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Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results

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Abstract

Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design (Garg et al 2008), we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM India Research Laboratory, Bangalore, 560 071, India

    Dinesh Garg

  2. Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 560 012, India

    Y. Narahari & Sujit Gujar

Authors
  1. Dinesh Garg
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  2. Y. Narahari
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  3. Sujit Gujar
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Correspondence to Y. Narahari.

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Garg, D., Narahari, Y. & Gujar, S. Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results. Sadhana 33, 131–174 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-008-0009-2

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