Introduction

Fisheries conflicts in Europe have often been interpreted as arising from disputes over access to fish. For example, a recent report on conflicts in the Arctic claims that most clashes in the region are caused by competition for “marine living resources” (Evans & Østhagen 2021). In 2021, Britain sought to limit the number of French fishers granted licenses to operate in British waters, causing what reporters called a “trawler war” between the UK and France (Fortuna 2021). Research on global patterns of international fisheries conflicts also finds that countries frequently “fight over” who should get access to fish, with conflicts prior to the 2000s occurring primarily between Europe and North America, and more recently within Asia (Spijkers et al. 2019). Within Swedish boundaries, the scholarly literature has described conflicts between conservationists and fishers, wildlife and fishers, and recreational and commercial fishers as competition over access to fish (Grip & Blomqvist 2020; Svels et al. 2019; Waldo et al. 2020; Waldo & Paulrud 2012). Similarly, conflicts between fishers and fisheries managers are often said to derive from managers’ efforts to limit fishers’ access to fish. For example, Larsson (2019) finds that conflicts between Swedish commercial fishers and fisheries managers have increased in recent decades because of bureaucratic efforts to limit fleet capacity. Other scholars investigating Swedish commercial fishers’ regulatory (non)compliance in the Baltic Sea have described the purpose of regulation as limiting access to fish, a perspective that suggests a basic conflict over stocks between fishers and managers (Boonstra et al. 2017).

Access to material resources appears to play a role in many fisheries conflicts, yet disagreements between coastal fishers and fisheries managers may not only be about the size, quantity, and allocation of quotas. Extensive scholarship from Europe and elsewhere has shown that coastal fisheries’ goals tend to reflect interrelated social and economic concerns (e.g., McGoodwin 2001; Andresen and Højrup 2007; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Pollnac et al. 2012; Weeratunge et al. 2014). Many researchers emphasize that small-scale, coastal, and inshore fishers engage in fishing as a preferred livelihood strategy, which has both material and immaterial components (e.g., Salmi 2005; Arias Schreiber & Gillette 2021; Gillette et al. 2022; Gustavsson & Riley 2018; Holland et al. 2020). This suggests that immaterial factors might also be implicated in fisheries conflicts. If so, attention to them would productively inform efforts to understand these tensions and contribute to their resolution or mitigation.

This study explores how attention to coastal fishers’ material and immaterial needs might illuminate aspects of fisheries conflicts that are missed in approaches theorizing them as grounded in conflicts over material interests. Empirically, we base our exploration on voluntary written statements provided by Swedish commercial fishing license holders who responded to a national survey about the state of the fishing sector. We draw on Burton’s theory of human needs and the relationship between human needs, conflicts, and conflict resolution to conceptualize fishers’ needs as both material and immaterial, and reflect on what this might suggest about the causes of conflicts and how to resolve them (Burton 1979, 1990; Burton & Sandole 1986). Our purpose is to consider whether and how a more holistic approach to fisheries conflicts could contribute to their prevention or mitigation.

Our text proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly overview the scholarly literature that seeks to theorize fisheries conflicts. We then describe Burton’s theory of human needs and how it justifies human needs as affecting conflicts and conflict resolution. A presentation of our case study, the Swedish context, and methods for data collection and analysis follows. We then describe our results in relation to key concepts from Burton’s theoretical perspective. A discussion of conflicts between coastal fishers and other actors and their relationship to fishers’ material and immaterial needs is then presented. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our research for preventing and alleviating fisheries conflicts in the future.

Fisheries conflicts

As the introduction suggests, “conflict” in fisheries scholarship is applied to a wide range of situations. For some scholars, the presence of conflicting interests, for example, different ideas about what should happen with living marine resources, is a conflict (e.g., Grip & Blomqvist 2020). In other studies, a sense of frustration and obstruction, for example, when seals and cormorants hamper coastal fishing, is conceptualized as conflicts (e.g., (Svels et al. 2019). Often, the presence of clashing interests is adequate for a study to talk about fisheries conflicts (e.g., Hendrix & Glaser 2011; Spijkers et al. 2018). However, other scholars emphasize the importance of action for a situation to be termed a conflict. For example, Bennett et al. (2001) define a conflict as consisting not only of clashing interests between two or more parties, but also the attempt by at least one party to assert its interests at the expense of another. They go on to note that such conflicts tend to be low-level and non-violent. Still, other researchers emphasize the explicit expression of political opposition, including through violence, for a situation to be a fisheries conflict (e.g., McClanahan et al. 2015). In this study, we employ conflict in its broader meaning, to include a sense of disagreement, obstruction, tension, and alienation, as well as opposing interests (see Collins 2022; Collins 2022; Scheff 1994, 1995).

