Abstract
The standard philosophical account of akratic action is that it is action contrary to one’s current better judgment about what to do. While respecting the philosophical debate associated with this conception of akrasia, I attempt to offer a different perspective on the subject by suggesting that akratic action could be conceived more broadly as “action without due self-restraint.” Under such a broader conception, there may be several varieties of akrasia. Following Frank Jackson, I propose that a paradigmatic variety of akrasia is “passionate akrasia,” defined in terms of the undue influence of passion. I provide an account of passionate akrasia that builds on Jackson’s decision-theoretic account, though revises it in important respects. In developing this account, I also suggest a solution to the problem of how one can act contrary to one’s current better judgment, thereby indicating how this approach can shed new light on traditional debates.
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Notes
Rorty (2017) speaks of different varieties of akrasia, but she means that the akratic break, under the standard account, can occur in different places. What I mean is that there can be different accounts of, specifically, akratic action.
Notice, it is not enough here to speak of a diachronic form of standard akrasia, as there are cases where the akrates has never formed a contrary judgment.
I use XY to denote the conjunction of X and Y when X and Y do not involve a logical symbol, and X.Y when either one or both of them does (e.g. A.¬B means ‘A and not B’).
That is, assuming there is no motivated change of belief, which may play a part in more complex cases of akrasia, but need not in the kind of example we have looked at.
The example is from an anonymous reviewer.
Tappolet (2003) makes a similar point in her account of “emotional akrasia,” arguing that emotions are perceptions of value that can conflict with an agent’s better judgment. I endorse her argument with two caveats. (1) Tappolet’s is still a standard account of akrasia, as she makes no provision for how one can act akratically when there is no contrary judgment. (2) As a consequence of this focus, she overlooks the need to explain why, in typical cases of akrasia, the akrates has not been influenced by her motivating reasons against the akratic action. The mere fact that the akrates has a perception of value does not explain the action, since the akrates (typically) has greater motivating reason not to act as she does. My account makes this issue central, while treating the clash with judgment as secondary.
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Michael, M.T. Passionate Akrasia. Philosophia 47, 569–585 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0008-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0008-4