Abstract
In this article I criticize some traditional impartiality practices in Western philosophical ethics and argue in favor of Marilyn Friedman’s dialogical practice of eliminating bias. But, I argue, the dialogical approach depends on a more fundamental practice of equanimity. Drawing on the works of Tibetan Buddhist thinkers Patrul Rinpoche and Khenpo Ngawang Pelzang, I develop a Buddhist-feminist concept of equanimity and argue that, despite some differences with the Western impartiality practices, equanimity is an impartiality practice that is not only psychologically feasible but also central to loving relationships. I conclude by suggesting ways that feminist dialogical practices for eliminating bias and meditative practices are mutually supportive.
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Notes
Because my focus is the practice of impartiality, I follow Friedman (1993) and largely abstract these methods from the various theoretical contexts in which they were proposed.
Marilyn Friedman (1993) makes this point (see Chap. 2).
I borrow the term ‘near enemy’ from the fifth-century Buddhist philosopher Buddhaghosa’s Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Buddhaghosa notes that each immeasurable quality has a ‘far enemy,’ or opposite trait, and a ‘near enemy,’ which is a trait that seems similar to the immeasurable quality but is in fact distinct. It is an enemy because, due to its similarity, it is easy to unknowingly lapse into feeling the ‘near enemy,’ in this case indifference, instead of the true immeasurable quality, equanimity.
Goodman (2009) Chap. 1.
By ‘reactive’ habit patterns I mean emotional, psychological, and even physical reactions that have become habits.
See Kamilasila (2001, 54).
McFall (1989) makes a similar criticism that impartiality is incompatible with love (p. 16).
See Curtin and Powers (1994).
Khenpo Pelzang does not consider the possibility that one may experience anger or hatred when contemplating one’s mother [‘…a mother is only ever kind; there is no such thing as a mother who is not’ (p. 140)]. Some contemporary Buddhist teachers who teach in the West, such as Mingyur Rinpoche (2009), suggest using another relation if one does not spontaneously generate love and gratitude when contemplating one’s mother.
See Cottingham (1983).
See Baron (1991).
The implications of this discussion for understanding the ethics of mothering is a fascinating topic, but one that I do not have space to develop here.
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Thank you to James Anderson, Mavis Biss, Harry Brighouse, Claudia Card, Anne Hansen, and John Makransky for helpful comments of previous drafts. This paper was written with a dissertation fellowship from the American Association of University Women.
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McRae, E. Equanimity and Intimacy: A Buddhist-Feminist Approach to the Elimination of Bias. SOPHIA 52, 447–462 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0376-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0376-y