Abstract
Harry Frankfurt Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–39 (1969) famously attacked what he called the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). PAP states that being able to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. He gave counterexamples to PAP known since then as “Frankfurt cases.” This paper sidesteps the enormous literature on Frankfurt cases while preserving some of our salient pretheoretical intuitions about the relation between alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. In particular, I introduce, explain, and defend a principle that has so far been overlooked, namely, “the principle of doxastic moral asymmetry” (PODMA): a rational agent, S, is morally responsible for an action that S performed, E, only if, when S did E, S justifiably believed either that E was closer to S’s most praiseworthy alternate possibility than it was to S’s most blameworthy alternate possibility, or that E was closer to S’s most blameworthy alternate possibility than it was to S’s most praiseworthy alternate possibility.
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Notes
Throughout this paper, I will take moral responsibility to refer to a relation between a rational agent, S, and an action done by S, namely, E, such that S deserves praise or blame for E. While this characterization is standard, in Sect. 4, I will say more about responsibility more generally. I’ll also emphasize a distinction between mere responsibility and moral responsibility.
The locution “enormous amount” is not an exaggeration. Fischer (2010) gives a nice overview of the competing positions and how they have been motivated and supported. See also Cain (2014), Cohen (2016), Cohen and Handfield (2007), Cova (2014), Davidson (1980), Di Nucci (2009), (2010a), (2010b), and (2011), Elzein (2013), Fischer (2000), (2006), (2013), Ginet (1996, 2002), Goetz (2005), Harrison (2006), Hunt and Shabo (2013), Janzen (2013, 2016), Kane (1985) and Kane (1996), Levy and McKenna (2009), Levy (2014), McKenna (1997), Mele and Robb (1998), Otsuka (1998), Palmer (2011, 2014), Pereboom (2001, 2009), Robinson (2014), Steward (2006), Widerker (1995), Widerker and Goetz (2013), Wyma (1997), and Young (2016). So in presenting and motivating a principle that appropriately restricts moral responsibility while avoiding any threat from Frankfurt cases, I hope to be sidestepping an intimidatingly complex and byzantine discussion.
Note that the relation between PAP and PODMA is not superficial. It is not merely the case that both principles concern the relation between alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. It is also the case, as will become much clearer throughout the remainder of the paper, that both principles preserve our salient pretheoretical intuitions in ordinary cases. In my view, PODMA preserves more of them.
I say “action” and the examples I will discuss in this paper will all be external actions, and in particular, external actions that affect other people in some way. Perhaps PODMA could also apply to things such as emotions. This will not be part of my focus here, since (a) I have more than enough ground to cover for now and (b) external actions seem to be the most natural candidates for ascriptions of moral responsibility.
If we do live in a deterministic universe (about which, again, this paper is neutral), such that none of us has alternate possibilities, one might think that it dubious to presuppose that we can have justified beliefs. One might reject the presupposition that one can have a justified belief that there are various alternate possibilities for most of our actions. But it seems to me that this criticism does not give nearly enough importance to two basic and extraordinarily common intuitions: first, it seems that we can often do otherwise, that is, it seems that we usually have alternate possibilities, and second, a rational agent’s being convinced that she can do otherwise seems to be deeply connected to her being praiseworthy or blameworthy, by ordinary standards, for what she does. When I use the term justified, I intend it to be understood it in the context of intuitions such as those two. I do not mean to presuppose that our justified beliefs are in fact justified, requiring that determinism is false and that there are in fact often alternate possibilities. I have in mind justification springing from a rational agent’s assessment of ordinary appearances.
By “when S did E,” I mean that at t1, before S did E, S justifiably believed whatever S believed about E, and then at t2, S did E still with that belief and based on that belief.
For a much fuller treatment of what constitutes a robust alternate possibility, see Pereboom (2014, pp 12–14).
