Abstract
Emile Durkheim may be best known as a structuralist and an empiricist of a distinctively quantitative sort, but a comparatively neglected set of lectures on pragmatism presented by Durkheim just prior to his death suggests that this characterization is only partially justified. Interestingly, whereas Durkheim is critical of pragmatism in some very consequential respects, he not only uses pragmatism to indicate the major shortcomings of rationalist and empiricist approaches to the study of human group life but he also builds on pragmatism as an instructive resource in developing his own thoughts on human knowing and acting. These lectures may help scholars appreciate some of the more enduring tensions in Durkheim’s scholarship, but they also reveal some of the inadequacies of contemporary “sociological theory” with respect to both depictions of the scholarship of Emile Durkheim and the more fundamental study of human knowing and acting.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Although Durkheim does not draw any connections between American pragmatism and its European predecessors (back to the classical Greek era; see Prus 2003, 2004, 2007a) in this set of lectures, it is apparent that that Durkheim (1887) had acquired some base-line familiarity with classical pragmatist (vs. structuralist) thought through his exposure to Wilhelm Wundt’s Ethics (also see Jones, 2002) As well as in developing his own (1904–05) The Evolution of Educational Thought.
Likewise, whereas Durkheim had published an earlier, severe commentary on Georg Simmel’s sociology in 1903 (Durkheim, 1985–1908 [1982: 188–195]), the conception of society that Durkheim presents in his lectures on pragmatism (“The Pluralist Conception of Reality” in Lecture 4 of Pragmatism and Sociology)—albeit derived from American pragmatism—resonates strongly with Simmel’s position. Whether or not Durkheim changed his views on Simmel’s sociology, Durkheim has read and thought about Simmel’s work.
William James (1842–1910) was the pragmatist best known among French academics, but Durkheim’s focus on James also appears to reflect the considerable fluency that he developed with James’ work in writing The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912). However, in addition to James’ (1902) Varieties of Religious Experience, Durkheim also displays extended familiarity with James’ The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Psychology (1896), Pragmatism (1907), and The Meaning of Truth (1909). Also see James (1977).
Durkheim’s references to John Dewey are less pronounced. For indications of Dewey’s earlier works, see Dewey, 1891, 1910, 1910–1911, 1972, 1977.
Although Durkheim does not specifically distinguish between “rationalism” and “structuralism” (or employ the term structuralism) in Pragmatism and Sociology, I am using the term “structuralism” in this essay essentially as a synonym for “social physics.” It refers to the idea that (a) an objective set of factors, forces or conditions determine the social order of the human community and that (b) the task of the social scientist is to uncover and specify these factors (along with associated formula) in order to account for the causes of aspects of human group life.
It is with these Comtean-style emphases in mind that I refer to Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society, The Rules of Sociological Method, and Suicide as having a heavy structuralist emphasis. Whereas rationalism often is taken to imply a pronounced dialectic or logical philosophic approach (that may be void of empirical materials) and structuralism is typically envisioned as an analogue to the materialism of the physical sciences, the use of reasoning or logic is not exclusive to those defined as “rationalists.” Rationality, reasoning, and logic are much more general features of analytic thought (including pragmatism as well as the most materialistically-grounded philosophies). Thus, at times, I have used the term structuralist in conjunction with rationalism to foster clarity.
Further, not only does structuralist analyses generally employ the deductive logic associated with rationalism and strive to reduce human lived experience to the sorts of highly abstract constructs associated with Cartesian rationalism, but both also assume an objective-subjective (reality) dualism and both imply a determinism that exists independently of human agency (i.e., knowing and acting). As well, because rationalism is not pure logic on its own, it is important to consider the structuralist features (as in ideal types) of rationalist thought even if no immediate attention is given to testing things out empirically or examining “data” of any sort.
Although some may wish to maintain a sharper separation of rationalism and structuralism, the present usage seems justified by Durkheim’s consideration of rationalism within the context of the broader sociological venture as well as his insistence on the centrality of Cartesian rationalism as the single most prominent element shaping subsequent French thought.
