Abstract
Strong reciprocity is an effective way to promote cooperation. This is especially true when one not only cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors (second-party punishment) but even punishes those who defect on others (third-party, “altruistic” punishment). Some suggest we humans have a taste for such altruistic punishment and that this was important in the evolution of human cooperation. To assess this we need to look across a wide range of cultures. As part of a cross-cultural project, I played three experimental economics games with the Hadza, who are hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. The Hadza frequently engaged in second-party punishment but they rarely engaged in third-party punishment. Other small-scale societies engaged in less third-party punishment as well. I suggest third-party punishment only became more important in large, complex societies to solve more pressing collective-action problems.
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Notes
The most P3 can sacrifice is 1/5 of his or her winnings in the TPPG whereas P2 in the UG can theoretically sacrifice any amount from 10% to 100% or, realistically, 4/5 of the total stakes. Thus, second-party punishment can be more costly than third-party punishment in these games. In Tanzania the stakes were 2,000 shillings, so P3 got 1,000 shillings (5 coins). He or she has to choose whether to keep all 5 coins or give me one (200 shillings) to take away 3 (600 shillings) from P1.
People were told they would play games for real money and that, in addition, they would receive a show-up fee, regardless of outcome. All three games involved real money, which the players received in private after the games were finished. I alone gave instructions and played with each player individually in a Land Rover. While waiting to play, people were kept in one area of the camp, and when they finished playing they were sent to another area so they could not influence those waiting to play.
All 62 people played in the same role (either P1 or P2) in the DG and UG. Among those, thirteen P1s in the DG and UG were also P1s in the TPPG and sixteen P2s in the DG and UG were also P2s in the TPPG (one P1 was a P3 in the TPPG and one P2 was a P3 in the TPPG).
P2s rejected low offers more in 2002, perhaps because (unlike in 1998) the strategy method was used; the Hadza just seemed more willing to reject the range of possible, but fictional, offers in 2002 than the one real offer they were presented in 1998 (24% of offers were rejected in 1998, although the mean offer in 1998 UG was higher—33%—and the modal offer was 20%).
Hadza third-party punishment is probably overestimated here. Although I explained the possible outcomes according to our standard protocol, it was difficult for many P3s to see why they should ever want to return 20% of their endowment to me (1 of their 5 coins). When they asked me why they would do so, I simply explained the game again, following our protocol. I did not want to bias them by saying, “You might want to punish P1 because he/she is being stingy, a bad person, and not nice to P2.” Several P3s in the first two days hoped they might end up getting more money if they gave me back some, as if their decision were some sort of gamble. I therefore began to make absolutely sure they understood they would not see any of the money they gave back to me. I began to do this by the end of the second day I played with P3s, and from then on not a single person of the 14 remaining players chose to punish when in the role of P3. Of the 12 P3s who played on the first two days, 5 did not punish offers of zero, but 7 did choose to punish (Table 2). These 7 very likely did not grasp that they would simply be giving up 20% of their endowment for good. Thus, zero might be a truer reflection of Hadza TPPG MAO.
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Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Mathew Firestone and Msa Sapo for assistance in running the games. I also wish to thank COSTECH for permission to conduct research in Tanzania, as well as Professor Audax Mabulla, University of Dar es Salaam, for assistance, and the National Science Foundation for funding (grants 0136761 and 0242455). Finally, I am always grateful to the Hadza for their generous hospitality and tolerance.
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Marlowe, F.W. Hadza Cooperation. Hum Nat 20, 417–430 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-009-9072-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-009-9072-6