Abstract
This paper presents a case study of phishing in Amsterdam, demonstrating that the current literature on criminal phishing networks provides an incomplete picture of this form of organized crime. The paper adds to the current literature by describing an organized group of phishers whose relationships are based on real-world social networks rather than internet forums, and who mainly use social engineering rather than malware as a tool to acquire information from their victims. Because the origin and growth of the Amsterdam network differ from those of groups previously described, other possibilities for situational crime prevention arise. In addition to technological measures, for example those aimed at forums, this article focuses on measures that target the social ties on which the networks are based.
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Notes
In this police investigation twenty money mules were interrogated and suspected to be part of the network. However, during the investigation many more were discovered. According to the respondents, during the criminal investigation period alone, at least 50–60 mules were used; however, it was simply too costly in terms of time to involve all of them in the investigation. The aim of the investigation was to identify and prosecute the core members of the group, not to prosecute all of the accomplices.
Using false identity papers, criminals are able to open new bank accounts (private or business), apply for internet bank accounts, or make changes to the account details of a client. The documents can also be used for other purposes. According to police respondents, they can be used, for example, for fraudulent telephone contracts and car rental. Whether the group actually did this is not known. The criminal investigation did not focus on the identity of the forger or on the specific activities that could be committed using false identities. However, it appears from the phone-tapped conversations that the group did purchase a number of fake identities from this facilitator.
Soudijn and Zegers (2012) described four stages: preparation, theft, transferring money and cash withdrawal. As the last two stages are so interconnected in our case, they are combined into one phase in this article.
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Leukfeldt, E.R. Cybercrime and social ties. Trends Organ Crim 17, 231–249 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-014-9229-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-014-9229-5