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Democracy and Development in a Globalized World: Thinking About Latin America from Within

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Abstract

The choice among paths that countries should follow has been a staple of political debates in Latin America and, over the past 40 years, Fernando Cardoso has brought his analysis to bear on these debates. This article summarizes and then assesses Cardoso’s argument about the choice of paths faced by Latin American countries, the consequences for democracy and development of following different paths, and the political position that is supported by this analysis of choices and their consequences. Though Cardoso explicitly supports the path of globalized social democracy over an anti-globalization option in the current period, I suggest that the current state of knowledge does not offer unequivocal support for the argument that choosing to follow the path of globalized social democracy—or that of anti-globalization—is the best political option for all countries in Latin America. Different countries might very well be doing what is best for them, given their circumstances, by following different paths.

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Notes

  1. Though the first Spanish version was published in 1969, in the rest of this text, I will refer to the 1979 English version. The English version of this book contains, among other things, a new preface and a postscript that had been published earlier as a journal article in Spanish in 1977 (Cardoso and Faletto 1977 ).

  2. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, oral comments, Brown University, April 4, 2008.

  3. For a flavor of this debate, see the exchanges between Cardoso and both Weffort and Marini in Cardoso ( 1972 ) and Weffort ( 1972 ), and in Serra and Cardoso ( 1978 ) and Marini ( 1978 ).

  4. The distinction between rule makers, rule takers, and rule breakers is drawn from Krasner ( 1977 ): 636).

  5. According to Cardoso, Brazil stands alone within Latin America on one dimension. The current lack on national control over the economy and the potential political challenges to the global economy are seen by Cardoso as opening the possibility for Brazil—a member, along with Russia, India, and China, of the so-called BRICs—to become a player in the decisions regarding the very rules of the global economy (Cardoso 2008 : 8–9, 26).

  6. Cardoso ( 2008 : 13, 16, 21) dismisses the applicability of the label “Washington Consensus agenda” and only uses the label “neoliberal” to refer to the economic reforms carried out in Chile under Pinochet and in Argentina under Menem.

  7. This appraisal contrasts with that of those who characterize the evolution of Cardoso’s political thinking, as he moved from sociology to politics, as the trading in of a leftist position for a neoliberal one.

  8. On the value of democratic processes, see Dahl ( 1989 ): Chap. 12).

  9. The proposed conceptualization of democracy is a procedural one, which introduces a limit on democratic power only in the self-referential instance of the reproduction of the democratic process. That is, the only outcome of the democratic process that is off-limits for elected authorities is the abolishment or erosion of the democratic process (Munck 2009 : 125). Thus, features such as judicial review and mechanisms meant to guarantee substantive rights by placing certain decisions beyond the control of elected authorities, though commonly included in definitions of hybrid versions of democracy—for example, liberal democracy and constitutional democracy—are excluded from this definition.

  10. For reasons of space, the analysis focuses only on recent cases and does not address the political experience of countries during the bulk of the twentieth century.

  11. The key ways in which the 1980 Constitution curtailed the power of elected authorities was by not allowing them to remove the top leadership of the military and by giving the military-influenced National Security Council the power to admonish top government leaders and institutions, including Congress and the President, on any matter deemed relevant to the country’s security.

  12. The way in which the constitution was reformed accounts for one important limitation, its failure to address the much-debated electoral rules. On the failure of Chile to have a constitutional moment and the restrictions that are associated with this failure, see Garretón (2007).

  13. Under the new constitution, the President has the power to dismiss the heads of the armed forces and Carabineros (the national police force), and the National Security Council is a body that only provides advice to the President and can be summoned only by the President, the President of the Senate, or the President of the Supreme Court.

  14. Initially, according to Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution, decrees ( medidas provisórias com força de lei (MPVs)) had immediate legal effect and, though decrees would expire after 30 days if Congress did not convert them into law, they could be reissued indefinitely. Subsequently, according to the 2001 Constitutional Amendment No. 32, decrees were valid for 60 days, but could be reissued only once. However, though during Cardoso’s first term (1995–1998) 160 MPVs were issued (an average of 3.3 per month) and during Cardoso’s second term, prior to the 2001 reform (1999 to 10 September 2001), 103 MPVs were issued (an average of 3.2 per month); during Cardoso’s second term, after the 2001 reform (11 September 2001–2002) 102 MPVs were issued (an average of 6.5 per month), and during Lula first 5 years in office (2003–2007) 310 MPVs were issued (an average of 5.2 per month; Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008 ; and author’s calculations based on data from Presidência da República Federativa do Brasil, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos 2008 ).