It may be recognized that French postmodernist / poststructuralist thought (à la Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, and Lyotard) builds centrally on the works of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. Albeit in notably differing ways, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche all are very much obligated to preAristotlelian Greek philosophers (also see Zuchert 1996).
There also is no indication that Mead or Blumer were aware of the (1913–1914) lectures Durkheim had generated on early American pragmatism.
Because of the position developed in this paper, it may be useful to briefly establish the foundations of Chicago-style or pragmatist informed (mostly via George Herbert Mead) symbolic interaction:
Symbolic interaction rests in the last analysis on three simple premises. The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings they have for them... The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer 1969:2)
Highlighting these notions in other terms, it may be said that for the interactionists, human group life is (1) intersubjective; (2) knowingly problematic; (3) object-oriented; (4) multiperspectival; (5) reflective; (6) sensory/embodied and (knowingly) materialized; (7) activity-based; (8) negotiable; (9) relational; (10) processual; and (11) takes place in instances. For more comprehensive considerations of the basic features of interactionist analysis, see Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), Strauss (1993), and Prus (1996, 1997, 1999).
Durkheim’s considerations of ethnography and comparative historical analyses also suggest a receptivity to interactionist ethnography. English translations of his “Debate on the Relationship between Ethnology and Sociology” [1907], “Debate on Explanation in History and Sociology” [1908], and “The Method of Sociology” [1908]) can be found in Durkheim (1895–1908; Stephen Lukes [ed.], 1982).
I use the term “pragmatist divide” in part to refer to the longstanding division between Platonist and Aristotelian positions on human knowing and acting. Thus, whereas Plato clearly acknowledges pragmatist features of human group life in some of his texts (especially Republic and Laws), his speakers also introduce a dual vision of reality (true, objective vs. sensate, humanly known), ideal forms, mind-body dualism, a condemnation of rhetoric as a field of study, and theological virtues. By contrast, Aristotle much more consistently adopts a pluralist, secular standpoint that is grounded in nature, process, biology, community, activity, speech, and collective and individual modes of deliberation.
Although contemporary social scientists generally have lost contact with the foundations of Western social thought, the pragmatist divide is often expressed as the “positivist/interpretivist” or “structuralist/pragmatist” debate. In the present text, Durkheim engages the pragmatist divide not only by contrasting American pragmatism with Cartesian/Kantian rationality but also by formulating what may be defined as a “sociological pragmatism.”
Although in essential agreement with most of Challenger’s (1994) commentary, particularly Durkheim’s broader intellectual indebtedness to Aristotle, I would stress the pragmatist nature of Aristotle’s considerations of human group life (see Prus, 2003, 2004, 2007a, 2008) as well as Durkheim’s pragmatist intrigues with human knowing and acting.
Scholars also are likely to appreciate the additional notes provided by the editors in Durkheim’s (1983) Pragmatism and Sociology.
Since neither of these translators seems familiar with the pragmatism of G. H. Mead or the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer, it would be inappropriate to suggest that their translations were particularly sympathetic to the primary analytic frame with which the present statement was developed.
There is no apparent mention of Suicide or a particular endorsement of the type of methodology utilized in that study in Durkheim’s 1913–1914 lectures.
Like Durkheim, Mead (1936) also acknowledges the relevance of Comte’s insistence on the centrality of the human group (as a fundamental unit of analysis).
Although pragmatism may have been more explicitly and extensively pursued through “American pragmatism,” it is apparent that American pragmatism has its roots in classical Greek scholarship (particularly in the works of Aristotle on ethics, rhetoric, poetics, politics, categories). See Prus (2003, 2004, 2007a, 2008).
Having examined both James’ and Schiller’s materials on pragmatism, I would describe Schiller’s (1907) Studies in Humanism as much more direct, coherent, and instructive.
Durkheim does not indicate his rationale for referencing Kant rather than Descartes in developing his statement. Perhaps, Durkheim anticipated less resistance from his audience were a German author rather than “the pre-eminent French philosopher” to be the subject of some highly sustained criticism. Elsewhere (e.g., Moral Education, The Evolution of Educational Thought) however, Durkheim is openly critical of Cartesian rationalism and French thought more generally.
