Abstract
Although philosophers of art and aesthetics regularly appeal to a notion of ‘pictorial content’, there is little agreement over its nature. The present paper argues that pictures have propositional contents. This conclusion is reached by considering a style of argument having to do with the phenomenon of negation intended to show that pictures must have some kind of non-propositional content. I first offer reasons for thinking that arguments of that type fail. Second, I show that when properly understood, such arguments can in fact be turned on their heads and shown to support the propositionalist position.
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Notes
See, for example, Crane (2009), Haugeland (1998), Peacocke (1987, 1992), and Sainsbury (2005). Heck (2007) is concerned with ‘mental maps’ (which he takes to have a different kind of content from beliefs) but offers considerations very much like those offered by other anti-propositionalists. Lopes (1996) is a slightly harder case, though he seems to hold that pictures do not have the same kind of content as sentences and beliefs (in personal correspondence he expresses that he is indeed inclined to that position). Block (1981) and Dennett (1986) also appear to sometimes take the contents of pictures to be of a distinct kind from the contents of beliefs, though it must be noted that they are engaged with a literature (specifically the ‘imagery debate’ in cognitive science) that isn’t always holding clear the difference between representational vehicles and their contents. I find allies in Blumson (2010) and Schier (1986). Sober (1976) may also be an ally. He aims to offer a translation procedure from pictures to sentences that express the same contents. Crane (2009) who is an anti-propositionalist would grant to Sober that there are sentences that describe the content of the picture, but none that can express it. More on Crane below.
Hanks (2009) offers a nice survey of the views as well as various advantages and problems.
Schiffer (2003) offers a helpful discussion, although the view is far and away the dominant one.
Many theorists also add (iii) that the phenomenal character (or ‘what it is like’ to undergo the experience) is wholly determined by the content. In fact, in order to maintain that perception is rather than merely involves a propositional attitude, one may insist on adopting (iii) in addition to (i) and (ii). For the purposes of this paper, one needn't take a stand on this issue. The propositional attitude theory is indeed widely endorsed. For example, Evans (1982), Harman (1990), McGinn (1989), and Searle (1983) all endorse (i) and (ii). ‘Qualia freaks’ such as Block (1996), Peacocke (1983), and Shoemaker (1990) endorse (i) and (ii) or something very much like (ii) though explicitly deny (iii). For examples of theorists who argue for (iii) in addition to (i) and (ii), see Byrne (2001), Crane, T (2003), Dretske (1995, 2003), Lycan (1996), McDowell (1996), Pautz (2009, 2010), Siegel (2010a), Thau (2002), and (Tye 1995, 2000). For dissent from the propositional attitude theory see Alston (1998), Brewer (2006), and Travis (2004).
There may be choices concerning richness. One straightforward propositionalist option is to hold that the contents of rich perceptual experiences and the contents of pictures are long, conjunctive propositions. We might then hold (roughly) that depending on how many conjuncts are true, the representation is more or less accurate. Alternatively, one might suggest that rich representations encode sets of propositions that are not united into a further proposition. Such a view has precedent in the philosophy of language. Dever (2001) offers the following example: If asked to evaluate the sentence ‘Barack Obama, formerly governor of Illinois, is the 44th president of The United States’ in the actual world, one might very reasonably argue that something is right about the sentence and something is wrong, but the sentence isn’t straightforwardly true or false. Obama was, after all, never a governor. For this reason, Dever argues that we should take such sentences to express two propositions: (i) that Barack Obama is the 44th president of the United States; (ii) that Barack Obama was the governor of Illinois. Importantly, Dever writes, ‘These two propositions will not be further united into a single proposition through the means of a sentential connective, so there is no single unit to which we can ascribe a truth-value’ (294–5). Such a position might better account for the fact that we aren’t inclined to say that pictures are simply false when they partially misrepresent. The exact details needn’t be settled now. My modest goal in the present paper is to argue that some propositionalist view is correct. If one is persuaded of that, the next step would be to work out the subtle choice points.
See Grice (1975).
