Abstract
Yasukuni Shrine resonates with talismanic symbolism for both its critics and proponents and that is precisely why it is so controversial within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors. Controversy over Yasukuni is rooted in the broader historical debate about war memory, responsibility, and reconciliation. Competing narratives about this past send mixed signals to neighbors and prevent reconciliation. Despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s six visits, Yasukuni is an awkward talisman and many Japanese, including conservatives, oppose these visits. The Shrine’s image has been cast and no amount of artful repackaging will obscure its indelible links with Japan’s discredited Imperial ideology and the costs it exacted. The Yasukuni dilemma involves shifting the focal point of official war remembrance away from the Shrine to a secular war memorial where people and officials can pay respect to the war dead free from political agendas and historical baggage.
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Notes
For a comprehensive rebuttal of such Pan Asian fantasies see Goto Kenichi, Tensions of Empire. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,2003). Also Paul Kratoksa (ed.), Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006).
For a thoughtful examination of this historical debate see Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. (Munich: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2005).
Japanese are less reticent about expressing nationalism for a variety of reasons, not least being the passage of time since WWII. There is a fading sense of direct responsibility for the atrocities that have tarnished nationalism in post-WWII Japan, especially among younger Japanese. In addition, nationalism in Japan is partly a response to often virulent, anti-Japanese nationalism emanating from China and South Korea that is given extensive coverage in the Japanese media. The rapid rise of China –politically, economically and militarily- coupled with Japan’s prolonged economic malaise in the 1990s has also stoked a nationalistic backlash. In addition, revisionist historians eager to instill national pride have been media-savvy and resourceful in reaching a wide audience through manga and films.
See Rebecca Clifford, Cleansing History, Cleansing Japan: Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Analects of War and Japan’s Revisionist Revival. Nissan Occasional Paper Series, 35 (2004).
Tamamoto Masaru, “How Japan Imagines China and Sees Itself” JIAA Commentary, 3 (31 May 2006). Can be accessed at: http://wdsturgeon.googlepages.com/home.
Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1994).
Gavan McCormack, “Nationalism and Identity in Post-Cold War Japan, Pacifica Review 12:3(October 2000), 247–263. Some Chinese citizens have sued for individual compensation without success. For a comprehensive assessment of forced labor claims by Chinese, comparison with similar cases in Germany and advocacy by Japanese see William Underwood, “ NHK’s Finest Hour: Japan’s Official Record of Chinese Forced Labor”, Japan Focus (2006). Also William Underwood: “Chinese Forced Labor, the Japanese Government and the Prospects for Redress”, Japan Focus (2006). William Underwood, “The Japanese Court, Mitsubishi and Corporate Resistance to Chinese Forced Labor Redress”, Japan Focus (2006). For Korean forced labor redress see William Underwood, “Names, Bones and Unpaid Wages: Seeking Redress for Korean Forced Labor”, Japan Focus (2006). All articles can be accessed at: http://japanfocus.org.
Article 9 states, ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.’
At the 2007 LDP Convention the party adopted the position that its members would continue to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Japan Times, 18 January 2007. Until the early 1990s the LDP represented a wider range of political opinions, but is now seen to be less inclusive. This may reflect the fading of the Socialist Party and the weakening of leftwing politics in general. Personal communication Andrew Horvat, Tokyo Economics University, who covered Japanese politics as a journalist from the 1970s.
Prime Minister’s Address to the Diet
June 9, 1995
1. I regard with all sincerity the fact that today the Diet has adopted this resolution, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war.
2. At this time, 50 years after the end of the war, the basic thinking of the Government is as I have made clear in statements and addresses to the Diet, and is consistent with the contents of this resolution. The Government will undertake to ensure that the essence of this resolution, which reaffirms the determination for peace while learning from the lessons of history, will be embodied in Japan’s policies.
3. I would like to take this opportunity to express my most sincere condolences to all victims in Japan and abroad, and, based on our deep remorse for the past, to reaffirm my personal conviction that we must make every possible effort to build world peace.
Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons
Learned from History
House of Representatives, National Diet of Japan
The House of Representatives resolves as follows:
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world.
Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse.
We must transcend the differences over historical views of the past war and learn humbly the lessons of history so as to build a peaceful international society.
This House expresses its resolve, under the banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way to a future that allows all human beings to live together.