The scholarship on fisheries conflicts is extensive, consisting of both case studies and efforts to model fisheries conflicts (Bennett et al. 2001). Within the theoretical literature, one strand of research sees fisheries conflicts as competition and/or disputes over natural resource use and tries to produce typologies of conflict (e.g., Bennett et al. 2001; Charles 1992; Hendrix & Glaser 2011; McClanahan et al 2015; Salayo et al. 2006). For example, Charles (1992) divided fisheries conflicts into those related to jurisdictional, managerial, and internal or external allocation. Jurisdictional conflicts concern who owns the fishing resources. Managerial conflicts are based on disagreements about how fisheries resources can be harvested optimally. Internal allocation conflicts are between different user groups within the fisheries sector, and external allocation are conflicts between fishers and non-fishing industries (Charles 1992). To take another example, Salayo et al. (2006) propose three paradigms for understanding fisheries conflicts. In the conservation paradigm, fisheries resources need to be protected from greedy fishermen. In the rationalization paradigm, the rents of fisheries resources should be maximized to benefit society. In the social paradigm, fisheries resources should contribute to the welfare of the fishing communities.

More recently, scholars have criticized research that focuses narrowly on resource allocation to explain fisheries conflicts (e.g., Penney et al. 2017; Spijkers and Boonstra 2017; Spijkers et al. 2021, 2019). Some have sought to create more holistic models. For example, Spijkers et al. (2019) analyzed 542 international fisheries conflicts reported between 1974 and 2017 and identified eight different types of fisheries conflicts. While marine resources figured in many of these categories, territory and territorial boundaries were also significant factors. In a second study using this database, Spijkers et al. (2021) list 22 economic, social, political, and environmental drivers and conditions that contribute to fisheries conflicts. These include poor rule enforcement, changes in rules and regulations, boundary disputes, oil and gas extraction, labor shifts between economic sectors, and ethnic tensions, as well as various conditions related to fishing stocks. Both studies indicate that the rise of fisheries conflicts is not narrowly confined to disputes over living marine resources.

Burton’s theory of human needs and conflict

John Burton was a twentieth-century conflict resolution scholar who sought to shift the field of conflict studies away from dominant assumptions concerning individual aggression and law-and-order constraints toward more holistic perspectives (Burton 1979, 1990; Burton & Sandole 1986). His theory of human needs posits that conflicts arise when people are denied or deprived of some common human needs. Three basic assumptions are relevant to his human needs theory. First, all humans, regardless of their culture, religion, or ethnicity, have the same type, number, and order of basic needs. Second, all persons seek the fulfillment of their needs, regardless of the hierarchy and ranking of these needs. Third, there are inherent social, political, and economic structures in a conflict context that generate tension and deprivation. Unless these structures are challenged and changed, conflicts can be expected to arise and escalate. While there was (and still is) only limited consensus on a comprehensive understanding of these needs and whether they are universal or cultural, we find that Burton does present a plausible list of needs. First, human beings require a sense of security and of identity. Second, since we have a generic drive to learn, we require a consistent response from the environment, without which learning is impossible. Third, from their social context, people require both recognition and valued relationships, or bonding. Finally, individuals require (some) control over their environments in order to ensure that their needs are fulfilled (Burton 1990; p. 47,95).

When analyzing conflicts, Burton (1990) made a distinction between needs, values, and interests. In his theory, human needs are universal, ontological, individual, essential, independent from development stages, and non-negotiable (Burton 1979). Values, for example, social norms, are the manifestations of or the means to satisfy needs. Interests are desired outcomes that are not necessarily related to needs. Interests can be preferences for certain ideologies or other priorities related to a particular class or group. Burton regarded interests as negotiable in the short run. Values can change over time, but slowly and only in an atmosphere of security and non-discrimination. Needs by contrast are always non-negotiable.

Burton thought that the parties to a conflict needed to understand the sources of the conflict in order to resolve it (Burton 1986). He argued that it was a mistake to assume that conflicts were resolved by socializing and/or coercing individuals into accepting particular social norms and values. His theory of human needs posits that conflict resolution requires processes that allow for the exploration of unseen motivations and intentions of the parties to a conflict (cf. Collins 2022; Collins et al. 2020; Scheff 1994, 1995). Fundamentally, Burton asserts that conflict resolution depends on developing the means through which all parties’ human needs—material and immaterial—can be met. Put differently, Burton, like subsequent scholars interested in the causes of conflict (e.g., Scheff 1994; Collins 2022), recognized the centrality of, for example, social bonds and emotions in human behavior. Alienation or damaged bonds are a basic cause of conflict, although the shift from conflict to violence requires other factors (Scheff 1994; Collins 2022). Furthermore, unlike conflict settlements, bargaining, or negotiations where changes in relations are absent, conflict resolution tends to solve problems by finding options that are mutually agreeable; it is therefore costly and requires change (Burton 1990; see also Scheff 1994).

