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Third Parties in the European Banking Union: Regulatory and Supervisory Effects on Private Law Relationships Between Banks and their Clients or Creditors

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Abstract

Third parties (like clients or creditors) are inevitably affected by banking regulation and supervision, even if the respective measures may formally only take effect between supervisory authorities and supervised financial institutions. From a legal perspective, those third party effects raise questions of contractual sanctions, the standing of private plaintiffs and potential liability for defective supervision. With the creation of the Banking Union, the same questions will henceforth arise at the European rather than the national level. Accordingly, respective answers need to take the traditional doctrines on direct and indirect horizontal effects of European law into thorough consideration. Starting with overviews of these effects and the general architecture of the European Banking Union, the present paper explores potential third party effects of that Banking Union on two different levels, namely with respect to supervisory policies and regulations, and in relation to specific supervisory measures. In accordance with the established case law of the European Court of Justice, the assessment on both levels requires careful consideration of the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the respective provisions of banking supervisory law.

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Notes

  1. Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, 12.

  2. See, for instance, Gerven (1976), at pp 4–9; Cherednychenko (2007), at p 170; Ferreira (2011), at pp 17–47; Hartkamp (2010), at pp 529–538; Hartkamp (2012), at pp 37–80; Hesselink (2003), at pp 3–7; Mak (2008), at p xxviii; Safjan and Miklaszewicz (2010), at p 477; cf. also the contributions in Busch and Schulte-Nölke (2011); Grundmann (2008); and Lekzykiewicz and Weatherill (2013).

  3. For a comparative survey, cf. Busch and Schulte-Nölke (2011), at p 11 et seq.

  4. More extensively, Hesselink (2013), at p 131; see also Craig and Burca (2011), at p 181 et seq.

  5. Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, 12.

  6. Craig (1992), at p 453 et seq.

  7. Similar, for instance, Wymeersch (2012b), at p 284.

  8. The term is particularly prominent in German constitutional law in relation to fundamental rights (Drittwirkung der Grundrechte). For a concise explanation of this concept and its resonance in international legal scholarship, see Clapham (2006), at pp 521–523.

  9. Craig and Burca (2011), at p. 181.

  10. Ibid, at p 193 et seq.; Kaczorowska (2013), at p 271; Woods and Watson (2014), at p 112; with minor reservations, Bobek (2014), at p 145.

  11. With respect to recommendations, e.g., see Case 322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi (1989) ECR 4407.

  12. Case C-253/00 Muñoz (2002) ECR I-7289, para. 27.

  13. See Opinion AG Geelhoed, Case C-253/00 Muñoz (2002) ECR I-7291, para. 47; see also para. 29 of the judgment.

  14. Case 9/70 Franz Grad (1970) ECR 825, para. 6.

  15. Art. 288(3) TFEU explicitly states that Directives ‘shall be binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’.

  16. Cf. Case 41/74 van Duyn (1974) ECR 1337, para. 13.

  17. Case 152/84 Marshall (1986) ECR 723, para. 48.

  18. Ibid.

  19. Case C-201/02 Wells (2004) ECR I-723, paras. 57–58.

  20. For an excellent overview, see Craig and Burca (2011), at pp 200–207.

  21. The leading authority is Case 14/83 Von Colson (1984) ECR 1891; for the application in horizontal cases, see also Case C-106/89 Marleasing (1990) ECR I-4135. The principle applies, however, only within the jurisdiction of the respective national court (no interpretation contra legem): Case C-212/04 Adeneler (2006) ECR I-6057, para. 110.

  22. Case C-194/94 CIA Security (1996) ECR I-2201; Case C-443/98 Unilever (2000) ECR I-7535.

  23. For discussions of this subtle and often difficult distinction, see Craig (2009); Dougan (2007).

  24. Extensively, for instance: Hartkamp (2010); see also, with respect to general principles of EU law, Safjan and Miklaszewicz (2010).

