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A tool for static detection of timing channels in Java

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Abstract

A timing attack exploits the variance in the running time of a crypto-algorithm’s implementation in order to infer confidential information. Such a dependence between confidential information and the running time, called a timing channel, is often caused by branching of the control flow in the implementation’s source code with branching conditions depending on the attacked secrets. We present the Side Channel Finder, a static analysis tool for detection of such timing channels in Java implementations of cryptographic algorithms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Modeling and Analysis of Information Systems (MAIS), Computer Science Department, TU Darmstadt, Hochschulstraße 10, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Alexander Lux & Artem Starostin

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  1. Alexander Lux
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  2. Artem Starostin
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Correspondence to Artem Starostin.

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Lux, A., Starostin, A. A tool for static detection of timing channels in Java. J Cryptogr Eng 1, 303–313 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-011-0021-z

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