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AI Successors Worth Creating? Commentary on Lavazza & Vilaça

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Notes

  1. Although, according to Nick Bostrom, any superintelligent AI would be highly likely to include the acquisition of ever greater computational resources among its instrumental goals (Bostrom, 2014). If that is correct, then one might expect that a rogue superintelligence would be motivated to interfere with the implementation of the artificial successors envisaged by Lavazza and Vilaça, since they would require computational resources that it could put to its own use instead.

  2. Some might suggest that even perceptual experiences could in principle be understood solely in terms of information processing and associated behavioural dispositions, with no necessary connection to phenomenal consciousness or “qualia”, so that even the philosophical “zombies” imagined by David Chalmers could have such experiences (Chalmers, 1996). Of course, the very possibility of such zombies is itself a contested issue in the philosophy of mind.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, No. 155, Sec. 2, Linong Street, Taipei, 112, Taiwan

    Alexandre Erler

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  1. Alexandre Erler
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Correspondence to Alexandre Erler.

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Erler, A. AI Successors Worth Creating? Commentary on Lavazza & Vilaça. Philos. Technol. 37, 40 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00732-0

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