explore the nature of such a map as it emerges from an embodied mind.
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Notes
Even though the present ego might not identify with the beliefs and import of the ego-construct.
We are not dealing with the question of biological time—in terms of circadian rhythms, heart beats, pulses, and so on. Organisms have a way of biological time keeping, in that, there is a periodicity that the organism can rely on for its survival. However, here we are more interested in the time that is taken as content of subjective experience.
Here malleable and rigid time representations refer to re-calibrated time representations subject to changing delays in motor-sensory pathways and more non-plastic representations of time (against which the re-calibrated temporal judgements are compared), respectively.
TSE is a psychophysical variable obtained from binary duration comparison judgements between a standard reference (with fixed duration) and a variable oddball (with varying duration). First step towards calculating TSE is to fit a logistic sigmoid function (Generally Weibull function) in order to get the point of subjective equality (PSE) that refers to the oddball duration point where the fitted response is at 50%—or the oddball duration that is confused maximally with the standard duration of the reference stimulus. TSE is obtained by dividing the standard duration with PSE. It is seen generally that in temporal oddball judgements TSE factor is > 1 for reference stimulus of ~ 120 ms duration and above, i.e., a lesser duration for the oddball appears similar to greater standard duration of reference. This is also called Time’s subjective expansion (TSE) effect. For a more detailed computational account see Sengupta et al. (2017).
For instance, the illusory reversal of events could also be accounted for within a temporal map following spatial on-center off-surround representation.
Heidegger gave a very radical solution to this very problem with his existential analytic. Although it is out of the scope of this paper, I would like to point out that the dynamism of Dasein leading back to the world involved a process of differentiation (from anonymous they) not very unlike the Cartesian split (albeit mitigated through the concatenation of instruments that lead Dasein out of the world in the first place) (See Heidegger 2010). I would like to address this point elsewhere.
“The event constitutes the “dehiscence” of time, its coming out of itself in different directions, which Heidegger calls “ekstasis,” the fact that it never coincides with itself, and which Levinas names diachrony… For the event, as such, is upsetting. It does not integrate itself as a specific moment in the flow of time. It changes drastically the whole style of an existence… It does not happen in a world–it is, on the contrary, as if a new world opens up through its happening. The event constitutes the critical moment of temporality–a critical moment which nevertheless allows the continuity of time.”—Dastur (2000).
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Acknowledgements
Cibani Premkumar did most of the editorial and proof-reading work. Jobeth Warjri and Vivek Nenmini listened to most of my early drafts. Reshanne Reeder, Jolly Thomas and Shinod N K helped me with their kind suggestions.
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Sengupta, R. How embodied is time?. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 35, 431–445 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0150-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0150-1