Case study, context, and methods

Since Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, the Swedish fishery sector has been regulated by the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Common Market Organization (CMO). The CFP gives member states some leeway in how they govern coastal fisheries (Arias Schreiber et al. 2019). The EU makes a number of recommendations to Member States about small-scale fishers, many of which Sweden (like other Member States) ignores (Linke et al. 2022; see also Bohman 2021). Other aspects of fisheries governance are mandatory. For example, it is an EU requirement that commercial fishers are organized into producer organizations that are included in fisheries management (Linke et al. 2022). In Sweden, this requirement has weakened coastal fishers’ democratic representation (ibid.; Larson 2019).

Sweden has a centralized, top-down management system, for which the Swedish Authority for Marine and Water Management (hereafter the Swedish management agency or HaV as its name is abbreviated in Swedish) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture are the designated authorities. HaV oversees the long-term sustainable management of fisheries resources and bears responsibility for implementing regulations established by the CFP. The Board of Agriculture is in charge of fisheries marketing and governs fishers’ producer organizations. The agencies share responsibility for developing national strategies and policies for fisheries.

Swedish commercial fisheries are managed through a system of fishing licenses, annual quotas for the most important fish stocks, specific technical measures, and fisheries closures (Prellezo and Carvahlo 2020). Increasing regulations and administrative burdens imposed by the authorities pose difficulties for coastal fishers (Hentati-Sundberg et al. 2014; Arias Schreiber and Gillette 2021; Gillette et al. 2022). Regulatory compliance has been described as “reluctant,” meaning that fishers follow regulations but lack a commitment to upholding them (Björkvik et al. 2020a, b; Boonstra et al. 2017). This may be a reaction to Sweden’s top-down management regime which provides limited opportunities for coastal fishers to influence fisheries governance; coastal fishers’ participation in decision-making is hindered by their low levels of membership in official producer organizations (Linke et al. 2022). Co-management is practiced in only two local fisheries: the shrimp fishery in Kosterhavet (Swedish west coast) and a vendace fishery in the Gulf of Bothnia (Björkvik et al. 2020a, b).

Contemporary Swedish commercial fisheries contribute far less to the national GDP than forestry or agriculture (Björkvik et al. 2020a, b). In 2018, Sweden had a fleet of 887 active fishing vessels (Prellezo and Carvahlo 2020), which according to the EU’s classification is divided into a large-scale fleet (vessels longer than 12 m), a coastal or small-scale fleet (vessels less than 12 m in length using passive fishing gears), and a distant fishing fleet (vessels longer than 24 m operating outside the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone). The number of Swedish fishers has been declining for decades (Neuman and Piriz, 2000; Waldo and Blomquist 2020). In 2020, Sweden had an estimated 900 coastal fishers, mostly operating along the Baltic coast (Björkvik et al. 2020a, b). Recruitment of new entrants is low, so this number is expected to decrease as current fishers reach retirement (ibid.; see also Gillette et al. 2022). The average coastal fisher in Sweden is male, and 37% of them are older than 65 (compared to 8% in the large-scale fishery). Many coastal fisheries have low or negative profit margins and the average wage of Swedish commercial fishers is lower than the average for the total population (Waldo and Blomquist 2020; Nielsen et al. 2018; Prellezo and Carvahlo 2020). Many coastal fishers use pluriactivity to cope with low profitability, obtaining additional incomes through non-fishing activities or the income of a partner or spouse (Andersson 2021; Gillette et al. 2021). This pattern is common in European coastal fisheries (e.g., Andresen & Højrup 2008; Pascual-Fernández et al. 2020; Pita et al. 2020; Salmi 2005).

Herring, sprat, shrimp, langoustine, and cod are the most economically important species in Swedish fisheries. Total catches are around 200 thousand tons annually, of which coastal fisheries make up about 5%, despite the fact that almost 70% of commercial fishers are employed in coastal fishing. Most of the large-scale fleet engages in pelagic fishing for herring and sprat. In terms of volume, these two species constitute the majority of the Swedish quota. Pelagic fishing is conducted in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Bothnia, with catches landed in Sweden and Denmark. Sweden also has a medium- and small-scale pelagic fishing fleet capturing herring and vendace in the Baltic Sea with gears such as smaller trawls, seines, and nets. This fleet fishes herring along the entire Baltic coast, while the vendace fisheries are in the Gulf of Bothnia. In the demersal fisheries (for fish species living near the seabed), about 60 small to medium-sized vessels catch shrimp with bottom trawls on the west coast. Smaller vessels targeting flatfish, perch, and pike with passive gear such as nets or traps also operate in the Baltic Sea. Along the north Baltic coast, salmon is an important species while the west coast also has trap fisheries for langoustine and Norwegian lobster.

