Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

What Happened to the Trolley Problem?

  • Published:
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a general introduction to the trolley problem. I describe its birth as a philosophical thought experiment, then its successful career in moral psychology. I explain the different reasons behind its popularity and success but argue that, despite its popularity and widespread utilization in psychological research, few researchers have actually tried to directly solve it and that we are still ignorant of the real factors guiding our responses to trolley cases. Against the idea that trolley problems were just a fad, I insist on the importance of seriously studying them and put forward a new hypothesis about the psychological mechanisms underlying our responses to trolley cases.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Actually, in a footnote of his book, Unger tells us that he sought the help of his colleagues from the Psychology Department to put his hypothesis to the test. Unfortunately, he didn’t have much success. The times were not ripe for the empirical study of moral intuitions.

References

  • Ahlenius, H., & Tännsjö, T. (2012). Chinese and Westerners respond differently to the trolley dilemmas. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 12(3–4), 195–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bartels, D. M., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011). The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Cognition, 121(1), 154–161.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cushman, F., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure. Social Neuroscience, 7(3), 269–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082–1089.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duke, A. A., & Bègue, L. (2015). The drunk utilitarian: Blood alcohol concentration predicts utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas. Cognition, 134, 121–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dupoux, E., & Jacob, P. (2007). Universal moral grammar: A critical appraisal. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(9), 373–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feltz, A., & May, J. (2017). The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis. Cognition, 166, 314–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene, J. (2009). Fruit flies of the moral mind. In M. Brockman (Ed.), What’s next? Dispatches on the future of science (pp. 104–115). Toronto: Random House of Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene, J. D. (2014). Beyond point-and-shoot morality: Why cognitive (neuro) science matters for ethics. Ethics, 124(4), 695–726.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111(3), 364–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105–2108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hauser, M. (2006). Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong. New York: Ecco/HarperCollins Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., KangXing Jin, R., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications. Mind and Language, 22(1), 1–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Killgore, W. D., Killgore, D. B., Day, L. M., Li, C., Kamimori, G. H., & Balkin, T. J. (2007). The effects of 53 hours of sleep deprivation on moral judgment. Sleep, 30(3), 345–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. Nature, 446(7138), 908–911.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kohlberg, L. (1963). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. Human Development, 6(1–2), 11–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kohlberg, L., & Hersh, R. H. (1977). Moral development: A review of the theory. Theory into Practice, 16(2), 53–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McIntyre, A. (2014). Doctrine of double effect. In: E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014). Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

  • Michelin, C., Pellizzoni, S., Tallandini, M. A., & Siegal, M. (2010). Should more be saved? Diversity in utilitarian moral judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 10(1), 153–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(4), 143–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of moral cognition: Rawls’ linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nadelhoffer, T., & Feltz, A. (2008). The actor–observer bias and moral intuitions: Adding fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s fire. Neuroethics, 1(2), 133–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pellizzoni, S., Siegal, M., & Surian, L. (2010). The contact principle and utilitarian moral judgments in young children. Developmental Science, 13(2), 265–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petrinovich, L., & O’Neill, P. (1996). Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17(3), 145–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petrinovich, L., O’neill, P., & Jorgensen, M. (1993). An empirical study of moral intuitions: Toward an evolutionary ethics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(3), 467.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Royzman, E. B., Kim, K., & Leeman, R. F. (2015). The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4), 296.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suter, R. S., & Hertwig, R. (2011). Time and moral judgment. Cognition, 119(3), 454–458.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, J. J. (1976). Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist, 59(2), 204–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, J. J. (1985). The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395–1415.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger, P. K. (1996). Living high and letting die: Our illusion of innocence. USA: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H. (2007). Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb: Intervention myopia in moral intuitions. Psychological Science, 18(3), 247–253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

    Florian Cova

Authors
  1. Florian Cova
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Florian Cova.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Cova, F. What Happened to the Trolley Problem?. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 34, 543–564 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0114-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0114-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation