Abstract
If elective abortion is publicly funded, then the government is obligated to take active measures designed to reduce its prevalence. I present two arguments for that conclusion. The first argument is directed at those pro-choice thinkers who hold that while some or all elective abortions are morally wrong, they still ought to be legally permitted and publicly subsidized. The second argument is directed at pro-choice thinkers who hold that there is nothing morally wrong with elective abortion and that it should be both legally permitted and publicly subsidized. The second argument employs premises that generalize beyond the abortion debate and that may serve to shed light on broader questions concerning conscience and the requirements of political compromise in a democracy.
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Notes
Here we run already into somewhat disputed territory: some self-identified pro-life thinkers would wish to restrict the “elective” label to “those abortions not done to preserve the life of the mother,” while others prefer the broader “life or health.” Within the latter camp, “health” would then usually be taken to signify serious physical risk.
See, for instance, Sher (1981) for an argument against public funding; Gutmann and Thompson (1996) suggest that even if public funding is proper, there should be a compromise such that elective abortion should be funded only by the tax dollars of self-identified pro-choice citizens. For a recent defense of subsidization, see Kaposy (2009).
I should note, again with respect to the terminology employed here, that while the rough definitions of “pro-life” and “pro-choice” provided above reflect much common usage (especially in North American politics and public policy debate), they remain items of some dispute. I do not wish to take up that dispute here. Thus, if a reader prefers to apply the pro-life label more broadly, encompassing all those who think elective abortion is seriously morally wrong (whatever they may hold regarding its legal status), then of course he or she can simply re-word my stated thesis accordingly. On such a re-wording, one of my arguments is directed towards those pro-life thinkers who hold that abortion is morally wrong but ought to be legal and subsidized, and the second directed towards the only genuinely pro-choice thinkers, namely those who hold elective abortion to be morally unobjectionable (and hence legally permissible and also perhaps worthy of public subsidization).
It is always worth keeping in mind that moral opposition to elective abortion need not arise from confidence in the humanity or personhood of the unborn—it can just as well arise from uncertainty as to their moral status (as the mere risk of killing an innocent human/person is arguably sufficient to render abortion morally wrong).
For discussion, see MacQueen and Patriquin (2011).
While I prefer to formulate this premise in terms of harm, an anonymous referee rightly points out that the notion of “harm” may not be the optimal one to employ here, in part because of the ongoing debates within ethics concerning how exactly to understand the nature of harm and the corresponding difficulty concerning which model of harm would best be employed here. As such I will formulate this premise more broadly to accommodate those who would prefer to think of the relevant sort of wrong being done here in terms of interests or rights or perhaps another category—I don’t mean the disjunction to be taken as exclusive.
Note how minimal this premise is—“lessen” rather than “minimize.” One might argue for the stronger formulation here, but I’ll opt for the easier route. Similarly, one could plausibly substitute a more ambitious “any” for “very large number,” but I will go for the weaker claim since, as we’ll see, it is all that is needed in the present context.
I am aware that the state already has amply sufficient reason to try and lower the murder rate. But this could in theory constitute one extra reason to throw on the pile.
For instance, in a 2012 Ipsos Reid poll of Canadians, only 45 per cent answered affirmatively the following question: “In your opinion, abortion should be permitted in certain circumstances.” This is obviously a somewhat ambiguous question, and in fact the answer seems to conflict with other findings from the same polling data (such as the finding that 49 per cent believe abortions should be permitted whenever the mother decides to obtain one). Still, it gives an indication of the pro-life leanings of a large percentage of Canadians, despite the fact that Canada has the most liberal abortion setup in the developed world, with no criminal legal restrictions on abortion. (Canada thus permits abortion at all stages of pregnancy, for any reason, with no criminal restrictions on methods employed. Subsidization is a provincial matter though, unlike criminal law.) The same poll showed that 60 per cent of Canadians favoured introducing legal restrictions at least on abortions done within the third trimester. For a review of some of the polling data, see Kennedy (2012).
References
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Acknowledgements
I would like to extend thanks to several anonymous referees for the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was completed in part to funding from the Canada Research Chairs program, for which I am grateful to the government and taxpayers of Canada.
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Dumsday, T. Why Governments That Fund Elective Abortion Are Obligated to Attempt a Reduction in the Elective Abortion Rate. Bioethical Inquiry 13, 87–94 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-015-9687-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-015-9687-8