Swedish fisheries face a number of ecological challenges. Of 69 fish stocks landed and assessed, at least 46% were fished unsustainably in 2018 (Bryhn et al. 2021). In most of the Baltic Sea, where most coastal fishers operate, decreasing and unhealthy cod stocks have resulted in a cod fishing moratorium since 2019. In some Baltic Sea commercial species, contaminants such as dioxin and PCBs are still present in high concentrations, precluding their use for human consumption and limiting opportunities for commercialization (Polak-Juszczak et al. 2022; Haapasaari et al. 2019). Increasing populations of seals and cormorants compete for fish resources and in the case of seals, directly eat fish from nets and scare away fish (Hansson et al. 2018; Blomquist and Waldo 2021).

This exploratory study of Swedish fisheries conflicts is based upon voluntary written responses to a self-administered survey questionnaire sent by post to all holders of a Swedish commercial fishing license in 2019. The survey was short (taking around 5 min to complete) and included both multiple-choice and open-ended questions. Fishers were asked about their plans to remain in or leave commercial fishing and their reasons for deciding between these alternatives, as well as their views of the main problems and issues in commercial fishing. Additional questions concerned fishing vessel size, gears, fishing areas, and membership in producer organizations. The questionnaire concluded with an open invitation for additional comments, asking “is there something else you would like to tell us”?

A total of 835 questionnaires were mailed together with a postage-paid return envelope. Forty-two percent (n = 351) of the fishers filled out and sent back the survey. One hundred and forty-two fishers sent their contact details with their responses, which allowed us to identify the target species specified in their fishing licenses. From this sample, 46 coastal fishers chose to provide a response to the final open question. Their comments ranged in length from a few sentences to three pages of additional text. We chose to restrict our analysis of fisheries conflicts to this voluntary material for two reasons. First, the survey questionnaire did not ask specifically about fisheries conflicts; we have no quantitative data on this topic. Second, the fishers who responded to the final open question identified the topics, issues, and, as our data shows, conflicts that they wished to bring to our attention (as opposed to the multiple-choice questions which formed the bulk of the survey, where respondents selected between given alternatives). We do not assume that this self-selected group necessarily represents Swedish coastal fishers in general. The sample is non-probabilistic and biased toward those fishers who were motivated to share their views on the survey. It is possible that conflicts were more often experienced by this group, although we cannot be certain this is so. However, the conflicts raised in our data set have also been described in other publications on Swedish coastal fisheries (e.g., Andersson 2021; Björkvik et al. 2020a; Gillette et al. 2022; Larsson 2019).

To analyze coastal fishers’ voluntary responses to our open invitation on the national survey, we first classified the fishers according to their geographic area of operation (Baltic Sea and west coast) and the target species specified in their licenses. These were cod, eel, and shrimp/langoustine. We then coded the responses. First, we coded for the contents of each comment, e.g., what was the text about. As we describe below, in 45 instances the responses described a conflict, in the sense of a disagreement, tension, or sense of obstruction or alienation. Next, we coded to determine which parties were involved in the conflict. After this, we drew on Burton’s theory to code for the needs, values, and interests expressed in each text.

Results

Among the 46 coastal fishers who provided additional voluntary text to the survey, only one, a langoustine fisher, did not write text that indicated some form of conflict. The remaining 45 respondents all wrote about some form of clash, tension, obstacle, disagreement, or feeling of alienation. This group included 16 fishers with a fishing license for cod, 19 with licenses for eel, and 10 with licenses for langoustine or shrimp (see Table 1). Here it is important to note that the size of cod and eel populations captured in the Baltic Sea has reduced dramatically over the last decades. The size of the shrimp and langoustine stocks, which are captured on the west coast, has been more stable.

Table 1 Thematic analysis of coastal fishers’ voluntarily provided complaints added to a survey sent to all holders of a Swedish commercial fishing license in 2019
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Fisheries conflicts according to Swedish coastal fishers

Disagreements related to fishing regulations and management, obstruction in the form of a belief that the Swedish management agency was trying to eliminate coastal fisheries in favor of large-scale fisheries, competition for fish from seals and cormorants, and tensions over administrative fees that fishers regarded as unnecessary and unjust accounted for 76% of the conflicts experienced by Swedish coastal fishers. As shown in Table 1, the bulk of complaints (31%) concerned overly strict regulations and inadequate fisheries management by the Swedish management agency. In the words of one langoustine fisher, “The management agency’s regulations and implementation of these regulations deserve all my criticism.”

