Abstract
Using data from a Spanish register on work-related accidents, this paper analyses the effect of contract types on two consequences of accidents: the probability of suffering a serious/fatal accident and the number of working days lost after an accident has happened. The focus is on the difference among temporary workers hired through temporary help agencies, direct temporary workers and open-ended workers. We find that workers hired through temporary help agencies are less likely to suffer serious/fatal accidents and the durations of their absences are shorter when they do, compared with workers holding either open-ended contracts or direct temporary contracts once personal, job and accident characteristics are controlled for.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
OECD (2002), using data for 12 European countries, reports that temporary workers receive less on-the-job training than their permanent counterparts. For Spain, Albert et al. (2005) find that workers with temporary contracts not only are less likely to be employed in training firms but, once they are in those firms, they also exhibit a lower probability of being chosen to participate in firm-provided training activities. Moreover, García-Serrano (2004) documents that temporary workers (especially the ones with shorter job tenure) tend to occupy jobs with poorer working conditions.
In the Spanish case, the worker must have made social contributions for at least 12 months in the previous 6 years to be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
In general, the empirical evidence suggests that temporary employment is insignificant in explaining accident rates when personal and job characteristics are taken into account. The exception is Guadalupe (2003), who finds a positive effect of temporary contracts on the probability of suffering a work accident, using aggregate data from administrative statistics for Spain.
There is a strand of the literature that analyses the screening and training of temporary workers by THAs and the success of these workers in the probability of being hired on a permanent basis. Their findings are contradictory regarding the effects of THAs. Some studies for a variety of countries are the following: Abraham (1990), Melchionno (1999), Houseman (2001), Ichino et al. (2004), Autor and Houseman (2005), García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005), and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008).
THA contracting has become a growing area, accounting for almost 16% of the total number of temporary contracts in Spain, where about 90% of all newly registered employment contracts are temporary and the proportion of temporary employment is the highest in Europe (more than 30% of total wage and salary workers since the early 1990s).
The limited evidence we have on that for the Spanish case comes from a survey on THAs (Muñoz-Bullón 2004). According to this survey, nearly 80% of THAs provided their temporary employees with training suited to specific client firms and over half of them implemented safety and health programmes for their workers.
There are various types of temporary work contracts: casual contract, per-task contract, training contract, work experience (practice) contract, and interim contract. For a description, see Toharia and Malo (2000).
Although the individual files allow one to make the aforementioned distinction, official statistics only publish the number of work-related accidents disaggregating between workers holding open-ended contracts and temporary contracts. Calculating conventional rates of incidence by contract types requires the use of another data set. In particular, one can use the Labour Force Survey to get information on the number of wage and salary workers broken down by contract types (this would comprise the population at risk of suffering an accident). The results show that accident rates are higher for temporary workers relative to permanent workers, although the difference has declined over time: accident rates fell from 96 per thousand in 2004 to 72 per thousand in 2008 for the former, while they have remained fairly stable around 40 per thousand for the latter.
Regarding the types of injuries (not reported in the table since there are many categories), the large majority of work-related accidents suffered by the three groups of workers can be classified in two categories: ‘superficial wounds and injuries’ and ‘dislocations and sprains.’ The share of the first category is larger among temporary agency workers than among other workers (in particular, than among workers with an open-ended contract), whereas the importance of the second category is similar (although a bit lower compared again to workers holding open-ended contracts). At the same time, temporary workers employed through THAs are less prone to suffering ‘physical trauma, multiple injuries or heart attack.’
Descriptives on other personal, accident, job and establishment attributes are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
Model (3) on the duration of absences also includes the degree of injury as a control variable.
Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that the parameter reflecting unobserved heterogeneity is zero for all estimated regressions, given support for the estimation of negative binomial models instead of Poisson models.
Likelihood ratio tests provide evidence of overdispersion, favouring the zero-truncated binomial model against the zero-truncated Poisson model.
References
Abraham K (1990) Restructuring the employment relationship: the growth of market mediated work arrangements. In: Abraham K, McKersie R (eds) New developments in the labor market: a new institutional paradigm. MIT, Cambridge, pp 85–119
Albert C, García-Serrano C, Hernanz V (2005) Firm-provided training and temporary contracts. SpanEconRev 7(1):67–88
Amuedo-Dorantes C (2002) Work safety in the context of temporary employment: the Spanish experience. Ind Labor Relat Rev 55(2):262–272
Amuedo-Dorantes C, Malo MA, Muñoz-Bullón F (2008) The role of temporary help agencies in facilitating temp-to-perm transitions. J Labor Res 29(2):133–161
Autor DH, Houseman SN (2005) Do temporary help jobs improve labour market outcomes for low-skilled workers? Evidence from random assignments, Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper No. 05-124
Barone A, Vinci C (2001) Accidents at work and human capital, C. P. Working Papers, Univesita degli Studi di Napoli, Istituto di Studi Economici
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK (1998) Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge University Press, New York
Dupré D (2001) Accidents at work in the EU 1998–1999, statistics in focus. Eurostat, Luxemburg
European Industrial Relations Review (1995) The deregulation of the Spanish Labour Market 262: 28–30
García-Pérez JI, Muñoz-Bullón F (2005) Temporary help agencies and occupational mobility. Oxford Bull Econ Stat 67(2):163–180
García-Serrano C (2004) Temporary employment, working conditions, and expected exits from firms. Lab Rev Lab Econ Ind Relat 18(2):293–316
Graham J, Shakow DM (1990) Labor market segmentation and job-related risks. Am J Econ Sociol 49:307–324
Guadalupe M (2003) The hidden costs of fixed term contracts: the impact on work accidents. Labour Econ 10:338–358
Hernanz V, Toharia L (2006) Do temporary contracts increase work accidents? A microeconometric comparison between Italy and Spain. Lab Rev Lab Econ Ind Relat 20(3):475–504
Houseman SN (2001) Why employers use flexible staffing arrangements: evidence from an establishment survey. Ind Labor Relat Rev 55:149–170
Ichino A, Mealli F, Nannicini T (2004) Temporary work agencies in Italy: a springboard toward permanent employment? Paper presented at the 2004 CEA Annual Meeting, Florence
Jimeno JF, Toharia L (1996) Effort, absenteeism and fixed-term contracts. Rev Esp Econ 13(1):105–119
Levitt SD, Porter J (2001) Sample selection in the estimation of air bag and seat belt effectiveness. Rev Econ Stat 83(4):603–615
Long JS, Freese J (2006) Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata, 2nd edn. College Station
Melchionno R (1999) The changing temporary work force: managerial, professional, and technical workers in the personnel supply services industry. Occupational Look Quarterly 43:24–32
Muñoz-Bullón F (2004) Training provision and regulation: an analysis of the termporary help industry. Int J Manpow 25(7):656–682
OECD (2002) Employment outlook. OECD, Paris
Paoli P, Merlé P (2001) Third European survey on working conditions, 2000. Office for Official Publications of European Commission, Luxembourg
Toharia L, Malo MA (2000) The Spanish experiment: pros and cons of the flexibility at the margin. In: Esping-Andersen G, Regini M (eds) Why deregulate labour markets. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 307–335
Winklemann R, Zimmermann KF (1995) Recent developments in count data modelling: theory and application. J Econ Surv 9(1):1–24
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
García-Serrano, C., Hernanz, V. & Toharia, L. Mind the Gap, Please! The Effect of Temporary Help Agencies on the Consequences of Work Accidents. J Labor Res 31, 162–182 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-010-9085-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-010-9085-2