Although Kant (see Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of the Faculty of Judgment) assumed a variety of positions on knowing, Durkheim will rely primarily on the more deterministic features of Kant’s philosophy for these lectures.
Although Durkheim does not pursue this topic in the immediate context, the broader sociological implication is that one could study morality in the same way one would examine other judgments or instances of claims-making activity - in collective historical / process terms. This is a central emphasis in Durkheim’s (1902a, b–1903) Moral Education as well as in his (1912) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
For related, thoughtful discussions of “certainty” and “concepts,” see the materials following Lecture 20 in this paper.
Having examined James’ work on religion as an instance of pragmatist scholarship (and been disappointed with it on similar grounds), I (as a pragmatist) have greatly appreciated Durkheim’s thoughtful analysis of James’ text.
Although Durkheim maintains some functionalist emphases, these notions assume more of an instrumentalist, humanly-engaged, processual quality than the sort suggested in Suicide, for instance. Durkheim envisions physical essences in more consistent structural-functionalist terms but envisions social reality as contingent (in pragmatist terms) on people encouraging, engaging, sustaining, and regulating understandings, practices and artifacts that have been found of value at earlier points in time.
In his earlier lectures on pragmatism, Durkheim explicitly acknowledges James’ attentiveness to the historical, collective development of human thought. Nevertheless, James approach has a more pronounced psychological, subjectivist (vs. intersubjective) quality and Durkheim’s charges are justified in comparative terms.
Those who know Dewey’s later (1934) Art as Experience, will see that Dewey not only rejects James’ more psychological and subjectivist standpoints, but is acutely attentive to the developmental historical flow of collective conceptualizations that Durkheim envisions at the heart of sociological analysis. Mead (1934) also is adamant in insisting on both the centrality of the human group for explaining all instances of meaningful knowing and acting and the processual, developmental flow of language. Still, by no means is Mead as attentive to the longer term aspects of temporality or the collectively generated nature of memory as is Durkheim (1912; also see Prus, 2007b).
Although Durkheim did not have access to these (later) materials, there also is no indication that Dewey or Mead were familiar with Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life or his 1913–1914 lectures on pragmatism.
Interestingly, Herbert Blumer (1969) who builds on Mead’s (1934) pragmatism makes explicit reference to the capacity of things (physical objects, group practices and notions of knowledge) to resist human images. This notion of resistance is a central feature in Blumer’s conceptualization of “obdurate reality.” Also see Prus and Dawson (1996).
The more accurate pragmatist viewpoint is that consciousness represents both a form of activity and a mode of knowing that informs subsequent activity. However, whereas the pragmatists refuse to separate consciousness and (meaningful) activity, they do not (as Durkheim knows) see the two concepts as synonymous.
On further reflection, Durkheim likely would delete this (somewhat atypical and unwarranted) contrast between the “man of action” and “the intellectual.” Seemingly intent only on distancing himself from the pragmatists at this point, Durkheim does not acknowledge the broader ways that people monitor, assess, and adjust activity as they do things. In this lecture, he also disregards the matters of people planning for action and learning from action.
Durkheim is not explicit in developing this point but seems to be objecting to Comte’s social physics and the idea that one could develop a human science modeled on the procedures (and mathematical analysis) of the physical sciences. Durkheim develops a parallel argument in Moral Education (1902–1903).
In arguing for a greater tolerance of intellectual diversity in scholarship, one wonders if Durkheim is questing for greater acceptance of his revisionist sociology within the context of both broader French commitments to Cartesian rationality and the more particularistic structuralist emphasis in the social sciences that he himself had earlier promoted.
These matters receive somewhat more sustained attention in Durkheim’s (1902–1903) Moral Education. Not only is Durkheim explicitly critical of Cartesian rationality and the generalized French tendency to ignore “the reality of the complex” by conceptually and mathematically seeking to reduce things to their more elementary units, but Durkheim also insists on the importance of understanding all things (including the development of science) as historical flows. Also see Durkheim’s (1904–1905) The Evolution of Educational Thought and (1912) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
Gross (1997) provides a valuable statement on both the receptivity of pragmatism among French scholars and the various subjectivist, idealist, and religious emphases that they gave pragmatism. His material suggests that much of the criticism in the later lectures that Durkheim directs against pragmatism may reflect cautions about accepting this increasingly diffuse, less scientific set of tendencies.