After too-stringent regulations and poor management, the most frequent subject for complaint related to fishers’ perceptions that the authorities and general public accepted, or even desired, the declining numbers of coastal fishers, and eventual disappearance of coastal fishing. According to an eel fisher,

“Sweden doesn’t want any commercial fishing anymore. Commercial fishers are the most red-listed [endangered/liable to become extinct] of all.” A cod fisher wrote,

“Now there are only a few boats left, and most of them have crew who are over 65 years old. If coastal fishing disappears it will never come back.” Another stated,

“A lot needs to be done and quickly if there is to be any coastal fishing left on the east coast. Call me if you want more information!”.

Two other conflicts were also common in the fishers’ texts: competition from and the negative impact of large-scale industrial fisheries on the size of fish stocks, and competition from and damage inflicted by the growing numbers of seals and cormorants. Competing claims and access to fish from these actors harmed coastal fisheries. As one cod fisher wrote,

“As long as industrial fishing continues in the Baltic Sea, and the numbers of seals and cormorants increases, there is no chance that conditions for continuing to fish in the Baltic will improve.”

Yet another source of tension was administrative fees that fishers were forced to pay and for which they perceived no benefit. A particular driver of frustration was a recently applied fee known as the EKAN fee, which requires fishers to pay for a form that confirms that they follow the legal requirements for safety and security onboard. As one eel fisher put it,

“The transportation authority’s fee for EKAN of 2500 SEK and its accompanying rules are an act of robbery against coastal fishing in the archipelago.”

Other conflicts within the fisheries sector that the fishers discussed related to the following: fisheries authorities ignoring national policies, competition with recreational fisheries, and excessive surveillance and bureaucratic demands. Outside the fisheries sector, fishers wrote about the negative image of fishers in Swedish media and the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea, which is caused mainly by agriculture and other industry. Such conflicts accounted for 22% of all the issues raised in the fishers’ voluntary comments.

Swedish coastal fishers’ needs and means to achieve them

Our analysis of coastal fishers’ texts reveals that material needs were not the only factor informing fisheries conflicts; immaterial human needs undergirded many of the issues that they raised (see Table 2). In general, the comments suggest four important categories of needs which, in the context of coastal fisheries, intertwine material and immaterial factors. These are (1) respect and learning; (2) belonging and identity; (3) survival, control, and security; and (4) status and recognition.

Table 2 Issues, values and interests (means), and needs derived from the complaints of 45 coastal fishers’ voluntarily provided texts added to a survey sent to all holders of a Swedish commercial fishing license in 2019
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Fishers’ need for respect was identified in values and interests concerning fisheries management and regulations. Coastal fishers expressed desires for institutional and operational changes in the Swedish management agency. They linked these changes to material problems such as declining fish populations, but also the lack of respect with which fishers were treated. For example, one fisher wrote,

“The most important question for commercial fishing today is the ocean environment, to investigate the real reasons behind the catastrophic decline of the cod stock.”

This fisher, like others in this study, believed he had knowledge that pertained to the “real reasons” for the cod catastrophe. As one eel fisher put it,

“Those people, politicians, researchers and those working with regulations that are governing commercial fishing, have too little experience of reality.”

That the authorities, scientists, and politicians did not turn to fishers to learn about “reality” was a source of contention and contributed to fishers’ feelings of obstruction. Many respondents indicated that fisheries management deficiencies stemmed from a failure to include fishers’ knowledge in decision-making. Fishers considered themselves as particularly able to understand the marine environment and fluctuations in fish stocks due to their unique ability to carry out prolonged and regular observations of the ocean in the service of their profession.

Many of those who lamented managers’ and scientists’ lack of interest in fishers’ knowledge were eager to communicate it. For example, one cod fisher wrote,

“The number of gray seals is much larger than what the researchers estimate. Probably 150,000 to 200,000. I have been fishing since 1973 so I have seen this population increase year after year”

To take another case, according to a langoustine fisher,

“Fishers started trawling outside Bua in 1934 and we still fish with trawls there, on the soft ocean floor, for langoustine. These alarmist reports on bottom trawling’s damage are simply not true.”

In their remarks, many fishers linked the bad performance of the Swedish management agency to concerns about the outtake of fish by industrial large-scale fisheries and increasing populations of seals and cormorants. For example, one cod fisher wrote:

“I think it is reprehensible that they [the authorities] allow the big industrial fishing of sprat and herring, which is the basic food for other fish higher up in the food chain in the Baltic Sea. If they continue with this [policy] the sea will be entirely emptied”

Similar observations were made about recreational fisheries. In the words of one eel fisher,

“Stop recreational fishing. Why should we have people from the whole world fishing here in our own waters?!”.

Fishers’ need for respect also underlies their interest, expressed in several comments, in making the authorities “walk the talk” or deliver on the promises to support coastal fisheries expressed in different policy documents. As one eel fisher wrote,

“Politicians and civil servants have talked about protecting coastal and small-scale fisheries but in fact they have done the opposite.”