Prime Minister Murayama, leader of the JSP coalition government with the LDP, used the 50th anniversary of Japan’s surrender to articulate the progressive view of the war, take unequivocal responsibility for the suffering inflicted on fellow Asians and make a sincere apology for the atrocities caused by Japanese aggression. His remarks were well received in Asia and went a long way in dispelling the ill will and negative impressions generated by the Diet’s war resolution of June, 1995.
Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
(15 August 1995)
The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.
The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe.
Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region-indeed, in the entire world-it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting:
support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.
Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future.
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.
Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished.
It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.” All documents cited from Jeff Kingston, Japan in Transformation, 1952–2000 (London: Longmans, 2001), pp.131–189.
Sven Saaler, Politics Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. (Munich: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2005).
See Phil Deans, “Higashi Ajia no nashunarizumu o meguro yasukunijinja’ [The Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian nationalisms] in Nakano Koichi (ed.) Yasukuni to mukiau [Facing up to ‘Yasukuni] (Tokyo: Mekong Publishing, 2006), pp. 15–50.
Yoshiko Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and History in Japan: Ienaga Saburo and the History Textbook Controversy, 1945–2005 (London: Routledge, 2006) and Yoshida Takashi, The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China and the United States. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
In post-Tiananmen Square China, the Communist Party sought to shore up its legitimacy by nurturing patriotic education that emphasized its role in defeating the Japanese and teaching Chinese students in gruesome detail about Japanese wartime atrocities. This nationalistic historical discourse in China had reverberations in Japan where conservatives were angered by this fanning of anti-Japanese sentiments. The emergence of a revisionist historical movement in Japan known as the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks (Atarashi Rekishi Kyokasho oTsukuru-kai) represents, inter alia, a Japanese backlash against this patriotic education in China.
Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan Times, 21 September 2006
See Takahashi Tetsuya, “The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine” (translated by Philip Seaton) http://www.japanfocus.org. Also, Columbia University’s Gerald Curtis in testimony to the US Senate in September 2005 said, “Yasukuni is not simply a shrine to honor the young men who fought and died for their country. Yasukuni honors the ideology and the policies of the government that sent these young men to war.” As quoted in Japan Times, 12 August 2006.
George Will, “ Much to-do about a shrine”, Japan Times, 22 August 2006. There was also Congressional pressure earlier in 2006 mobilized by Congressman Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) on Japan to modify the US-related exhibits.
Okazaki Hisahiko, “Seiron”, Sankei Shimbun 24 August 2006 as cited in Okazaki Hisahiko, “Change Needed at Yasukuni” Japan Times 5 September 2006.
Ibid.
According to David Pilling, the Financial Times bureau chief in Tokyo who interviewed Okazaki shortly after his article appeared, “Basically he said there was nothing wrong with the exhibits on Nanking, etc. He has subsequently said that China can’t get annoyed at what isn’t there. (i.e. things left out).” Personal Communication.
Saaler reminds us that Justice Pal may have found the defendants innocent of the charges, but, “...although questioning the legitimacy of the trial did not doubt that Japan had actually conducted a war of aggression or committed war crimes.” Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion (Munich: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2005), p. 30. For more on Justice Pal’s opinion see B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Ruter, eds., The Tokyo Judgement: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 29 April 1946–12 November 1948, 2 vols, (Amsterdam : APA University Press, 1977).
Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy. (London:Continuum, 2002), 250.
Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite, or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any religious activity.
For analysis of rightwing politics in Japan see Wakamiya Yoshibumi, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999) and Ken Ruoff, The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy 1945–1995. (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2001).
After understanding the repercussions of his official visit, PM Nakasone has consistently and publicly opposed Shrine visits by prime ministers and was an outspoken critic of PM Koizumi’s visits. This is because he thinks that the costs of the visits in terms of damaging bi-lateral relations with China make it not worth going and that the national interest must trump personal agendas. Personal communication, Gerald Curtis, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.
Premier Jiang Zemin visited Japan in 1998 and hectored his hosts about historical issues in a public and confrontational way. Given saturation media coverage of his visit many Japanese were taken aback while conservatives were furious. This event rendered history more divisive on a wider scale and soured government relations. Koizumi’s promise to visit Yasukuni on August 15 when running for the LDP presidency in 2001 may have been aimed at tapping into resentments among politicians stemming from the perception that China was holding Japan hostage to history. Koizumi’s gesture, inter alia, was aimed at showing Japan would no longer accept such tactics and carried little risk as China’s image had suffered among the Japanese public because of Jiang’s shrill denunciations. Personal communication, Andrew Horvat, Tokyo Economics University.