As well, there is every indication that Durkheim recognizes that “today’s activities” will soon be, if they are not already, part of the historical flow that today’s people and those who follow them will experience in the unfolding future. Thus, the study of the human condition requires that we attend to the things that people do in the present and be mindful of people’s present conceptions of the future as well as the ways that those in earlier communities had engaged and brought forth the developments of what is now “our (conceptually enabling) past.”
Because Durkheim takes liberties with his own earlier accounts of pragmatism and disproportionately emphasizes certain aspects of the authors he associates with pragmatism (usually James, sometimes Bergson), it may be understood how some commentators who are less familiar with pragmatist scholarship and (its sociological extension) symbolic interaction may confuse Durkheim’s position with that of the 20th century postmodernists. Hopefully, this more extended rendering of Durkheim’s lectures will have shown how mistaken it is to designate Durkheim as a “postmodernist.” For more sustained comparisons of interactionist and postmodernist approaches, see Dawson and Prus, 1993a, b, 1995; Prus, 1996, 1999).
The critical difference, Durkheim (P&S: 68) says, revolves around the failure of the pragmatists to give priority to the mentality of the group over that of the individuals within [based on his earlier lectures on pragmatism, Durkheim likely would acknowledge that this claim is only partially accurate even with respect to William James]. It is the truths, reasoning, and morality of the collectivity, Durkheim stresses, that not only have a more pervasive and enduring quality but also assume a more valued, authoritative essence.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Durkheim (1912) assigns great significance to Aristotle’s Categories as denoting a set of concepts foundational to all instances of knowing in community life.
Still, much like Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) who achieved considerable attention because of his work on experimental psychology but whose considerable contributions to philosophy (Ethics, Logic, and System of Philosophy) have been largely neglected, Durkheim’s demographic analyses (with its potential for survey research) also attracted much more attention than has his philosophy of human knowing and acting. In both cases, this appears to reflect the particular interests of the larger collectivities in which scholarship takes shape.
As well, whereas people in the community generally desire “quick-fixes” for the things that concern them, science (physical and human), as Durkheim observed, is to be understood as an emergent, contested, multiplistic process. While science may be “one with the society in which it is embedded,” there will be a tension between the desire for more immediate answers and the more sustained scientific quest for knowledge (and understanding) about “what is” and “what is not.”
On the linkages of the works of Wilhelm Wundt and Emile Durkheim, see Durkheim’s (1887) Ethics and the Sociology of Morals as well as Jones (1999).
Like Durkheim, Mead stresses the irreducibility of the human group for comprehending all matters of human knowing and acting. However, Mead’s notions of memory and the enabling-developmental relevance of the historical flows of community life (as also is the case for those in the interactionist community more generally) are much more limited conceptually than are those articulated by Durkheim.
Thus, even though Mead, Blumer, and others in the interactionist community would clearly reject the psychological or individual reductionism of William James, contemporary pragmatist (and interactionist) scholarship would benefit greatly by more explicitly incorporating transhistorical materials in the analysis of community life (see Prus, 2007b ).
For a more sustained, research-oriented pragmatist consideration of the multiple life-worlds that constitute human communities, see Prus (1997).
Whereas Durkheim also is cognizant of the negotiated nature of reality, he envisions this as generally more readily accomplished in the various realms of science than in the areas of religion and morality. This is because of the greater openness to testing and the more sustained quest to know among those who constitute the scientific community. Still, Durkheim also envisions scholarship (and science) as characterized by various emphases and resistances to particular forms of knowing (also see Durkheim’s The Evolution of Educational Thought).
References
Alexander, J. (1986a). Rethinking Durkheim’s intellectual development I: On “Marxism” and the anxiety of being misunderstood. International Sociology, 1, 91–107.
Alexander, J. (1986b). Rethinking Durkheim’s intellectual development II: Working out a religious sociology. International Sociology, 1, 189–201.