Like the previous remarks showing a need for respect, these comments had a material and an immaterial dimension. For example, in the following comment, the fisher links support for coastal fishing—which can be understood as meeting human needs for respect—to access to fish. He writes,

“Small-scale fishing has been talked about for at least 15 years, that it should be supported, but all the protected areas where fishing is not allowed affect small scale fishing – it is only empty words from the authorities.”

A need for respect was also expressed in the fishers’ complaints about the excessive surveillance to which they claimed to be subject. The fishers regarded themselves as contributing to healthy and local food, preserving culture and traditions, and providing employment opportunities, especially for rural communities. They also believed that the size of their landings was insignificant relative to industrial fisheries’ catches, and that their traditional gears had less-damaging environmental impacts. Yet coastal fishers wrote that they were controlled as if they were uniquely responsible for depleting fishing stocks. One langoustine fisher expressed such sentiments by writing,

“The reason I am considering quitting fishing is my age, and the fact that the surveillance increases annually: satellite surveillance while we are at sea, HaV, the controls at the dock, controls by the coast guard. Yet we capture langoustine with almost no bycatch”

Fishers also experienced a lack of respect in the periodicity and form of requirements for reporting, and how they were treated by the authorities when they contacted them about reporting. For example, one langoustine fisher wrote,

“The regulations require continual monthly reporting, including when you are away or do not have a computer. It doesn’t work to try and call the authorities; they only get angry if you do!”

Fishers’ need for membership in a community, and their belief in the value of coastal fishing as a livelihood and identity, was strongly manifested in their concerns about the decline of coastal fisheries and their future disappearance. In their comments, fishers made it clear that they considered coastal fisheries valuable to society, and they expressed a strong desire to recruit more fishers, and particularly younger fishers. Here again they pointed to fisheries management, which restricted the numbers of new fishing licenses awarded, as causing this conflict. Remarks about the future of fisheries could include material and immaterial aspects. For example, one shrimp fisher wrote,

“The absolute most important thing is to get younger people to fish. The median age among fishers is 58 years old. In 15 years there will be no more Swedish commercial fishing to speak of. Fishers need to get a decent salary, no one has any money to get started if the state does not do anything – even if it were in any case possible to get a commercial fishing license”

This comment clearly points to the relationship between coastal fishing as a livelihood—which has a material or economic dimension—and the vital importance of recruiting younger fishers. Put differently, the fisher articulates the social importance of Sweden having commercial fishing as a profession, and the need for coastal fishing to be adequately remunerated.

In the comments, needs for survival, security, and control tended to have a strong material component (e.g., access to fish), yet immaterial needs were also implicated. Typically such comments identified conflicting interests between coastal fishers and other actors, such as large-scale fisheries, seals and cormorants, and recreational fisheries. Outside the sector, agriculture and industry were blamed for environmental degradation (eutrophication). To give an example of this type of conflict, a cod fisher wrote,

“I do not see any future in coastal fishing, it is only the large-scale industrial fishing who benefits [from fisheries]. I am so sad about this. Stop the trawling and all those bloody regulations.”

This complaint is about access to fish, yet the fisher’s expression of sadness, and wish to stop trawling, indicates this conflict is not only about who gets to earn an income. His remark suggests that coastal fishing has immaterial value as a particular livelihood practice.

Fishers’ comments about the need for status and recognition suggest a sense of alienation from the broader public, whose erroneous image of fishing casts all fishers in a negative light. Fishers valued their many societal contributions and wanted to change fishers’ negative image and bad reputation as a means of addressing this need. As one langoustine fisher explained,

“The huge focus on commercial fishing means that other problems with the ocean are hidden, and we lose valuable time. Of course, commercial fishing affects the ocean and fisheries resources, but what about other factors?”

Discussion

Our results show that the conflicts coastal fishers experience—the disagreements, sense of obstruction and alienation, tensions, and competing claims they described in their voluntary texts—have not only material but also immaterial dimensions. Many of the conflicts are at least in part about access to fish. We see this in the fishers who complained that large-scale industrial fishers were inadequately regulated, that recreational fishing should be restricted, or that growing seal and cormorant populations should be reduced. Such conflicts relate to a lack of fisheries resources and/or their unequal or unfair allocation, also called “structural scarcity” in the fisheries conflicts literature (Bennett et al. 2001). From the perspective of Burton’s theory of human needs, these conflicts are related to respondents’ need for security, survival, and control. In our data set, fishers from the Baltic Sea, where the level of overexploited species is higher, and profitability is lower in comparison with the fisheries in the west coast (Waldo and Blomquist 2020), were more likely to talk about fisheries conflicts as concerning material resources or access to fish.

