Abstract
The point of departure for most neuroeconomics is behavioral economics: the rational man of economics has been rejected in favor of more realistic psychological models. The old model supposes hyperrationality of individuals, and because it has been discredited, existing economic theory is useless. To complete the behavioral revolution, we need only peer into the brain and build more realistic models of decision making. As I explain here, this assessment of modern economics is hopelessly wrong.
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Acknowledgments
NSF grants SES-03-14713 and SES-08-51315 provided financial support. I am grateful to Colin Camerer, Guillame Frechette, Drew Fudenberg, Glenn Harrison, Rosemarie Nagel, Tom Palfrey, and Jie Zheng for many discussions.
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Levine, D.K. Neuroeconomics?. Int Rev Econ 58, 287–305 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0128-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0128-7