Aristotle (1984) The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Jonathan Barnes (ed.) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (c384-322BCE)
Blumer, H. (1966). Sociological implications of the thought of George Herbert Mead. American Journal of Sociology, 71, 535–548.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interaction. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Blumer, H. (1971). Social problems as a collective behavior. Social Problems, 1, 298–306.
Challenger, D. (1994). Durkheim through the lens of Aristotle: Durkheimian, postmodernist, and communitarian responses to the enlightenment. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield.
Cullivier, A. (1955). Pragmatisme et Sociologie. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
Dawson, L., & Prus, R. (1993a). Interactionist ethnography and postmodernist discourse: Affinities and disjunctures in approaching human lived experiences. In N. K. Denzin (Ed.), Studies in symbolic interaction 15, pp. 147–177. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Dawson, L., & Prus, R. (1993b). Human enterprise, intersubjectivity, and the ethnographic other: A reply to Denzin and Fontana. In N. K. Denzin (Ed.), Studies in symbolic interaction 15, pp. 193–200. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Dawson, L., & Prus, R. (1995). Postmodernism and linguistic reality versus symbolic interactionism and obdurate reality. In N. K. Denzin (Ed.), Studies in symbolic interaction 17, pp. 105–124. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Dewey, J. (1891). Outlines of a critical theory of ethics. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms (reprinted 1957).
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Amherst, NY: Prometheus (reprinted 1975).
Dewey, J. (1910–1911). Philosophy and education in their historic relations. Boulder, CO: Westview (1993).
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York: Penguin Putnum.
Dewey, J. (1972). The early works, 1882–1898. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, J. (1977). The middle works, 1899–1924. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Durkheim, E. (1883-1884) Durkheim’s philosophy lectures: Notes from the Lycée de Sens Course [Referenced as The Sens Lectures in the present paper] Neil Gross and Robert Alun Jones (eds.) New York: Cambridge University Press (2004)
Durkheim, E. (1887) Ethics and The Sociology of Morals. Trans. by Robert T. Hall. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus (1993).
Durkheim, E. (1893) The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. by George Simpson. New York: Free Press (1947).
Durkheim, E. (1895). The Rules of Sociological Method. Trans. by Trans. S.A. Solvay and J.H. Mueller. Edited by E.G. Catlin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1938].
Durkheim, E. (1895–1908). The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method. Edited by Stephen Lukes. Trans. W. D. Halls. London: Macmillan (1982).
Durkheim, E. (1897) Suicide. (Trans. by J.A. Spaulding and G. Simpson) New York: Free Press (1951).
Durkheim, E. (1902–1903) Moral Education. Trans. by Everett K Wilson and Herman Schnurer. New York: Free Press (1961; Reprinted 2002; Mineola, NY: Dover).
Durkheim, E. (1902–1911) Education and Sociology. Trans. by Sherwood Fox. Glencoe, IL: Free (1956).
Durkheim, E. (1904–1905) The Evolution of Educational Thought. Trans. by Peter Collins. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1977).
Durkheim, E. (1912) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Trans. by Joseph Ward Swain. London: Allen and Unwin (1915).
Durkheim, E. (1913–1914) Pragmatism and Sociology (Lectures). Trans. by J. C. Whitehouse, Edited and Introduced by J.B. Allcock, with a Preface by A. Cuvillier. New York: Cambridge University Press (1983).
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine.
Gross, N. (1996). A note on the sociological eye and the discovery of a new Durkheim text. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 32, 408–423.
Gross, N. (1997). Durkheim’s pragmatism lectures: a contexual interpretation. Sociological Theory, 15, 126–149.
Gross, N., & Jones, R. A. (2004). Durkheim’s philosophy lectures: Notes from the Lycée de Sens course (1883–1884). New York: Cambridge University Press.
James, W. (1902). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature. New York: Longmans, Green.
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1975).
James, W. (1909). The meaning of truth: A sequel to ‘pragmatism’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1975).
James, W. (1977) The Writings of William James. Edited by John J. McDermott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Joas, H. (1993). Pragmatism and social theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Joas, H. (1996). The creativity of action. Trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Jones, R. A. (1985). Emile Durkheim: An introduction to four major works. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Jones, R. A. (1999). The development of Durkheim’s realism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, R. A. (2002). Pragmatism and protestantism in the development of Durkheim’s sociology of religion. In T. A. Idinopulos & B. C. Wilson (Eds.), Reappraising durkheim for the study and teaching of religion today, pp. 45–58. Boston: Brill.
