Abstract
This paper proposes a conception of mutual advantage as a motivation for cooperative behaviour. This motivation is contrasted with the ‘emotional’ reciprocity that is represented in current theories of social preferences. The paper explores parallels between mutual advantage and Humean analyses of convention and between mutual advantage and theories of team reasoning.
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Acknowledgments
This paper is based on a lecture that I gave at a ‘Workshop in Honour of Robert Sugden’ held at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Naples ‘Federico II’ in May 2010. I am very grateful to Sergio Beraldo, Luigino Bruni and everyone else who contributed to the success of this workshop. I was touched that so many of my present and former research students, and so many people with whom I have worked over the years, wanted to participate. The theme of the lecture is a conception of economic and social life as a scheme of cooperation, rather than (as it is all too often seen as) a positional competition. In choosing this topic, I wanted to express my appreciation of the ethos of cooperation, friendship and commitment to the discovery of truth that characterises the community of researchers to which I am proud to belong.
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SI: Honor of Robert Sugden.
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Sugden, R. Mutual advantage, conventions and team reasoning. Int Rev Econ 58, 9–20 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0114-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-011-0114-0