There is perhaps a sense of “S justifiably believes that p” on which it might also be the case that S has some justification for believing that it is not the case that p. I might have some justification for believing that, instead of reading, my most praiseworthy alternate possibility was washing the dishes. But I might also have some justification for believing that my most praiseworthy alternate possibility was not washing the dishes but, instead, sweeping the floor. But in PODMA I take it that: “When S did E1 S justifiably believed that E2 was S’s most praiseworthy alternate possibility and that E3 was S’s most blameworthy alternate possibility” if S had better reasons for believing that this was the case than for believing that something else was the case (such as believing that E4 was S’s most praiseworthy alternate possibility and/or that E5 was S’s most blameworthy alternate possibility). Similarly, it is the case that S justifiably believes that G1 > G2 if when S did E S had more justification for believing that G1 > G2 than S had for believing that G1 = G2 or that G2 > G1. And mutatis mutandis for S believing that G2 > G1, and for S believing that G1 = G2.
One arguably natural expansion of my proposal might run as follows: [C] All else equal, the degree to which G2 > G1 tracks the degree to which S might be praiseworthy for E (I say “might be” since PODMA is not sufficient for moral responsibility, but S would in such cases have at least satisfied a necessary condition for that degree of praiseworthiness). And, all else equal, the degree to which G1 > G2 tracks the degree to which S might be blameworthy for E. But I mention this possible expansion only to gesture at potentially useful ways to build on PODMA as it is presented in this paper. For the purposes of this paper, I will confine my attention to PODMA as solely necessary but not sufficient for moral responsibility as stated in [A] and [B].
There is probably no one who has made this point with more impact than P. F. Strawson (1962). Strawson heavily criticized other academic approaches to moral responsibility on the grounds that they sought objective and context-independent conditions for moral responsibility without giving enough importance to potentially vital factors such as reactive attitudes, personal relationships, and expectations for good will within specific contexts. On the one hand, I think that PODMA is a fairly context-aware and intentionality-sensitive contribution to our understanding and mapping of moral responsibility. So I think that my proposal shares some significant common ground with Strawson’s. But on the other hand, PODMA is in a straightforward sense an independent and objective condition and requirement for moral responsibility. For evidence of the impact of Strawson’s proposal, see for example that Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and McKenna (2012) argue for different versions of Strawson’s proposal.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Acta Analytica for raising this part of the objection.
Another rational agent might think that because donating is supererogatory, donating is especially praiseworthy—S does something praiseworthy that is not even morally required. If that is right, the rational agent who does not donate (and has all of the relevant justified beliefs about the situation) does satisfy PODMA. And so, presumably, S satisfies PODMA’s necessary condition for being morally blameworthy for not donating, given that G1 is greater than G2.
Sorensen (1988, 2001) and Williamson (1994, 2000) argue that there is some such number, and that there are similarly sharp transitions for other predicates in natural language, but that we cannot know exactly what that number is. Vagueness on their account is limited to the epistemic domain rather than extending into the metaphysical domain. There are several well known positions which contradict Sorensen and Williamson’s position, such as the many-valued approach taken by, e.g., Field (2003), context-dependence-oriented approaches as seen in, e.g., Stanley (2003). Rather radically, Bertrand Russell (1923) argued that all of natural language is vague. Vagueness is a technical problem that affects much of ordinary language, rather than a special problem for a clause in PODMA.
I wish to remain as neutral as possible here on competing accounts of epistemic justification, the role of evidence, the nature of belief, doxastic norms, and to what extent belief is in our control. I am not presupposing that evidence is the only important factor in belief formation, but it does seem to me that it is one of the most important factors. Even strong reliabilists (who hold that truth conduciveness of the belief-forming process is what determines whether the resulting belief is justified or unjustified, e.g., Bonjour (1985, Sect. 3) and Goldman (1986, pp. 109–112) acknowledge that evidence ought to play some non-trivial role in epistemic justification in some cases. For example, an agent might have formed a justified belief through a reliable process but evidence appears afterwards that suggests that the agent’s reliably justified belief is false.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Acta Analytica for raising objection 6.
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Patrick Bondy, Chris Heathwood, Bob Pasnau, Alastair Norcross, Rob Rupert, Adam Woodcox, and an anonymous reviewer for Acta Analytica. Thanks also to Mark Johnstone for helpful advice.
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Coren, D.A. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry. Acta Anal 33, 145–159 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0330-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0330-7