It is important to note that public support for and opposition to Yasukuni Shrine visits remains fluid and vacillates considerably, suggesting ambivalence among the Japanese people. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in August 2006 regarding whether the next prime minister should visit, 31% agreed and 47% opposed. See Asian opinion polls at: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/ For more on this shifting public opinion see Phil Deans, “Higashi Ajia no nashunarizumu o meguro yasukunijinja’ [The Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian nationalisms] in Nakano Koichi (ed.) Yasukuni to mukiau [Facing up to ‘Yasukuni] (Tokyo: Mekong Publishing, 2006), pp. 15–50.
Robert Whiting, Tokyo Underworld (New York, Pantheon, 1999), pp. 83–90. Whiting states that Kodama was.”...an extortionist, CIA agent, bribery artist and bag man. As far as being a gangster, technically, Kodama did not belong to any gang, to my knowledge. But, on the other hand, you could certainly say that he exercised sway over them. He used gangsters as enforcers in his Kodama Kikan in China [during the war he was a procurement officer for the Imperial Navy], he used gangsters to build that famous army to fight the leftists during the 1960 Security Treaty extension demonstrations, he organized the gangs in the Kanto-kai in 1963, for political purposes ... Among Kodama’s many gangland disciples were Inagawa Kakuji and Ishii Susumu, who referred to him as "sensei," and the man whose judgement and counsel they respected most. It’s because of Kodama, whose money helped fund the establishment of the LDP, that the LDP and the yakuza are so closely intertwined.” Personal communication.
Ironically, his son, Fukuda Yasuo, who served as Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, chaired a panel to study alternatives to paying tribute to the war dead at Yasukuni. He endorsed the panel’s recommendation in 2002 to establish a secular war memorial. Koizumi ignored this recommendation.
At a annual Imperial garden party in October 2004 when a member of the Tokyo Metropolitan School Board asked Emperor Akihito whether he agreed with the 2003 order by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government that made displaying the Hinomaru flag and singing the ‘Kimigayo” anthem compulsory in public schools, he replied that , “It is desirable not to force” teachers and students to sing “Kimigayo” standing in front of the Hinomaru. In April 2006 at a press conference he reiterated that it is a matter of individual discretion. He stated, “It is desirable that (the issue of) the national flag and anthem be considered (and judged) by each and every national.” Japan Times 26 April 2005. Teachers have been suspended and fined for not complying with this government directive.
The Yomiuri Shimbun’s Watanabe Tsuneo told David Pilling that he did not think PM Abe would visit Yasukuni and said that he had told Abe, “...if he visited Yasukuni, all he would see is a piece of paper with a list of the war dead. On the other hand, in the Chidorigafuchi national cemetery, there are bones of 350,000 war dead, (with) no Class-A war criminals. That’s the place you should go, I told him.” Financial Times, 28 December 2006.
Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan Times, 21 September 2006. Nakasone, echoing the consensus opinion in Japan and abroad, wrote that under Koizumi, Japan’s “...diplomacy towards Asian neighbors has floundered.” As noted in fn 25, since 1985 Nakasone has opposed Shrine visits because they harm the national interest of building better relations with China. Personal communication, Gerald Curtis, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.
Japan Times, 9 August 2006.
Between 1969–1973, the LDP submitted a bill to the Diet five times to transform Yasukuni Shrine into a secular organization. Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 August 2006. This effort reflects a desire to make Yasukuni an ‘acceptable’ site for the Emperor and prime ministers to visit. Secularization is a strategy for addressing constitutional constraints and sidestepping the history issue without resolving it. Significantly, this would involve tying the state to this symbolic site, making it even more contentious both at home and in the region. For other problems with secularization and Shrine visits becoming a mandatory civic duty in the pre-WWII era, see Linda Grove "1932-nen jochi daigaku yasukuni jiken" [The Sophia University ‘Yasukuni Incident’ of 1932] in Nakano Koichi (ed.) Yasukuni to mukiau [Facing up to Yasukuni] (Tokyo: Mekong, 2006) pp.341–362.
Japan Times, 12 August, 2006. Ironically, Nihon Izokukai first proposed enshrining the Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni in 1957.
Japan Times 16 August 2006.
