Brandeis v. Cohen et al.: The Distancing from Israel Debate

Abstract

This paper comments upon the two lead articles in the Contemporary Jewry analysis of the Israel distancing hypothesis—the contrasting interpretations of Steven Cohen and Ari Y. Kelman who argue that Jewish Americans, especially younger Jewish adults and the intermarried, are becoming increasingly distant from Israel, and the rejoinder by Theodore Sasson, Charles Kadushin and Leonard Saxe from Brandeis University, who argue that “… neither the scholarly literature nor survey evidence consistently supports the view that attachment to Israel is declining among American Jews.” After discussing some methodological shortcomings in the data used in both the Cohen–Kelman and the Sasson–Kadushin–Saxe papers, as well as the reality that the emergence of J-Street as an alternative and younger-Jewish-adult-oriented supporter (and critic) of Israel may reflect a qualitative change in younger Jewish adult perspectives on Israel, this commentary focuses upon the puzzling reality that the authors of the two articles present essentially the same data, yet come to radically different conclusions. Both groups of researchers demonstrate that younger Jews are less likely to be strongly attached to Israel; both note that the intermarried are less connected to Israel; both note that the majority of American Jews still feel connected to and support Israel. The Cohen–Kelman articles interpret these data as reflecting generational changes; Sasson–Kadushin–Saxe interpret the data in a life-cycle change model. The authors of this commentary offer another interpretation, one which focuses upon the methodological problems inherent in using the American Jewish Committee’s annual surveys of American Jewish opinion.

Appendix A: Taglit-Birthright Israel and Distancing

One final comment: Taglit-Birthright Israel has been a successful program, encouraging younger Jews of all denominations to travel to Israel by providing funds for their visits. The recent Brandeis research report on Taglit-Birthright documents the considerable impact of the program. It is not really relevant to the quality of the research report that the program was “created” by the same Jewish philanthropist who funded the Steinhardt Research Institute at Brandeis. While this would have made it awkward if the follow-up research did not show strong positive results, and usually researchers try to avoid any hint of a conflict of interest, the professionalism of the researchers at Brandeis, under Len Saxe’s leadership, makes the issue moot.

On the other hand, we all need to recognize that Birthright Israel was created because there were fears—the Brandeis researchers might argue (in retrospect) unwarranted—that younger Jews were becoming more distant from Israel, and support for Israel might decrease over time. Implicit in the Brandeis “life-cycle” interpretation is an assumption that many younger Jews who are not connected to Israel will ultimately become strongly pro-Israel as they age. Happily for many thousands of Jewish Americans, the interventionist Birthright solution to the attitudinal distancing hypothesis (and the implicit notion that American financial support for Israel might also decrease over time) was implemented. The model used was a direct response: Reduce the distance attitudinally by reducing the distance physically; send thousands of young Jews to Israel as part of their birthright.

Over time, the Birthright participants have become less Orthodox denominationally; the earliest cohort was disproportionately Orthodox. Hopefully over time, the program will continue to expand its appeal among all America’s young Jews, including the inter-dating and the intermarried. Apparently, one of the most powerful ways to reduce the distancing effect is to eliminate (for a period of time) the physical distance between American Jews and Israel. “If you send them, they will change” was not only implemented, but it appears to have worked. However, even Birthright has limits economically and physically. (All young American Jews cannot be accommodated in Israel, unless our arithmetic is wrong.) All young Jewish Americans will not have a Birthright experience.

The perceived need that created Birthright reflects the same forces that created the preconditions which allowed for and encouraged the emergence of J-Street as a new force in American Jewish politics and as a competitor to AIPAC. The controversy over whether President Obama would attend the J-Street convention clearly signals the discomfort of the AIPAC-generation with the J-Street-generation. The President’s announced intention to attend the General Assembly of the Jewish Federations of North America in November 2009 only further dramatized the contemporary concerns of the lay and professional leadership of American Jewry in regard to Israel. The President’s change of plans—due to his need to attend the memorial for the slain soldiers of Fort Hood—brought his chief-of-staff, Rahm Emanuel, whose father is Israeli, to the podium to proclaim the administration’s support for Israel.

Finally, the increased level of coverage of Israel-Palestine news by America’s media (especially live television coverage of military confrontations in Israel and Palestine and the settlements controversy) and the carefully orchestrated international management of reactions to events in Israel by Israel’s opponents (individuals, countries, and movements) may have changed forever the landscape of emotional attachment versus alienation from Israel, although not necessarily the outcome. In summary, in 2009 the Israel distancing hypothesis is as valid a hypothesis as it was decades ago. The debate/discourse is not resolved, but rather, has been engaged on a different playing field with a revised set of players.