Abstract
An analysis of the stock exchange crashes since 1929 reveals a pattern: Finance intermediaries in search for extra profits are using social dispositions to produce growth markets by linking them to technical or social utopias, far out of real profit chances. Gaining influence through their financial investments into politics they have been able to shift the risks of exuberant growth to third parties (savers or stakeholders). The stock exchange is working for the profit of the society (as allocator of capital), when the public is highly aware of its activity and under efficient democratic rules.
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Mein Aufsatz schließt an Überlegungen an, die ich im Berliner Journal für Soziologie in Heft 2/2005 in einer frühen Fassung dargelegt habe.
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Blomert, R. Wie viel Demokratie verträgt die Börse?. Leviathan 35, 430–457 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11578-007-0026-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11578-007-0026-2