  25. Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, OJ 1994 L 135/5 (DGS I), recently replaced by Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, 2014 OJ L 173/149 (DGS II). For plans to reform that regime, see reference infra n. 43.

  26. Infra n. 31.

  27. Case C-222/02 Peter Paul (2004) ECR I-9425; for more extensive accounts, see Binder (2005), Häde (2005), Tison (2005).

  28. At the time, Paragraph 6(4) of the Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Law on Credit Institutions—KWG); today, Paragraph 4(4) of the Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Law on the Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision—FinDAG); for an accurate overview of German jurisprudence and academic writing on this issue, see Baumbach and Hopt (2014) Ch 7 (Bankgeschäfte), para. A/5.

  29. Cf. infra n. 140 et seq.

  30. Case C-604/11 Genil 48 SL (2013) ECR I-0000, ECJ 30 May 2013, not yet reported.

  31. The Directive was adopted in 2004 (MiFID I) and substantially reformed and supplemented by a Regulation in 2014 (MiFID II/MiFIR), see Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145/1; as well as Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), OJ 2014 L 173/149; and Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, OJ 2014 L 173/84.

  32. In this sense, Recital 4 MiFID II and Recital 3 MiFIR.

  33. Cf. Art. 24(1) and Art. 25(2) and (3) MiFID II, respectively.

  34. See, for example, Ferrarini (2005), Moloney (2014a), at pp 375–377.

  35. With the exception of one single provision on private enforcement, and as opposed to some earlier reform proposal; see Art. 75 MiFID II on the procedural issue of an ‘extra-judicial mechanism for consumers complaints’, and European Commission, Public Consultation: Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 8 December 2010, at p 63 (para. 7.2.6.: ‘Introducing a principle of civil liability of investment services providers would be essential for ensuring an equal level of investor protection in the EU’).

  36. Cf. Recital 137; Art. 69 (‘Competent authorities shall be given all supervisory powers, including investigatory powers and powers to impose remedies’), with an extensive enumeration of specific powers in (2); and Art. 70(6) MiFID II (on specific administrative remedies); see also Svetiev and Ottow (2014), at p 501 et seq.

  37. Assmann (2011), Busch (2012), Cherednychenko (2009, 2014, 2015), Grigoleit (2013), Mülbert (2006), Svetiev and Ottow (2014), Tison (2010). For the parallel discussion at the level of national law, particularly intensive in Germany (with respect to the contract law consequences of §§ 31 et seq. WpHG), see Grundmann (2015), para. VI 196 et seq.; Schwark (2010), paras 12–15; cf. also Einsele (2014) and Forschner (2013).

  38. Cf. Grundmann (2013).

  39. Para. 57 of the judgment.

  40. Para. 57 et seq.; see also Ruling 3 in the operative part of the judgment.

  41. In a similar vein, for instance, Herresthal (2013), at p 1420 et seq.

  42. More extensively Grundmann (2013), at p 278 et seq.

  43. See, e.g., Binder (2013), at p 311 et seq.; for a recent analysis of the EU position, see Payne (2014).

  44. The SSM is based on Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ 2013 L 287/63 (SSM Regulation), and on Regulation (EU) 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013, OJ 2013 L 287/5. The SRM, on the other hand, is based on Regulation (EU) 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, OJ 2014 L 225/1 (SRM Regulation), and on the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, Council Document 8457/14 of 14 May 2014.

  45. Extensively on the SRM: Binder (2015a), Gordon and Ringe (2015), Wojcik and Ceyssens (2014), Zavvos and Kaltsouni (2015).

  46. For detailed accounts of the SSM, cf. Dammann (2014), Ferran and Babis (2013), Lackhoff (2015), Lehmann and Manger-Nestler (2014), Sacarcelik (2013), Tröger (2014), Witte (2014), Wolfers and Voland (2014a, b), Wymeersch (2014). See also European Central Bank, Guide to Banking Supervision, November 2014.

