Abstract
In this paper I discuss a number of problems associated with the suggestion that it is possible for God to randomly select a possible world for actualization.
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Notes
Ibid. 149–150. Grover also considers problems associated with Jove creating one device over another, and whether there could be a ‘best randomizer.’ I will not review these problematic issues or those just mentioned above here. I intend, instead, to raise additional worries associated with the proposed random selection device.
Perhaps this is a bit unfair to Grover. He does appear to express some worries regarding the possibility of randomly selecting a member from an infinite set in his discussion regarding the Principle of Sufficient Reason (see, Ibid. 148). In a correspondence with Grover, he remarked that he merely grants the possibility of such a random selection for the sake of argument.
I assume that the notion of randomness being discussed here is that of equal probability of being selected. (i.e., such that each possible selection has an equal chance of being selected).
One might be tempted (as I think the Howard-Snyders are) to simply claim that such a random selection is possible and that since an omnipotent being can do anything possible, an omnipotent being could make such a random selection. As I’ll go on to argue, I think the bold proclamation that such a random selection is possible is unwarranted, and that we ought to be skeptical about whether such a selection is indeed possible.
op cit. 267.
See Morgan 1984 for a penetrating discussion of various random number generators and algorithms. Currently, the most sophisticated attempts to generate random numbers with computers involve coupling the fixed set of computer instructions with the sampling of a ‘seed,’ or source of entropy outside the computer; usually some purported random natural phenomenon such as white noise or the rate of decay of a nuclear source. As such, this purported method of generating a random selection ultimately relies on tapping some existing (i.e., external) natural source of randomness. So now the issue is whether such outside sources are truly random. In talking to physicists and statisticians about this, it appears that the primary justification for the claim that, say, the rate of decay of a nuclear source is random is that the rate of decay is unpredictable, even with sophisticated computers. This, however, does not demonstrate that the rate of decay is truly random. We might, for example, develop technology in the future that is able to predict the rate of decay of a nuclear source. In the end, this sort of procedure depends on the existence of an external source of randomness. If indeed there be such, then this may be a way in which one (e.g., Jove) could pick from an infinite set at random. But if there are no external sources of randomness, then this procedure will not provide a random selection from an infinite set. And I think that it is really an open question as to whether there are any such sources of randomness. I’d like to thank members of the physics and statistics department at UCLA for enduring conversations with me regarding these issues, especially Lynn Fairbanks.
Einstein’s famous remark ‘God does not play dice with the universe,’ might have an alternative interpretation that applies quite well to the present discussion (once we drop the disguise and put God in for Jove).
The spinner within a circle procedure was suggested to me by Ian Hacking in a correspondence.
There are analogous possible selection procedures. For example, throwing a javelin where the infinite number of possible distances that it could be thrown corresponds to the infinite number of possible choices. What I say below would obviously apply to such procedures as well.
This is, of course, assuming that an epistemic view of vagueness like Williamson’s is false (see Williamson 1995, 1996). This is the view (when applied to this case) that there is a determinate boundary to the region that the dart picks out, it is just that we are forever epistemically in the dark regarding where this boundary lies. Jove would presumably know where this boundary lies, as he is an omniscient being. Assuming a view like Williamson’s is correct, Jove would apparently be able to use modification (a) of these proposed selection procedures to select a world to create. However, there are a number of problems for the epistemic view of vagueness (see, for example, Burgess 1998, Gomez-Torrente 2002, and Simons 1996. In addition, as will be discussed below, there are other difficulties that arise for modification (a) of these proposed selection procedures.
References
Burgess (1998). In Defense of an Indeterminist Theory of Vagueness. Monist, 81, 233–252.
Gomez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64, 107–125.
Grover (2003). This World, ‘Adams Worlds’, and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Religious Studies, 39, 145–163.
Howard-Snyder (1994). How an Unsuprassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World. Faith and Philosophy, 11, 260–268.
Morgan (1984). Elements of Simulation (p. 51–136). London: Chapman and Hall.
Rowe (1994). The problem of no best possible world. Faith and Philosophy, 11, 269–271.
Simons (1996). Timothy Williamson’s Vagueness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4, 321–327.
Steinberg (2005). Why an unsurpassable being cannot create a surpassable world. Religious Studies, 41, 323–333.
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Williamson (1996). What Makes it a Heap? Erkenntnis, 44, 327–339.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Stephen Grover and an anonymous reviewer for comments on a draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Ian Hacking for a helpful correspondence during the early stages of my thinking about this topic.
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Steinberg, J.R. God and The Possibility of Random Creation. SOPHIA 47, 193–199 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0066-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0066-3