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“Trust but verify”? The performance implications of verification strategies in trusting relationships

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Abstract

Considerable extant research demonstrates the benefits of trust in buyer-seller relationships. More recent research points out downsides of the vulnerability inherent with trust. Recognizing this dilemma of trust, partners may offset the vulnerability of trust with verification strategies—efforts to produce information relevant to the exchange relationship. This research examines the use of three types of verification strategies—monitoring, assurances, and corroboration—which may be employed to safeguard against the vulnerability of trust. When control mechanisms like trust and information are combined, they may complement one another and enhance performance or function as substitutes, be redundant or compete, and consequently detract from performance. Emerging theory on combined modes of governance provides insights. We draw on this theory and develop hypotheses proposing that combinations of trust and verification may enhance or detract exchange performance—depending on the specific verification strategy. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 230 buyer-supplier relationships. Results of the research provide some support for the proposed relationships and yield implications for the management of cooperative exchange relationships.

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Notes

  1. The Madoff Ponzi scheme uncovered in 2008 relied on customers’ trust of Bernard Madoff.

  2. These factors are further exacerbated given that as found by these researchers, “partners also remain surprisingly loyal within business relationships... dealers who believe their trusted supplier has abused them often react with resignation, silence and even loyalty” (Anderson and Jap 2005, p. 76).

  3. The international relations literature has relevance for the study of marketing exchange relationships given it addresses “strategic situations ... involving a relationship of interdependence among a relatively small number of actors” (Abbott 1993, footnote 4). Many exchange relationships involve such circumstances, e.g., marketing channel, buyer-seller.

  4. “Trust but verify” was made famous through President Ronald Reagan’s approach and statement to then General Secretary Mikail Gorbachev during talks concerning strategic arms control in the late eighties. When asked whether he trusted the overtures being made by Gorbachev, Reagan replied “Doveryai, no proveryai,” translated as “trust but verify” (New York Times, June 12, 1987, A12). Illustrating Reagan’s appreciation for the complexities of trust, the phrase went on to become a lexicon of U.S. arms control policy during the Reagan era. The phrase has since served as a touchstone for scholars and others fascinated by the anomalies of trust and its relationship to other strategies of governance within interdependent exchanges (cf., Krass 1985).

  5. Indirect evidence of the performance enhancing benefits of at least one form of monitoring is provided by Noordewier et al. (1990). In their study of OEM purchasers, monitoring during the execution of an exchange agreement was conceptualized to be an element of relational governance. Their results suggest increasing the relational governance (including monitoring) of an exchange under conditions of high uncertainty leads to enhanced inventory and administrative performance.

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Correspondence to Gregory T. Gundlach.

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Gregory T. Gundlach is Coggin Distinguished Professor in Marketing at the University of North Florida. Joseph P. Cannon is Associate Professor of Marketing at Colorado State University. The authors have contributed equally to this project and the order of authorship is random. The authors appreciate support from the National Association of Purchasing Management and the Purchasing Management Association of the Carolinas and Virginia. The authors appreciate comments from Kevin Bradford and Dave Gilliland on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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Gundlach, G.T., Cannon, J.P. “Trust but verify”? The performance implications of verification strategies in trusting relationships. J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. 38, 399–417 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-009-0180-y

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