At the same time, our results also indicate that many conflicts had immaterial dimensions. Put in terms of the theory of human needs, the comments indicate fishers’ needs for respect, belonging, recognition, and status. Here we see parallels to the literature on fishers’ job satisfaction and fishing as a livelihood (e.g., Salmi 2005; Andresen & Højrup 2008; Arias Schreiber & Gillette 2021; Gillette et al. 2022; Gustavsson & Riley 2018). In this literature, fishing does not only fulfill material or economic needs but also sociopsychological needs such as belonging and identity, status, and a desired way of life, as well as opportunities for learning and displaying creativity, competence, or mastery. To take one prominent example from our data, when the fishers complained that the management agency ignored their knowledge and created policies that were out of touch with reality, they pointed to a lack of respect for their knowledge and experience, in addition to indicating a conflict about access to living marine resources. This finding correlates with other scholarship that has identified claims of fishing in a morally correct manner as a source of fisheries conflicts (Penney et al. 2017).

While reliable statistics for the numbers of fishers in the coastal fishing sector are not available (Björkvik et al. 2020a), the total number of fishers in Sweden is estimated to have decreased from around 25,000 to 1400 over the last half century. Many coastal fishers who shared their views with us stressed the importance of recruiting new, younger fishers to their profession. They described a conflict between this goal and the fisheries authorities’ restrictive approach to granting fishing licenses. This disagreement suggests that fisheries conflicts are not always about competition over access to fish. If the fishers’ primary need was increasing their access to fisheries resources, they would not advocate for more people to join coastal fishing. The need here is immaterial, a need for belonging, identity, and security. The fishers saw an intrinsic value in coastal fishing as a livelihood practice (cf. Gillette et al. 2022). The goal of recruiting more fishers might also be about strengthening their political position vis-à-vis the fisheries authorities, although we see nothing in our sample that supports this hypothesis. Furthermore, as said above, even with numbers decreasing, 70% of all Swedish commercial fishers are currently coastal fishers and the rest belongs to the large-scale fisheries sector.

Our data suggests that immaterial needs play a role in causing fisheries conflicts, most notably fishers’ needs for respect, belonging, status, and recognition. According to Burton’s theory, these needs are non-negotiable, yet they can be satisfied through a wide and varied range of measures. For example, one area where we have identified a need for respect relates to fishers’ knowledge of the marine environment. Swedish fisheries managers could address fishers’ need for respect and mitigate the conflict between coastal fishers and managers by taking steps to incorporate coastal fishers’ knowledge in devising policies and regulations. A second measure that fisheries managers could take that would address coastal fishers’ needs for respect would be to reduce controls on and surveillance of this sector. They could also strengthen controls and surveillance of recreational fisheries, which the coastal fishers regard as inadequately monitored. Yet another way in which the Swedish management agency could address fishers’ immaterial needs—a measure which also has a material dimension—would be to take concrete steps to support rhetorical commitments to protecting coastal fisheries. This might entail for example removing some restrictions on low-impact fishing gears and/or allowing coastal fishers to target more species.

When it comes to belonging, a significant measure that the fisheries authorities could take is to help recruit a new generation of coastal fishers, thus ensuring that Swedish coastal fishing will continue. The new Swedish Fisheries and Aquaculture National Strategy (HaV and SJB 2021) is ambiguous on this topic. The strategy states clearly that recreational fishing should be boosted because of its contribution to local businesses and individual well-being. However, the implementation plan for commercial fishing also commits to “increasing the proportion of younger commercial fishers in Sweden, both among those granted fishing licenses and among those who work on fishing vessels (HaV and SJB 2021, measure 10, pp. 34–35). If this measure is implemented not only in the large-scale fisheries but also in the coastal fisheries sector, it will respond to a key source of conflict for the coastal fishers we discuss here, namely that the Swedish fisheries authority is content to allow coastal fisheries to “die out.” We note that an overarching goal of the national strategy is to achieve “profitable and competitive industries.” This suggests that fisheries managers prioritize material or economic goals—which in the Swedish context works to the advantage of large-scale fisheries—rather than immaterial human needs for respect, belonging and identity, status, and recognition. Indeed, recent discussions in Swedish fisheries about the privatization of fishing rights in the demersal fisheries suggest that material concerns continue to dominate many fisheries management initiatives.

While scholars have diverging views on the causes of fisheries conflicts, many researchers argue that preventing or mitigating them is important for achieving the sustainable use of marine resources and the well-being of coastal communities (e.g., Grip & Blomqvist 2020; McClanahan et al. 2015; Spijkers et al. 2018). Based on our exploratory research, we suggest that achieving such goals depends on understanding the causes of fisheries conflicts as having material and immaterial dimensions. According to Burton, human needs—material and immaterial—are non-negotiable. This means that fisheries conflicts must be addressed by negotiating about the means through which needs are met, namely fishers’ interests and values.

