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Licensing in the Context of Entrepreneurial University Activity: an Empirical Evidence and a Theoretical Model

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Abstract

US universities are leading the way in technology commercialization and licensing. This paper discusses the practice of licensing at the US universities, as well as the main directions and tasks of technology commercialization and licensing at the University of Maryland. Universities and research centers can implement steps to improve their technology commercialization and licensing negotiation by using solid analytical models. In the following sections, we suggest and describe a game-theoretic model to analyze, understand, and anticipate the behavioral profiles of inventors, entrepreneurs, and innovators on a dynamic interactive basis and in the context of a university or research center linkages with the market (of the innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem) in pursuit of designing an optimal (or feasibly sub-optimal) licensing contract.

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Acknowledgments

Some research presented in this paper was conducted with support from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the US Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (USRF), and the Russian Federation Ministry of Education and Science (order №2014/2-752). The authors thank Prof. Dr. Andrzej Baniak for his valuable comments regarding the game-theoretic model discussed in this paper and Dr. Kai Duh for his help in the organization of the research project at the University of Maryland. Also thanks to Paul Dudenhefer for partially editing this paper and JECK anonymous reviewers for their recommendations regarding the paper improvements.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Washington University School of Business, Washington, DC, USA

    Elias G. Carayannis

  2. Altai State University, Barnaul, Russia

    Igor N. Dubina

  3. Mining University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Alina A. Ilinova

Authors
  1. Elias G. Carayannis
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  2. Igor N. Dubina
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  3. Alina A. Ilinova
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Correspondence to Elias G. Carayannis.

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Carayannis, E.G., Dubina, I.N. & Ilinova, A.A. Licensing in the Context of Entrepreneurial University Activity: an Empirical Evidence and a Theoretical Model. J Knowl Econ 6, 1–12 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-014-0234-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-014-0234-3

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