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Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind

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Abstract

The emergence of the Cognitive Sciences, in the middle of the 20th Century, was initially based on an abstract model of the mind: the computer metaphor. The human mind was understood in analogy to the digital computer, as a rule-based, symbol processor. As a consequence, the human being was envisioned as logically–rationally guided, radically disembodied and isolated from culture. Over the last few decades, several disciplines, such as Biology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, have begun to address the study of intentionality, intersubjectivity and natural cognition. Searching for a better understanding of these complex issues, a number of approaches have been developed with the promise of capturing the specific qualities of human cognition, radically omitted from a computationalist view of mind. Nevertheless, since these research programs are rather recent, concrete methodological designs and empirical approaches in the form of experimentally testable hypotheses are still scarce. This special issue brings together several perspectives in order to propose alternative research approaches in the topics of Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind. We believe it is necessary to discuss and advance towards explicit empirical frames in the form of actual experiments, specific predictions and formal models. The essays presented here constitute an attempt to move in this direction, with the specific aim of reconsidering the study of some forgotten properties of brain and mind.

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Notes

  1. It is important to emphasize that the notion of classic computation does not need to be exhaustive of what is a valid computational process. In other words, perhaps a biological system is a better computer than the best computer in existence. However, it still is one, only under a different paradigm of what we understand as computation (e.g.: Gabriel and Goldman 2006). See also Cosmelli et al. (2008).

  2. It is important to emphasize that although a certain temporary sequence exists between classic computationalism and the alternative approaches of cognition, there are simultaneous antecedents often interwoven throughout both perspectives (Ibáñez 2007a, b).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Neuroscience Laboratory, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 275, Santiago, Chile

    Agustín Ibáñez

  2. Department of Gerontopsychiatry, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

    Agustín Ibáñez

  3. Centro de Estudios Neurobiológicos, P. Universidad Católica de Chile, Marcoleta 391 Segundo Piso, Santiago, Chile

    Diego Cosmelli

  4. Escuela de Psicologia, P. Universidad Catolica de Chile, Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile

    Diego Cosmelli

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  1. Agustín Ibáñez
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  2. Diego Cosmelli
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Correspondence to Agustín Ibáñez.

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Ibáñez, A., Cosmelli, D. Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind. Integr. psych. behav. 42, 129–136 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-007-9045-4

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