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Punishing Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not?

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More than sixty years after the seminal Nuremberg trials, different forms of transitional justice mechanisms abound around the world. Above all, the International Criminal Court started recently the hearings in its very first case. Reading the document containing the charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a militia leader accused of horrendous war crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the question of why to punish perpetrators of atrocity crimes seems almost ludicrous. However, concerns that international prosecutions inadvertently prolong or even exacerbate conflicts do require a response. Most proponents of international criminal tribunals argue that prosecutions have a deterrent effect. This article reviews the deterrence argument, highlights its inherent complexities, and proposes a refined approach to meet both the realities of atrocity crimes and international prosecutions.

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Notes

  1. For a survey of the most common criticisms, see Mennecke and Markusen 2003, pp. 297ff. Most of the current critics of the Genocide Convention, however, have not taken note of the evolving case–law of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia and how this reflects significant new interpretations of the legal definition of genocide, addressing many long-standing criticisms. In regard to these developments in the law, for example, see Schabas 2005, and Bjørnlund et al. 2005, pp. 17–48.

  2. The other main objective behind punishment, retribution, is based on the notion punitur, quia peccatum est (punishment because there has been a crime); the deterrence argument is utilitarian in its nature and characterized by the idea of punitur, ne peccetur (punishment so there will be no crime). ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 11 November 1999, paragraph 9. For further examples from the ICTY and ICTR use of deterrence, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 19 November 1996, paragraph 64; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 21 May 1999, paragraph 2; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Serushago, 5 February 1999, paragraph 20; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 2 October 1998, paragraph 19. See for the ICTY also Sayers 2003, p. 759 with further references.

  3. See, for example, the responses of UN member states to a report by the UN Secretary General outlining different options concerning the establishment of a war crimes tribunal in UN Doc. S/3175 (22 February 1993). See also Schabas, 2006, pp. 13ff.

  4. This quote stems from a speech delivered by Juan E. Mendez (2005). A similarly broad remark can be found in a report by the UN Secretary General on transitional justice (UNSG 2004b, paragraph 39).

  5. On the link between the deterrence argument and the founding of the international criminal tribunals, see for example UNSC Resolution 827, 25 May 1993, paragraphs 4–7, that speaks of establishing the ICTY to “put an end to such crimes.”

  6. A joint statement signed by the chief prosecutors of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY and Special Court for Sierra Leone on 27 November 2004 asserts that international criminal justice institutions “contribute to the prevention of future crimes” and that “a sustained commitment to accountability will deter these atrocities” (Crane et al. 2004).

  7. For a similar view of the effect of a Security Council referral to the ICC, see “Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” 2004, paragraph 90.

  8. An informal survey, conducted by the author in spring 2005, among relevant international institutions and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the ICC Outreach Office, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the ICTY Office of the Registrar, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, the International Center for Transitional Justice, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICTR and the Coalition for International Justice confirmed the assumption that there is a lack of empirical data.

  9. For a similar account, see Power (2005).

  10. For the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the exact number of perpetrators is unknown, but NGO experts monitoring local efforts to hold genocidaires accountable estimate that there are some 400,000–500,000 perpetrators. Cf. Penal Reform International 2004, pp. 12–13. Concerning the massacres committed during the Bosnian conflict at Srebrenica in July 1995, a Bosnian commission of experts published in October 2005 a list with 19,000 names of personnel implicated in the killings. See Nicholas Wood 2005.

  11. For the policy perspective, see, for example, Amnesty International 2004, and the references given supra page 6 in regards to the UN Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC (UNSC 2005, pp. 8, 10). For a more skeptical stance by an academic expert, see Akhavan 2001, pp. 10–13.

  12. For a critical account of the Ugandan government (...) see the comprehensive report. “Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda” published by Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2005b).

  13. On the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council and the related US concerns, cf. Sarooshi 2004, pp. 95–122. It is also interesting to note that the UN Security Council resolution that referred the Darfur situation to the ICC provides for a reference to this Article 16 of the ICC treaty, cf. UN Resolution, 2005, paragraph 2.

  14. The example of Sierra Leone is a case in point. Being one of the main players in the civil war in Sierra Leone, former Liberian President Charles Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but for a long while escaped justice by hiding in exile in Nigeria. His continuing influence on the political processes in countries in the region was characterized as destabilizing and dangerous. See, for example, the press release by Human Rights Watch, “UN Security Council: Ensure Justice in West Africa”, 24 May 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2005a). In March of 2006, although, he was captured and flown to Sierra Leone instead in order to be put to trial.

  15. For practical and political reasons, the ICTY’s role during the war in Bosnia remained limited. The indictment against Slobodan Milosevic, for example, was only issued late in the Kosovo war on 24 May 1999. For information on the ICC’s involvement in Darfur visit http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=darfur.

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Mennecke, M. Punishing Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not?. Hum Rights Rev 8, 319–339 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-007-0017-3

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