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On the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Enhanced U.S. Border and Interior Immigration Enforcement: Evidence From Mexican Deportees

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Demography

Abstract

Since about 2000, a number of federal and state policies have been implemented in the United States with the intention of stemming the flow of illegal immigration. In this article, we focus on two initiatives: (1) Operation Streamline, as an example of increased border enforcement by the federal government; and (2) state-level omnibus immigration laws, as an illustration of enhanced interior enforcement by state governments. We investigate whether these policies have reduced the intentions of deported Mexican immigrants to attempt a new unauthorized crossing. Although state-level omnibus immigration laws reduce the proportion of deportees intending to attempt a new crossing, increased border enforcement has proven to be far less effective. In addition, we ascertain the human costs associated with these policies. Our findings are mixed in this regard. Noteworthy is how the adoption of more stringent interior enforcement seems to result in a “herding” or “ganging-up” effect, whereby the incidence of verbal and physical abuse rises with the number of states enacting such measures. Additionally, our estimates suggest that deportees are more likely to respond that they have risked their lives to cross into the United States as a result of enhanced border enforcement.

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Notes

  1. Arizona was the first state to pass immigration enforcement laws in April 2010. Five states quickly followed, enacting similar laws in 2011: Alabama (AL HB56); Georgia (GA HB87); Indiana (IN SB590); South Carolina (SC S20); and Utah (UT package H116, H466, H469, and H497). In 2012, additional states have introduced similar omnibus enforcement bills: Kansas (H2576), Mississippi (H488 and S2090), Missouri (S590), Rhode Island (H7313), and West Virginia (S64). Bills in Mississippi and West Virginia have failed. More information is available online (http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx).

  2. Examples of such studies using a variety of data sources—including the Encuesta Sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF-Norte), the Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico (ENHRUM), the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), or aggregate series on border apprehensions—are the works by Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012), Angelucci (2012). Bean et al. (1990), Bustamante (1990), Chavez et al. (1990), Cornelius (1989, 1998), Dávila et al. (2002), Donato et al. (1992), Espenshade (1990, 1994), Gonzalez de la Rocha and Escobar Latapí (1990), Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999), Kossoudji (1992), Massey et al. (1990), Orrenius (2001), Orrenius and Zavodny (2003), Richter et al. (2007), Singer and Massey (1988), and White et al. (1990).

  3. Expedited removals are reserved for individuals captured within 100 miles of the border and within two weeks of illegally entering the country, and effectively eliminate the need for a removal hearing before an immigration judge. They trigger a five-year reentry bar on apprehended migrants. The Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), also known as Lateral Repatriation Program, transports undocumented immigrants to points east or west and far from where they were apprehended in order to make it difficult to reconnect with their coyotes, specialized smugglers used by undocumented immigrants to cross the border..

  4. See Varsanyi (2010) for a comprehensive overview of state and local immigration policy-making in the United States.

  5. Although some deportees were returned to the interior of Mexico through the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), the vast majority of undocumented immigrants were returned to locations along the border located east or west from where they were apprehended through the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP). In fact, the MIRP has been suspended because of cost considerations.

  6. As noted earlier, the EMIF-Norte is a cross-sectional survey. It does not follow individuals over time.

  7. Dates on the implementation of Operation Streamline across the various Border Patrol sectors were obtained from Lydgate (2010). Please refer to panel A of Table 8 in the appendix.

  8. Dates on the enactment of omnibus immigration legislation were obtained from the National Conference of State Legislators (NCLS) website (http://www.ncsl.org). See panel B of Table 8 in the appendix.

  9. Repetitive illegal crossings have traditionally accounted for the largest component of overall apprehensions (Cornelius 1998; Spener 2001).

  10. A number of t tests, available from the authors, suggest that there were statistically significant reductions in the proportion of deportees intending to illegally cross again from the first to the last available survey year.

  11. Once more, differences in the proportion of migrants intending to cross illegally again in the first and last available survey year are statistically significant at the 5 % level or better; t tests are available from the authors.

  12. Interested readers may obtain t tests of the statistical significance of these differences from the authors.

  13. We estimate separate models for the “intent to return within the next seven days” and “intent to return in the more distant future.”

  14. Separate equations are estimated using responses to questions concerning being physically abused, verbally abused, having possessions confiscated, separated from family, informed of the right to counsel, and risking life.

  15. Indeed, the estimated impacts—which would be computed as ∂re − migrate within the week/∂OS = [0.024 + (–0.007 ×6)] and ∂re − migrate ever/∂OS = [–0.012 + (–0.008 ×6)]—in 2012 when six Border Patrol sectors had OS in place, are not statistically different from zero, according to joint significance tests.

  16. The effect on the likelihood of committing recidivism within the week when OS is expanded to one more sector is given by ∂re − migrate within the week/∂ # Sec = [–0.028 + (–0.007 × OS)] = –0.035 for deportees captured in a sector with OS in place (i.e., OS = 1) and by –0.028 for the rest. Yet, neither of the two effects is statistically different from zero. Similarly, the effect of expanding OS to one more Border Patrol sector on the likelihood of committing recidivism in the more distant future is not statistically different from zero for all deportees.

  17. As noted in the Introduction, these polices might not only increase the risk of crossers but also alter the profile of crosses. For example, word of stepped-up border enforcement could deter the most risk-averse potential migrant, in favor of migrants who take greater risks. Alternatively, more-naïve potential migrants may be the ones crossing. Although distinguishing among the channels through which increased enforcement operates is of interest, our data cannot differentiate. Rather, we focus on the overall impact of stepped-up enforcement, whether via changes in the selection of migrants or via changes in the behavior of the authorities and/or the apprehended migrants.

  18. In this case, ∂re migrate ever/∂OIL = [–0.022 + (–0.009 ×6)] = –0.076, where 6 is the number of U.S. states with an OIL in place in 2012.

  19. This estimate is obtained as follows: ∂verbal abuse/∂ # States =0.011 + (0.005) × (OIL) =0.016 if apprehended in a state with an OIL in place (i.e., OIL =1), or 0.011 otherwise.

  20. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), among others, found evidence of an intermediate selection of immigrants from Mexico with respect to the education distribution. This result can be explained by two facts: (1) migration costs preclude migration for those with low levels of schooling, and (2) high returns to schooling in Mexico dissuade those with high levels of schooling from migrating.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to several anonymous referees, the Economics Research Department of the Central Bank of Uruguay, participants at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, and the 2013 NORFACE Conference for their comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, 92182, USA

    Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes

  2. Department of Economics, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, 49008, USA

    Susan Pozo

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  1. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
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  2. Susan Pozo
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Correspondence to Susan Pozo.

Appendix

Appendix

Table 8 Operation streamline and omnibus immigration laws dates
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Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Pozo, S. On the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Enhanced U.S. Border and Interior Immigration Enforcement: Evidence From Mexican Deportees. Demography 51, 2255–2279 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-014-0340-7

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