Ienaga Saburo, Japan’s Past, Japan’s Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
Tamamoto Masaru, “ A Land without Patriots: The Yasukuni Controversy and Japanese Nationalism”, World Policy Journal (Fall 2001), 33–40. Tamamoto was at the heart of the controversy that enveloped the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in the summer of 2006 when a Sankei newspaper columnist, Komori Yoshihisa, complained that the JIAA was publishing articles on its tax-supported website blaming Japan for deteriorating relations with China. Blaming Koizumi for damaging Sino-Japanese relations was hardly a rare perspective, but his Yasukuni visits were specifically criticized by Tamamoto. In response to Komori’s article, the JIAA removed all of the articles from its website and its President, Ambassador Sato Yukio, issued a public apology. The article in question can be accessed at: http://wdsturgeon.googlepages.com/home. For discussion of this incident see David McNeill, “The Struggle for the Japanese Soul: Komori Yoshihisa, Sankei Shimbun, and the JIIA controversy”, http://japanfocus.org. Also Steven Clemons, “The Rise of Japan’s Thought Police”, Washington Post, 27 August 2006.
Its is a mater of concern to conservatives that patriotism runs tepid in Japan as only 10% of Japanese surveyed between 1989–91 expressed a willingness to fight for their country in the event of war, the lowest level in the 37 countries surveyed. The revisionists are using history as a way of nurturing national pride and cultivating a sense of patriotic duty. Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion (Munich: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2005), p.36.
For a discussion of this longstanding pattern of making apologies only to have them undone see Jane W. Yamazaki, Japanese Apologies for World War II: A Rhetorical Study. (London:Routledge, 2005).
20 July 2006 Nihon Keizai Shimbun. The Nikkei article reported that the Emperor, “...believed Yasukuni Shrine erred when it decided to include Class-A war criminals from WWII on its list of people honored there.” Emperor Showa is quoted from the ‘Tomita memo’ saying, “That’s why I have not visited the shrine... [again]. This is from my heart.” 24 July 2006. Nikkei Weekly.Emperor Showa (Hirohito) visited Yasukuni Shrine eight times after WWII but never after the Class-A war criminals were enshrined there in 1978. His son, Emperor Akihito has never visited the shrine since ascending to the Chrysanthemum Throne. Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 2006.
Emergency poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun, 22 and 23 July, 2006 as cited in August, 2006 Emergency Poll. Poll numbers are quite fluid. In this August 2006 poll, 49% agreed that it was good PM Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine while 37% opposed. Interestingly, regarding whether the next prime minister should visit, in August 31% agreed and 47% opposed. In the July 2006 poll taken right after the Emperor’s reservations were reported only 20% favored a visit to Yasukuni Shrine by the next prime minister while 60% opposed a visit. See Asian opinion polls at: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/In a Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll conducted July 21–23, 2006 28% supported the visits while 53% opposed. In the same newspaper’s poll in June, 2007 , 50% backed Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits while 37% opposed them. Only 17% of respondents in this same poll supported Prime Minister Koizumi visiting the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of the end of the war. Nikkei Weekly 31 July, 2006. A Mainichi poll in July 2006 found that 54% of respondents opposed Shrine visits by the next prime minister while 33% supported visits compared to a January, 2006 poll in which 47% supported and 47% opposed visits. 25 July 2006 China Daily.
Japan Times, 12 June, 2005.
Japan Times, 12 August, 2006.
Japan Times, 16 August 2006.
In 2006 the conservative Editor-in-Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun Watanabe Tsuneo commissioned a series of articles concerning Japan’s war responsibility. His unflinching acknowledgement of Japan’s war responsibility and criticism of wartime leaders sent shockwaves through the Establishment given his prominence, impeccable nationalist credentials and extensive influence. A critical assessment of Japan’s wartime conduct has been published by the newspaper. See James Auer (ed.), From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible? (Tokyo:Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006).
Gerald Curtis, “Japan Faces China: Confrontation or Accomodation?” unpublished ms. drawing on interviews with PM Koizumi.
Wlodzimierz Borodziej, “The German-Polish Textbook Dialogue” in Andrew Horvat and Gebhard Hielscher, eds., Sharing the Burdens of the Past: Legacies of War in Europe, America and Asia. (Tokyo: The Asia Foundation, 2003), pp. 35–38.
Jean-Claude Allain, “The German-French Dialogue about History School Textbooks”, in Andrew Horvat and Gebhard Hielscher, eds., Sharing the Burdens of the Past: Legacies of War in Europe, America and Asia. (Tokyo: The Asia Foundation), 2003. pp. 21–26.
See Andrew Horvat, "Overcoming the Negative Legacy of the Past: Why Europe is a Positive Example for East Asia." in The Brown Journal of World Affairs, XI:1(Summer/Fall 2004), 137–148.
