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Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review

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A Correction to this article was published on 12 February 2022

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Abstract

Given the importance of the joint analysis of the economic and political process, several researchers have examined the effect of the political regime on economic growth and development. The great majority of these researchers are crystallized on the assessment of the economic impact of a democratic political system in relation to an autocratic political regime. The aim of this review is to analyze the existing theoretical literature that underlines the effects of a democratic political system on economic growth with a brief look at some related models. Particularly, the paper examines channels through which democracy could affect growth and development.

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Notes

  1. President Abraham Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln 184, 184 (William E. Gienapp ed., 2002).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Orleans Economics Laboratory (LEO), University of Orleans, UMR CNRS 7322 Rue de Blois, BP 26739, 45067, Orléans Cedex 2, France

    Wafa Ghardallou

  2. CBA Research Center, Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

    Wafa Ghardallou

  3. Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management (FSEG), University of Sousse, B.P. 307, Cité Erriadh, 4023, Sousse, Tunisia

    Dorsaf Sridi

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Ghardallou, W., Sridi, D. Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review. J Knowl Econ 11, 982–1002 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-019-00594-4

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