Fishers’ interests can be addressed in the short term. Reducing administrative fees, redrawing the boundaries of fishing grounds to delineate coastal, recreational and large-scale fisheries, setting quotas and controls for fisheries sectors that compete with coastal fishers, and reducing the numbers of seals and cormorants are all examples of interests that fishers are eager to see addressed by the management agency. In addition, fishers are eager to contribute their knowledge to fisheries management. Were the management agency to initiate discussions about these issues with coastal fishers, they would immediately begin to address the fishers’ immaterial needs for respect, status, and recognition, while also acknowledging their material needs. Depending on how negotiations around these interests evolved, the fishers could well have a willingness to collaborate and compromise with regard to these interests.

Researchers have argued that value change is complex but possible and may yield systemic shifts in patterns of human behaviors (Horcea-Milcu et al. 2019). Research suggests that Swedish coastal fishers’ values, like those of other livelihood actors, are persistent and enduring (e.g., Andresen & Højrup 2008; Gillette et al. 2022; Gustavsson et al. 2017). Changing values, according to Burton’s theory, requires time and a secure and respectful environment. Contemporary Swedish fisheries are managed under a top-down, centralized system. Most Swedish coastal fishers are not members of producer organizations and are institutionally excluded from democratic representation in fisheries governance (Linke et al. 2022). Our sample suggests that at least some coastal fishers lack trust in Swedish fisheries managers and agencies and might not be interested in working in partnership with them. This poses problems for values change.

Our study suggests that at least some coastal fishers in Sweden are unable to meet their material and immaterial needs from their profession. The voluntary comments we scrutinize here overwhelmingly evidence conflict, disagreement, obstruction, tension, and alienation in coastal fishers’ relationships with fisheries managers, other actors in the sector, and the broader society. Many scholars argue that adaptive co-management arrangements are crucial to sustainability and the way forward for fisheries governance (Dahlet et al. 2021; Mendenhall et al. 2020). Sweden has only two co-managed fisheries today. According to Murunga et al. (2021), leadership, trust, and past experiences influence stakeholders’ engagement and collaboration in fisheries co-management and what outcomes co-management can achieve. We suggest that attending to coastal fishers’ material and immaterial needs is an important and necessary step for Sweden to be able to move successfully toward more adaptive co-management.

Conclusion

In his recent monograph on conflict, Randall Collins (2022:87) observes, “In talking politics and writing history, we typically explain what people do by their interests. But interests are often in dispute; people are accused of doing things that aren’t in their own interests and failing to support a particular economic policy. ‘Interests’ are the rhetoric of modern politics, not an accurate predictor of how people go into action.” Many conflict scholars have rejected materialist and realist approaches (Burton 1990; Scheff 1994; Collins 2022). They argue that emotions and the social bond are crucial aspects of disputes and conflicts between persons and between persons and groups cannot be reduced to clashing material interests.

Coastal fisheries, like other livelihood sectors, address both the material and immaterial human needs of their participants (Andresen & Højrup 2008; Arias Schreiber & Gillette 2021; Gustavsson et al. 2017; McGoodwin 2001). Burton’s theory of human needs is a useful framework for exploring coastal fisheries conflicts. Our exploratory study suggests that fisheries conflicts have both material and immaterial dimensions. Conflicts between coastal fishers and large-scale fishers, recreational fishers, and seals and cormorants all have a material dimension. Competition for living marine resources is important to understanding such conflicts. At the same time, Swedish coastal fishers’ needs for respect, belonging and identity, and recognition and status were not simply about competition for fish. Such immaterial needs are met (or not met) through social relationships, with fisheries managers, scientists, politicians, and the public. Such needs are, according to Burton’s theory of human needs, universal, ontological, individual, essential, independent from development stages, and non-negotiable (Burton 1979). Interests and values are how such needs are expressed; interests are open to negotiation in the short term, and so are values in the long run. It is by addressing interests and values that fisheries conflicts can be resolved.

Oversimplified models of fisheries conflicts as caused by material needs and resource competition ignore immaterial human needs and obscure the important factors in conflicts. Nevertheless, models of conflicts as predicated on competition for scarce resources continue to be mainstream (Mehta et al. 2019). Arguably, parties to a conflict often try to overcome incommensurable conflicts over human needs by reducing these conflicts to material interests. This oversimplification improves commensurability between the parties to a conflict, if only superficially, and increases prospects for them to reach a trade-off or consensus in the short term. It is precisely this superficial prospect of a quick resolution that makes explanations of conflicts as based on material factors so attractive to policymakers: they contain the promise and possibility of a short-term solution. More meaningful conflict resolution, as Burton and other scholars have argued, requires also addressing immaterial human needs. This may be a time-consuming and costly process, but it is also far more likely to mitigate conflicts.