The prospects of the two sides reaching consensus appear remote as the Japanese modern history group is dominated by scholars who favor a revisionist history while the Chinese side is made up of government employed scholars who will find it difficult not to tow the official line. There also seems to be a lack of political will and flexibility on both sides. Personal communication from reconciliation specialist Andrew Horvat, Tokyo Economics University.
Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) makes this point in the Japan Times, 21 September 2006.
The deliberate scuttling of goodwill through bogen (undue remarks) is discussed by Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. (Munich: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2005). p. 70–80.
For 2001 market share, ibid., p. 66. For 2005 market share Japan Times, 2 September 2005. For analysis of the Tsukurukai see Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to ‘Correct’ History” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds.) Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk, NY: East Gate, 2000) pp. 53–73.
There may be a case for diminishing returns on holding Japan’s feet to the fire of history. Japanese officials see this as a shakedown and question large outlays that are not contributing to improved ties. Since Premier Jiang’s 1998 ‘historic” visit, relations grew frostier while Japan downsized its ODA programs and lending for development projects. Thus, using history in diplomacy may be backfiring on China, leading to funding cuts and, more importantly, weakening the pro-China constituency in Japan.
Korean President Kim Dae Jung developed warm ties with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo (1998–2000) and received a signed statement of apology in 1998, thus provoking Premier Jiang’s ire when he was not offered a similar deal when he visited. However, the Korean-Japan honeymoon is over and faces the ongoing politicization of resentments over history that animate contemporary politics in South Korea. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun is well known for exploiting anti-Japanese popular sentiments for political gain.
Jeff Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 246–47.
Wakamiya Yoshibumi, “Jounalism is not an instrument of nationalism”, Asahi Shimbun/International Herald Tribune, 13–14 January 2007.
There is controversy about whether the anti-Japanese demonstrations were orchestrated. According to Howard French, Shanghai Bureau Chief for the New York Times, quiet encouragement and complicity may be a better way to describe what happened. It was more a case of what the government did not do that facilitated the public protests. Given extensive presence of government security agents on university campuses and policing of the Internet, the plans were surely well known. Non-intervention in a tightly regulated society was the equivalent of a green light. The well-organized transport of the students to the protest sites and a passive security presence suggest that the street protests were accommodated and managed when they could have been thwarted. The subsequent containment of the protests is further suggestive about the government’s ability to influence events. The belated crackdown can also be seen to reflect the government’s fear that emboldened students venting against the Japanese could next turn on the Chinese Communist Party. Party leaders are rightly concerned that popular resentments against the CCP are smoldering and a source of risk. More remotely, the protests can be seen as the fruits of the government’s patriotic education policy introduced in the 1990s that fanned anti-Japanese sentiments among young Chinese. The CCP was in a tight spot, running the risk of not demonstrating sufficient patriotism by quelling the mass campaign, but also feared damaging vital economic relations with Japan. Personal communication.
Ian Buruma, “Commentary” in Andrew Horvat and Gebhard Hielscher, eds., Sharing the Burdens of the Past: Legacies of War in Europe, America and Asia. (Tokyo: The Asia Foundation), 2003. p. 140.
Togo Kazuhiko “"A Moratorium on Yasukuni Visits," Far Eastern Economic Review 169:5(June 2006), 5–15.
China may have learned a lesson from the face-off with Koizumi over the Shrine. Engaging in a public confrontation is counter-productive and plays into the hands of advocates of visits and the Shrine’s view on history. Stoking controversy lends legitimacy to Yasukuni and pushes it into the center stage while giving the revisionists a soapbox and provoking a defensive backlash. Japanese who oppose visits may also resent the Chinese government’s intervention.
Christian Caryl, Newsweek Bureau Chief in Tokyo wrote,“...German ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt, invited to give a lecture in Tokyo last month, treated his hosts to an exercise in bluntness. He accused the Japanese of soft-pedaling their country’s responsibility for its wartime past–and came to a devastating conclusion: ‘Sadly, the Japanese nation doesn’t have too many genuine friends in the world outside.’ It was a syndrome he blamed on ‘the ambiguity of the Japanese public when it comes to acknowledging the conquests, the start of the Pacific war and the crimes of the past history.’ " 21 October 2005. p. 5. The speech was given in September, 2005.
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Kingston, J. Awkward Talisman: War Memory, Reconciliation and Yasukuni. East Asia 24, 295–318 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-007-9020-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-007-9020-1