Abstract
The causes of religious violence have attracted numerous explanations in the years since the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers. However, most forms of religious extremism do not result in violence (e.g., the Amish, Hasidim, Jains) and religious groups have not cornered the market on egregious violence. Nevertheless, religious violence does occur, and this paper examines the interplay of social networks and religious violence. It builds on Cass Sunstein’s “law of group polarization,” which predicts that when like-minded people deliberate as an organized group, the general opinion shifts toward extreme versions of their common belief. It argues that internally dense religious groups that maintain few ties to the wider society are more likely to embrace extreme views and behavior than are those that are not as dense and/or remain tied to the wider society. The argument is then tested using social network analysis methodologies to examine the evolution of the Hamburg Cell, which played a critical role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations that can limit but not eliminate religious extremism and violent behavior in the future.
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Notes
Moreover, non-religious groups can be just as violent as religious ones, with Sri Lanka’s LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam), Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and Turkey’s PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan—Kurdish Worker’s Party) serving as three prominent examples.
Technically, in White’s view of meaning comes from switching between networks (Steiny 2007).
Yousef attempted to enlist Ishtiaque Parker, a South African student to whom Yousef’s brother-in-law introduced him. At first, Yousef shared little with Parker, but eventually he told him about his involvement in the World Trade Center and convinced Parker to transport a bag overseas for him. Later, Yousef sent Parker to an airport with explosive-packed suitcases with instructions to place them on a U.S. carrier. Parker did not go through with the plan, lying to Yousef that airport security was too tight. Yousef also told Parker that Philippine authorities had confiscated Yousef’s computer, which had Parker’s name in it. This frightened Parker, and when Yousef asked him to take a small package to a Shiite mosque, Parker called the U.S. Embassy. This led to Yousef’s arrest and extradition to the U.S where he is now serving two life sentences.
Scott Atran, email communication, October 7, 2014.
Longitudinal social network datasets that track groups both prior to and during their radicalization period are rare. The Hamburg Cell dataset is one of the few, which is why it is used here.
The JJATT was sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) and developed under the guidance Scott Atran (PI). Although there are some limitations to the data (see Gerdes 2015), this is not unusual with data on covert and illegal networks (Krebs 2002; Sparrow 1991) Nevertheless, the data appear to accurately reflect what scholars have learned about the cell (9/11 Commission 2004; Sageman 2004).
For the years 2000 and 2001, the data actually include two times points.
Network measures were calculated using UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002). It is generally preferable to estimate multiple measures because just as no single metric can capture an economy’s performance (e.g., gross domestic product, unemployment, poverty rate, inflation), no single social network measure captures a network’s interconnectedness. The appendix details how each of the measures is calculated. If data on external ties were available, Krackhardt’s (1994) E-I index, which compares the ratio of internal and external ties and is an excellent measure of a group’s insularity, could be calculated.
Standard tests do not apply because the nature of social network data violates their assumptions (Borgatti et al. 2013: 125–126). For example, standard statistical models assume the independence of observations, but a central assumption of social network analysis is that observations (i.e., actors) are interdependent and these interdependencies affect behavior (Azarian 2005; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Also, standard models assume that the population variables follow a known statistical distribution (e.g., normal, logistic), but the distribution of social network data is seldom normal and often unknown. Finally, and perhaps most relevant here, social network data are not a random sample of observations. There is no larger population to which to generalize. The network is the population, and as such the estimated metrics do not reflect the means of 100s or 1000s of observations but rather the population itself. In other words, the density for 1998 is not the average of, say, 400 observations; it is the density a single network, the 1998 Hamburg network. Thus, significance tests of the differences in means do not apply here. This is why it is quite common for papers analyzing social networks to only calculate and present descriptive statistics of networks. See, for example, the recent papers analyzing the change in a network of UK Suffragettes over time (Crossley et al. 2012).
Here, structural similarity refers to actors who share the same or similar patterns of ties to others and is often used to express similarities in tie patterns that result from similar job functions (e.g., middle managers are expected to have patterns of ties that are similar to one another).
SOAMs can also include variables that measure the effect that exogenous factors (i.e., attribute data), such as race, gender, religious affiliation, and age, have on tie formation. The JJATT data on the Hamburg Cell do not include any attribute data on the network members. This is not a problem here since what the models tested was whether the Hamburg Cell displayed a (statistically significant) propensity toward network closure. That is clearly the case. It is possible that its propensity is also a function of other social processes such as homophily (e.g., similar age, nationality), and their inclusion in the models would reduce the effect of the alternating triangles. That, however, would not alter the fact that over time the Hamburg Cell became increasingly interconnected.
Unbeknownst to the cell, German authorities had inserted a microphone in the apartment and occasionally monitored their conversations.
The other four members of the cell went to Afghanistan for training in the spring of 2000.
Interestingly, in the lead up to their attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo that left 12 people dead, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi also took steps to conceal their extremist beliefs (Callimachi and Yardley 2015).
A model that tested the network’s evolution from 1995 to 1996 did not converge and thus its results are not included in the table.
It should be noted that p values are not calculated for the rate parameters because a value of zero would indicate that no changes were made and thus testing whether they were zero makes no sense (Borgatti et al. 2013: 146).
The two-year delay between the group’s radicalization and the 9/11 attacks, of course, reflects the time it took for its members to travel to Afghanistan to be trained and then return to Germany and then move to the United States in order to plan and carry out the operation.
See the University of Manchester’s Covert Network Project: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/research/research-centres-and-networks/mitchell-centre/our-research/covert-networks/.
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Everton, S.F. Social Networks and Religious Violence. Rev Relig Res 58, 191–217 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-015-0240-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-015-0240-3