  47. See European Central Bank, Aggregate Report on the Comprehensive Assessment, October 2014.

  48. Art. 7 SSM Regulation; more extensively, for instance, Dammann (2014), at p 1080 et seq.; Ferran and Babis (2013), at pp 273–275 (‘pre-ins’).

  49. Art. 4(1)(b) and (2) SSM Regulation; see also Recital 14; more extensively, Tröger (2014), at pp 461–463 and 471–473.

  50. Art. 6(4) SSM Regulation; more extensively, for instance, Binder (2013), at p 307 et seq.; Lehmann and Manger-Nestler (2014), at p 13 et seq.

  51. For a detailed list of those banks, see European Central Bank, ‘The list of significant supervised entities and the list of less significant institutions’, last updated 4 September 2014, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssm-listofsupervisedentities1409en.pdf, accessed 22 April 2015.

  52. Art. 6(5)(a) SSM Regulation.

  53. Art. 6(5)(b) SSM Regulation.

  54. Art. 14 SSM Regulation; see Witte (2014), at p 94; Wolfers and Voland (2014b), at p 1477.

  55. Moloney (2014b), at p 1611.

  56. With respect to the Commission Proposal (A roadmap towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final, 12 September 2012): Wymeersch (2012a), at p 4; similar, Ferrarini and Recine (2015), para. 5.04 (‘characterized by both regulatory polycentrism and supervisory centralization’).

  57. See again Wymeersch (2012a), at p 4 (‘regulation of banks remains essentially a national matter’).

  58. Cf. in particular Art. 9(3)(b) and (9) Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 L 24/1.

  59. Binder (2013), at p 298, Wymeersch (2012a), at p 5.

  60. Recital 11 SSM Regulation.

  61. The prototype is the former FSA Handbook, subdivided, since 2013, into the new FCA and PRA Handbooks: Lehmann and Manger-Nestler (2014), at p 12.

  62. Communication from the Commission ‘European financial supervision’, 27 May 2009, COM(2009) 252 final, at p 4 (‘one harmonised core set of standards (a single rulebook)’); Conclusions of the Council of the European Union of 18/19 June 2009, pt 20 (recommending to establish ‘a European single rule book’). See also Moloney (2014a), at p 880 et seq.

  63. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-rulebook/, accessed 22 April 2015.

  64. Art. 4(3) para. 2 SSM Regulation.

  65. Wymeersch (2012a), at p 5; see also Babis (2014), in particular at pp 8–34 (‘truly single?’).

  66. In a similar vein, Wymeersch (2012a), at p 5: ‘… likely to be opposed by the Member States that prefer to maintain their own practices, exceptions, and ways of dealing’.

  67. Cf. Art. 10 et seqq. Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/12 (EBA Regulation), in conjunction with Art. 290 et seq. TFEU; see also Ferran (2015), Levi (2013), at pp 59–73; and, with respect to the similar rule-making powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority, Moloney (2011), at p 41.

  68. See http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook/interactive-single-rulebook (‘an on-line tool that provides a comprehensive compendium’), accessed 22 April 2015.

  69. European Commission, A single rulebook for the resolution of failing banks will apply in the EU as of 1 January 2015, Press Release of 31 December 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2862_en.htm, accessed 22 April 2015.

  70. Somewhat contradictory, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-rulebook/ (one of three pillars) and http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook/interactive-single-rulebook (no mention), both accessed 22 April 2015.

  71. http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook/interactive-single-rulebook, accessed 22 April 2015.

  72. For a similar assessment, see Tröger (2014), at p 484 et seq. (‘ECB a de facto more powerful standard-setter than the EBA’); cf. also Schneider (2013), at p 456.

  73. Art. 6(1) SSM Regulation.

  74. Cf. Recital 42 as well as Art. 31 para. 1 EBA Regulation. More extensively on the (partly) heterarchical structure: Cleynenbreugel (2014), at p 189.

  75. In a similar vein, Lastra (2013), at pp 1210–1217; see also Ferrarini and Recine (2015), paras. 5.62–5.83; Tröger (2014), at p 482: ‘A Two-Speed Europe in Banking Supervision’.