Jones, R. A., & Kibbee, D. (1993). Durkheim, language, and history: a pragmatist perspective. Sociological Theory, 11, 152–170.
Lofland, J. (1976). Doing social life. New York: Wiley.
Lofland, J. (1995). Analytic ethnography: Features, failings, and futures. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 24, 30–67.
Lukes, S. (1972). Emile Durkheim, his life and work: a historical and critical study. New York: Harper & Row.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mead, G. H. (1936) Movements of thought in the nineteenth century. Merritt H. Moore (editor). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Plato. (1997). Plato: The Collected Works. John M. Cooper (Ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett (c427-347BCE).
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Prus, R. (1997). Subcultural mosaics and intersubjective realities. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Prus, R. (1999). Beyond the power mystique. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Prus, R. (2003). Ancient precursors. In L. T. Reynolds & N. J. Herman-Kinney (Eds.), Handbook of symbolic interactionism, pp. 19–38. New York: Altamira.
Prus, R. (2004). Symbolic interaction and classical greek scholarship: conceptual foundations, historical continuities, and transcontextual relevancies. The American Sociologist, 35(1), 5–33.
Prus, R. (2007a). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: laying the foundations for a pragmatist consideration of human knowing and acting. Qualitative Sociology Review, 3(2), 5–45.
Prus, R. (2007b). Human memory, social process, and the pragmatist metamorphosis: ethnological foundations, ethnographic contributions and conceptual challenges. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 36(4), 378–437.
Prus, R. (2007c). On studying ethnologs (Not just People, ‘Societies in Miniature’): on the necessities of ethnography, history, and comparative analysis. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 36(6), 669–703.
Prus, R. (2008). Aristotle’s Rhetoric: a pragmatist analysis of persuasive interchange. Qualitative Sociology Review, 4(2), 24–62.
Prus, R., & Dawson, L. (1996). Obdurate reality and the intersubjective other: The problematics of representation and the privilege of presence. In P. Robert (Ed.), Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research, pp. 245–257. Albany: State University of New York.
Rawls, A. W. (1996). Durkheim’s epistemology: the neglected argument. American Journal of Sociology, 102, 430–482.
Rawls, A. W. (1997). Durkheim and pragmatism: an old twist on a contemporary debate. Sociological Theory, 15, 5–29.
Schiller, F. C. S. (1903). Humanism: Philosophical essays. London: Macmillan.
Schiller, F. C. S. (1907). Studies in humanism. London: Macmillan.
Schmauss, W. (1994). Durkheim’s philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge: Creating an intellectual niche. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stone, G., & Farberman, H. A. (1967). On the edge of rapprochement: was Durkheim moving toward the perspective of symbolic interaction? Sociological Quarterly, 8, 149–164.
Strauss, A. (1993). Continual permutations of action. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Whitehouse, J. C. & Allcock, J. B. (1983). Pragmatism and Sociology: Emile Durkheim. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wundt, W. (1914). Ethics: An Investigation into the Facts and Laws of the Moral Life [from the Second German edition of 1892]. Volume I: The Facts of the Moral Life (trans. by Julia Gulliver and Edward Bradford Titchener); Volume II: Ethical Systems (trans. by Margaret Floy Washburn); Volume III: The Principles of Morality and the Departments of the Moral Life (trans. by Margaret Floy Washburn). London: George Allen.
Zuchert, C. (1996). Postmodern Platos: Nietzche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Mathew Burk, Lorraine Prus, Tony Puddephatt, and Jessica Wheeler for their readings of earlier drafts of this paper as well as Beert Verstraete for his more extensive thoughtful discussions of Greek and Latin scholarship with me. I am also grateful to Lawrence Nichols (TAS editor) and the Springer editorial staff for their assistance with this manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Prus, R. Reconceptualizing the Study of Community Life:. Am Soc 40, 106–146 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-009-9066-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-009-9066-1