By ‘visual properties’, I have in mind the features of a picture that one can detect through vision alone. Abell (2009) offers a helpful list: ‘occlusion shape, texture, tonal relations, apparent size relations of parts relative to a point, relative spatial location of parts, local color, and aperture color relative to a point (color as it appears at that point when seen through a reduction screen which isolates color from the distorting effects of environmental features such as ambient light and nearby areas of differing color)’ (196). Exactly which properties can be visually represented is a matter of debate (See, for example, Siegel (2010b)), but those issues needn’t distract us presently. The important point now is that a picture can intuitively depict one but not the other of two visually identical objects, so what’s depicted will not always be determined by the visual properties of a picture alone (more on this in the main text). Such possibilities create known trouble for theories of depiction that rely on visual resemblance.
See, for example, Fodor (2008) for a discussion of both vehicles and their contents. Fodor’s own view is that the nature of the vehicle of content has a bearing on the nature of the content itself. Fodor isn’t explicit about whether he thinks the contents of pictures are non-propositional, but one might reasonably take him to hold that they lack the sort of structure that the contents of sentences have. Presently, the important point is that one may wish to flesh out differences between cognitive states such as belief and perceptual states at the level of vehicles while remaining silent on the nature of their content. Dretske (1981), for example, takes all representations to have ‘information content’ (plausibly construed either as a Russellian proposition or a possible worlds proposition) but distinguishes between pictures and sentences at the level of vehicles of content. He then takes this difference to illuminate interesting differences between belief and perception.
‘Picture-like’ and not ‘pictures’ since of course we don’t have public images in our heads. Theorists such as Kosslyn (1980) who hold that there are picture-like mental representations argue that some mental representations are intrinsically spatial: spatial relationships are represented by actual spatial relationships on the picture-like surface. Kosslyn posits a functionally defined surface called the visual buffer that is influenced by Marr and Nishihara’s (1978) 2 1/2-D sketch account of visual processing. Block (1981) offers a helpful, philosophical discussion of the ‘imagery debate’ in cognitive science.
The first serious, contemporary suggestion of non-conceptual content can be found in Evans (1982). For more developed discussions, see Byrne (2001), Crane (1992), Heck (2000), and Tye (2006, 2005), though it is worth noting that the literature is large and growing. Bermúdez and Cahen (2010) offer a helpful overview of the topic. Speaks (2005) offers reasons for thinking the term hasn’t been sufficiently clarified in the existing literature.
An alternative view about nonconceptual representation takes states to be conceptual or not—a state is conceptual just in case being in that state requires the deployment of concepts. (This is not unrelated to the content vs. vehicle distinction above). But that distinction may well apply to whatever one ends up saying about the contents had by pictures—perhaps grasping the contents had by pictures requires concepts or perhaps not. This is why I said above that whether being nonconceptual and pictorial are really intertwined depends in part on what is meant when one calls a representational state ‘nonconceptual’.
Sainsbury clearly takes a stronger position here, holding that there is no such thing as the negation of a complete picture, though he allows ‘aspects of a picture’ to be related to negative facts. See fn. 7 above for a way a propositionalist might accommodate (if it is something that needs accommodating) that there is no negation of a complete picture.
Frank, M.C., et al. (2008)
Again, see fn. 7.
This is an instance of the wider phenomenon of propositional anaphora. A helpful discussion can be found in Moltmann (2006).
It was noted earlier that Crane and Sainsbury are themselves interested in pictures because of an alleged connection to perceptual experiences. Notice that similar points to those just made apply to experiences as well. After knowingly putting on glasses that seem to shift things a bit to the left, one might truthfully say that things aren’t quite where they appear. Plausibly, when one says that things aren’t as they appear, the subject, in effect, says that the way her experience represents things is false or inaccurate—she negates (with words) the content of her experience. Examples involving sentential operators rather than truth-functional connectives are available as well.
Thank you to two anonymous referees and to the editors, Valeria Giardino and Gabriel Greenberg, for helpful feedback. I also benefited greatly from conversations with Tim Crane, Josh Dever, Katherine Piatti, and Michael Tye and from audience feedback at the 39th Annual Meeting of The Society for Exact Philosophy. Special thanks to Derek Ball, Brian Cutter, Steven James, Katherine Ritchie, Mark Sainsbury, and Bailey Szustak for comments on earlier drafts.
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Grzankowski, A. Pictures Have Propositional Content. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 151–163 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0217-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0217-0