  76. Art. 3(2) SSM Regulation in conjunction with Art. 40(1)(d) and (4a) EBA Regulation, as amended by Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013, OJ 2013 L 287/5; see also Witte (2014), at p 92.

  77. See supra 2.2.

  78. See supra 3.2.

  79. See supra n. 1.

  80. Recital 22 EBA Regulation.

  81. Recital 11 EBA Regulation; see also Arts. 1(5), 8(1)(a) and 9 of that Regulation.

  82. See supra nn. 10 and 16.

  83. Cf., for example, Art. 10 EBA Regulation. In general on this so-called Lamfalussy regulatory architecture: Ferrarini (2005), Schmolke (2005), Schmolke (2006); with further references, Grundmann (2012), at p 480 et seq.

  84. Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale (2014) ECR I-0000, ECJ 15 January 2014, not yet reported (where the Court refused to invoke Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by itself or in conjunction with the provisions of Directive 2002/14/EC, in a dispute between individuals in order to disapply an incompatible national provision).

  85. See, inter alia, Avgerinos (2003), at pp 20–22.

  86. Cherednychenko (2013), at p 158.

  87. This focus is already expressed in the titles of some of its main components, see Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 OJ L 176/338 (CRD IV), and Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, 2013 OJ L 176/1 (CRR).

  88. Dragomir (2010), at p 120; they also relate, to some extent, to bank governance: Binder (2015c).

  89. On that distinction, though from a more general perspective: Nozick (1993), at pp 9–14; see also Goldman (2001), at p 62.

  90. Similar, Dragomir (2010), at p 120 et seq.

  91. For the first reference to this illustrative picture, see Hopt (1975), at p 52.

  92. Cf. supra n. 80 et seq., and Art. 81(2)(b) EBA Regulation.

  93. See supra 2.3.1.

  94. In a similar vein, Joosen (2015), at p 225.

  95. Recital 1 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 OJ L 173/190 (BRRD).

  96. Binder (2015b).

  97. In some more detail, Bates and Gleeson (2011), at p 269 et seq.

  98. Art. 59(2) BRRD.

  99. Art. 55(1) BRRD.

  100. See supra 2.1.

  101. See supra n. 22 et seq.

  102. Supra n. 20 et seq. For an example of future national transposition, see Bank of England, Consultation Paper CP 13/14: Implementing the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, July 2014, Appendix 5, available for download at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2014/cp1314.pdf, accessed 22 April 2015.

  103. Cf. in particular Art. 54 CRR; more extensively, Bliesener (2013), at p 215 et seq.

  104. Grundmann (2011) (in a more general sense).

  105. European Banking Authority, Consultation Paper: Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the contractual recognition of write-down and conversion powers under Art. 55(3) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), EBA/CP/2014/33, 5 November 2014.

  106. Cf. again Grundmann (2011), at p 911 et seq.

  107. For details on the ECB’s regulatory powers, see Dragomir (2010), at p 232 et seq.; Louis (1998, 2004), Zilioli and Selmayr (2001).

  108. Recital 30 SSM Regulation.

  109. Recital 13 SSM Regulation.

  110. See Recitals 28 and 29 SSM Regulation.

  111. Cf. Recitals 7, 11 et seq., 30–32 and 87 as well as Art. 4(3) para. 2 (‘handbook’) SSM Regulation.

  112. Again, quite in contrast to the single rulebook, cf. Recitals 7 and 81 (‘consistent’), 11 (‘comprehensive’), 12 (‘coherent’) as well as 31 (‘convergence’) SSM Regulation.

  113. See supra 3.1.

  114. For that discussion, particularly intensive in Germany, cf., inter alia, Habersack and Mayer (1999), Lutter (2005), Mayer and Schürnbrand (2004), Riehm (2006), Schnorbus (2001).

