Abstract
On the basis of a case study in bioengineering, this paper proposes a novel perspective on models in science and engineering. This is done with the help of two notions: representation and design. These two notions are interpreted as referring to modeling relations between vehicles and targets that differ in their respective directions of fit. The representation relation has a vehicle-to-target direction of fit and the design relation has a target-to-vehicle direction of fit. The case study of an organ on chip model illustrates that the technical device can participate in both design and representation relations. The two relations share the same relatum of the organ on chip, but they have different directions of fit. In the design relation, the chip is adjusted to a design plan, in which case we are dealing with a target-to-vehicle direction of fit. In the representation relation, the chip is adjusted to a human organ, in which case we are dealing with a vehicle-to-target direction of fit. The example shows that a conception of modeling as involving only relations with a vehicle-to-target direction of fit is too narrow to account for models in science and engineering.
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Notes
This is a conviction that is often found in the literature, see for example the beginning of the quote by Peter Kroes cited in Section 4 that can be interpreted in that way.
To avoid potential misunderstanding let me stress the following. The organ on chip is not a computer chip. Organ on chip models consist of human tissues and of microchips that function as platforms for these tissues. See Section 3 for a detailed description of these artifacts.
For the term “direction of fit” see Searle (1983) and further discussion below.
An exception is Suárez (2015) in which the construction of a bridge with the help of an engineering model is discussed. The notions of representation and design are used in the account of the construction of the bridge but the connection between the two notions is not analyzed.
An alternative fictionalist view on models is defended by Toon (2012). His view, however, denies that there are model systems. Toon’s view is a direct view of representation, as opposed to an indirect view.
In the remainder of the paper, I will argue that this relation between model description and model system can indeed be interpreted as a design relation.
The case study shows this to be correct about concrete models. The second claim may have to be qualified as being valid for concrete models, only. Whether the specification relation of mathematical models also has this target-to-vehicle direction of fit will be left open in this paper.
Other scholars also discuss this phenomenon of variable targets: Susan Sterrett stresses that model users consider not only the suitability of models but also the suitability of targets (cf. Sterrett 2014, p. 36). Axel Gelfert (Gelfert 2016) claims that exploration is one of the core functions of models and he discusses four exploratory uses. One particular exploratory function of models is that they are used to explore the suitability of different targets (cf. Gelfert 2016, p. 93).
The notions of representation and design can be understand as standing for either a process or a product. On the one hand, the respective terms can denote a process or activity. Representation can mean the practice of representing, i.e., the activity of using scientific models for particular purposes. For example, models can be used in order to infer relevant claims about target systems that are represented by model systems (cf. Suárez 2004). Design can mean the activity of designing, i.e., the practice of building a concrete or perhaps a non-concrete object that effectively and efficiently fulfills a technical function (cf. Vermaas et al. 2011; Kroes 2012; Houkes and Vermaas 2010, 2014). On the other hand, representation can mean the product that is the outcome of the process of representation. In the philosophy of science, models are called “representations” and with this choice of terminology the aspect of representation as product is stressed. Similarly, design can mean the outcome of the activity of designing. This outcome can be characterized as a plan of an artifact. The design can be used to produce technical artifacts such as mass products, e.g., airplanes and tools for the handyman or architectural artifacts that are singular products, e.g., official buildings or residential houses.
There are early similarity views of models that use the notion of analogy (Hesse 1963; Leatherdale 1974). According to Mary Hesse, the positive analogy consists of properties that model system and target share, the negative analogy consists of properties of the model system that the target does not have and the neutral analogy consists of properties of the model system of which it is not yet known whether the target has them. A straightforward approach on modeling and resemblance in philosophy of science that uses the notion of similarity explicitly is defended by Giere (1988, 2006). Weisberg (2013) develops a similarity view that draws primarily on psychological studies of similarity judgments. On top of that, he allows for similarity to be not symmetric. Alongside these approaches, there are various structuralist views employing notions of homomorphism (Bartels 2006), isomorphism (French 2003) or partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003) that can be interpreted as similarity views as well. Christopher Pincock (2012) defends a structural view on representation that is not committed to a specific mapping relation between structures. All of these structuralist views give a precise mathematical definition of structural similarity that utilizes the notion of a mapping relation between set-theoretic structures. Another structuralist view is defended by Bas van Fraassen (2008). According to this view, the embedding of data models in substructures of theoretical models is an achievement of model users that can be spelled out with the notion of a morphism. In addition, van Fraassen acknowledges selective resemblance as a representation criterion for the outcome of a measurement. He is not explicitly endorsing a similarity view. In fact, he is endorsing a deflationary account of representation and he argues against naive similarity views of representation. However, I interpret his insistence on selective resemblance as a defense of a weak form of a similarity view.
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Acknowledgments
For written and oral comments, I am indebted to Kathleen Ess, Florian Fischer, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Peter Kroes, the audiences at the following events: fPET 2014 in Blacksburg, the third Dutch-German Workshop in the Philosophy of Technology 2014 in Darmstadt, EPSA 2015 in Düsseldorf, and the anonymous referees for this journal.
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Poznic, M. Modeling Organs with Organs on Chips: Scientific Representation and Engineering Design as Modeling Relations. Philos. Technol. 29, 357–371 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0225-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0225-3