  15. Also, unlike Lagos in Chile, President Cardoso successfully pushed for an amendment of the constitution in 1997, which allowed for his immediate reelection.

  16. Compare the positive assessment of Hunter ( 1997 ) to the more critical view of Zaverucha ( 1994 , 2000 ).

  17. The military exercised a significant degree of political power in Brazil during the Sarney government (1985–1990). Thereafter, important landmarks in the increased assertion of civilian control of the military include Fernando Collor de Mello’s decision to close down the National Information Service ( Serviço Nacional de Informações ) and the National Security Council, two agencies fundamental to the exercise of military tutelage over civilian political power, and Cardoso’s creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999.

  18. The first act of the government that briefly replaced the government led by Chávez was the abolishment of the constitution and the dissolution of the elected National Assembly and the Supreme Court.

  19. Another act of the government that affected Venezuela’s level of electoral democracy was its decision not to renew the license of the TV station RCTV in May 2007. The grounds offered for this decision that RCTV had backed the failed coup against him in 2002 is accurate. But Chávez himself had staged a failed coup attempt in 1992. Thus, this government decision is generally seen as a restriction on the freedom of the press, an important condition for democratic elections.

  20. During these three periods, Chávez passed 50, 51, and 63 decree-laws, respectively, on a broad range of economic, financial, and social issues. The powers enabling Chávez to rule by decree for 18 months starting in early 2007 were broader than had been the case previously. For the first time in Venezuelan history, the President was given the power to rewrite organic laws, that is, laws of constitutional rank that generally would take a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to change.

  21. The opposition in Venezuela must share some responsibility for this negative trend, especially through its decision to boycott the 2005 parliamentary elections.

  22. Assessments of Cuba under Castro have also considered whether Cuba did actually break with dependency or, rather, traded dependence on the USA for dependence on the Soviet Union. For a comparison of Cuba and Brazil along these lines, which puts Brazil in a positive light, see Packenham ( 1992 ): Chaps. 6 and 7).

  23. Given that this conclusion is derived from an analysis of very few cases, this statement should be treated as quite tentative. Moreover, a key test of these alternative political models is how they weather the challenge triggered by the financial crisis in the USA in 2008.

  24. For more extensive discussions of Latin America’s elusive quest for growth with equity, see Ocampo ( 2004 ) and Ffrench-Davis and Machinea ( 2007 ).

  25. Periods of reform that led to gains in equity in the past, as was the case in Mexico following its revolution, Argentina during Juan Perón’s first two administrations and Cuba under Fidel Castro were also associated with similar trends, with the difference that the concentration of power in those cases was a feature of a generally less democratic overall context.

  26. Calculated on the basis of data from Table 1 and World Bank ( 2007 ).

  27. For complementary views on the “two lefts” in current Latin America, see Petkoff ( 2005 ) and Castañeda ( 2006 ).

  28. For a broader effort at elaborating and justifying what Cardoso labels the “globalized social democracy” option, see the joint work of the Institute Fernando Henrique Cardoso (iFHC) and the Corporación de Estudios para Latinoamerica (Cieplan) on social cohesion and a new economic and social agenda for Latin America. The materials at available at: www.plataformademocratica.org .

  29. For a critical look at efforts to transfer especially US models to Latin America and elsewhere, see Gardner ( 1980 ), Dezalay and Garth ( 2002 ), and Kennedy ( 2004 ).

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  1. School of International Relations, University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles, CA, USA

    Gerardo L. Munck

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Correspondence to Gerardo L. Munck.

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In preparing this article, I benefited from comments by Mariano Bertucci, Patrick Heller, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Richard Snyder, and two anonymous reviewers.

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Munck, G.L. Democracy and Development in a Globalized World: Thinking About Latin America from Within. St Comp Int Dev 44, 337–358 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9047-y

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