  115. Case C-166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf (1974) ECR 33, para. 2.

  116. Similar, Witte (2014), at p 98 (‘two-stage process). As opposed to directives, however, instructions leave much fewer choices to the addressee: Gaitanides (2005), at p 175; see also Selmayr (1999), at pp 374–376.

  117. More extensively, Zilioli and Selmayr (2001), at p 109 et seq.

  118. Cf. Art. 17 et seq. EBA Regulation (either breach of EU law or emergency situation).

  119. Witte (2014), at p 103.

  120. Similar, ibid, at p 103.

  121. Ferran and Babis (2013), at p 265 (‘prescriptive supervisory rules’).

  122. In a similar vein, Tröger (2014), at p 468 (‘extraordinary clout to shape NCAs’ actual supervisory practices in great detail’).

  123. Witte (2014), at p 104.

  124. In detail, for instance: Barav (1974), Usher (2003), Türk (2009), at p 167.

  125. Case 25/62 Plaumann (1963) ECR 95, 107; more recently, for example, Case C-263/02 Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA (2004) ECR I-3425; for an overview, see Poli (2012).

  126. Witte (2014), at p 101 et seq. The cases in state aid law concerning the standing of competitors seem somewhat contradictory and inconclusive, see Winter (1999), at pp 527–529.

  127. Witte (2014), at p 102.

  128. Case 175/84 Krohn (1986) ECR 763, para. 17.

  129. Ibid, para. 23; see also Case T-112/95 Dethlefs (1998) ECR II-3821, para. 29.

  130. Case C-222/02 Peter Paul (2004) ECR I-9425, para. 47.

  131. On this issue at national level, see, for example, the German Federal Court of Justice decisions BGH 23 January 1980, BGHZ 76, 119, 126 et seq.; and BGH 5 November 2002, BGHZ 152, 307, 315.

  132. At national level again, cf. BGH 22 May 1978, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM): 1978, 785, 787 (avoidance of large exposure limits).

  133. Cf. Dalhuisen (2015), at p 5.

  134. Extensive comparative analysis in Tison (2004), at pp 138–147.

  135. See supra 2.3.1.

  136. Three Rivers District Council and Others v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2002] 2 WLR 1220; for detailed reviews, see Andenas (2000), Dragomir (2010), at pp 336–340; Hadjiemmanuil (1997).

  137. Cour Administrative d’Appel de Paris, 3ème chambre, 30 March 1999 (El Skikh), La Semaine Juridique 2000, Ed. Générale II, No. 10276.

  138. Dragomir (2010), at p 356; on the general issue of protection of individual interests as a parameter of individual rights, see Prechal (2005), at pp 118–124.

  139. See supra 4.

  140. Case C-222/02 Peter Paul (2004) ECR I-9425, para. 38.

  141. Ibid, para. 47.

  142. Similar with respect to CRD IV: Dragomir (2010), at pp 356–358.

  143. Witte (2014), at p 89. Yet it is not entirely unusual that the application of European law depends on specific questions regulated by national law; cf., for instance, with respect to the freedom of establishment: Case C-208/00 Überseering (2002) ECR I-9919 (‘company exists only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning’).

  144. More extensively (and in comparison with the debate on transformation vs adoption in international law theory): Witte (2014), at pp 105–109.

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Acknowledgments

For very helpful input and comments I wish to thank, in particular, Marija Bartl, Jens-Hinrich Binder, Paul Davies, Christina Eckes, Guido Ferrarini, Stefan Grundmann, Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Martijn Hesselink, Agnieszka Janczuk-Gorywoda, Eljall Tauschinsky and Chiara Zilioli. Of course, all remaining errors are my responsibility alone.

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    Florian Möslein

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Correspondence to Florian Möslein.

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F. Möslein: Professor of Private Law, German and European Business Law.

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Möslein, F. Third Parties in the European Banking Union: Regulatory and Supervisory Effects on Private Law Relationships Between Banks and their Clients or Creditors. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 16, 547–574 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-015-0024-9

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