Abstract
The Transcendental Reading of the Tractatus argues that Wittgenstein endorses, under the notion of ‘metaphysical subject’, the existence of a willing subject as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. Tejedor aims to reject this reading resorting to three criticisms. (i) The notion of ‘willing subject’ does not appear explicitly in, nor can it be deduced from, the Tractatus, (ii) the metaphysical subject and the willing subject are not synonymous or analogous notions and, finally, (iii) Wittgenstein abandons the notion of ‘willing subject’ at the end of the Notebooks. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it analyzes the critique introduced by Tejedor and presents three problems that demonstrate that Tejedor’s critique cannot adequately reject the Transcendental Reading. Secondly, it sets forth an alternative reading of the Tractatus that overcomes the issues that stem from the Transcendental Reading. This alternative reading conceives the metaphysical subject as an ethical subject and a willing subject. Additionally, it advances an alternative account of the transcendental character of ethics that does not defend the existence of a transcendental subject understood as a condition of ethics and representation in the Tractatus.
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Notes
In addition, the alternative reading we set forth in section 4 demonstrates the insufficiency of Tejedor’s first criticism.
The remarks introduced by Tejedor regarding NB 9.11.16 do not present any issues. However, in 2.3 we will show how these remarks demonstrate an inability by Tejedor to differentiate the willing subject of the Notebooks from the transcendental willing subject proposed by the Transcendental Reading.
In 2.2 we will outline a basic approach to Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language.
In this work we will only outline a general characterization of Wittgenstein’s solipsism, presenting the basic elements without intervening in the various existing debates. The basic elements posed can be found in various and divergent works on the topic of solipsism such as Hintikka (1958), Levine (2013), McGinn (2006) and McGuinness (2002). Albeit, it is important to introduce a clarification concerning the idea of ‘my language’, following McGuinness (2002, 138). ‘My language’ does not refer to everyone’s personal language. Contrarily, it refers to language as such, that is, the limits of the world are the limits of language as such. Privacy concerning language only hinders Wittgenstein’s argument surrounding solipsism. However, these remarks concerning language do not affect the idea that the I is still the measure of the world: language has to have a center and that center is the I.
In the present study the notions sagen (TLP, 6.53), sprechen (TLP, 6.423) and rede/reden (TLP, 5.641) are ultimately understood as interchangeable.
Wittgenstein introduces the analogy of the eye in TLP 5.632, 5.633 and 5.6331 in order to clarify his understanding of the metaphysical subject. The metaphysical subject stands in relation to the world, as does the eye in relation to the visual field. ‘You do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye’ (TLP, 5.633).
Both notions are also understood as synonymous by Tejedor (2015, 58–59).
This characteristic is also present in the metaphysical subject and the willing subject, as shown above.
To clarify this characterization of the I Wittgenstein resorts to the analogy of the eye in NB 12.8.16. The I is stands in relation the world, as does the eye in relation to the visual field. You do not see the eye and nothing in the visual field allow you to infer its existence.
Wittgenstein in NB 5.8.16 goes so far as to affirm that the existence of the I is dependent on the will.
Furthermore, the I and the metaphysical subject are also regarded as synonymous in TLP 5.641.
During certain segments of this article we have maintained this identification between the willing subject of the Notebooks and the transcendental willing subject proposed by the Transcendental Reading in order to convey the problems in Tejedor’s work. Nevertheless, the present study does not defend nor endorse this identification.
This task requires a specific investigation that goes beyond the scope of the present study. Nonetheless, a basic problem in the understanding of the willing subject as a transcendental willing subject, as proposed by the Transcendental Reading, will be presented further on. In addition, a possible objection against the Transcendental Reading on the basis of NB 9.11.16 will be introduced.
A conclusion that partially rejects the proposal of the Transcendental Reading.
It could be argued that Wittgenstein sets forth an ethical approach that lacks any form of subject, as Wiggins (2004) does briefly. Nonetheless, this reading would require specifying why Wittgenstein does not resort to impersonal forms during the propositions concerning ethics in the Tractatus.
Furthermore, ‘the relation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical self to the everyday self of which we commonly speak remains unspecified’ (Sluga 1996, 330).
Christensen seems to relate the metaphysical subject to ethics. Nonetheless, there is no proposal or use of the notion of ‘ethical subject’.
The characterization of the will presented is a basic approach following the works of McGuinness (1966, 305–328), Morris (2008) and Mulhall (2007, 221–247) that suffices for the completion of the task established; that is, determining the relation between the metaphysical subject and the will and if this subject can be conceived as a willing subject. For further information on this issue see the works referenced.
This article will not delve into the will conceived as a phenomenon, since Wittgenstein in TLP 6.423 establishes that it is a subject that concerns psychology, and not ethics. Moreover, it seems that the empirical subject is better related to the will conceived as a phenomenon, since Wittgenstein regards the empirical subject as a study matter for psychology (TLP, 5.641).
It is important to reiterate that the alternative reading we have presented does not endorse the commitments that Morris presents when subscribing to the Transcendental Reading.
Hence why the alternative reading posed in section 4 does not take into consideration the relation established in 2.2 between the metaphysical subject and the willing subject in the Notebooks.
Christensen seems to endorse this understanding of the subject, arguing that we ‘cannot speak of representation of the world without including an idea of the subject’ (Christensen 2011, 803). Nonetheless, it is uncertain that this entails endorsing the commitment of the Transcendental Reading to conceiving the subject as a transcendental condition of representation.
Furthermore, this work does not endorse the resolute reading of the Tractatus. We endorse the proposal developed by Cheung (2008) concerning the propositions of the Tractatus.
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Fairhurst, J. The Ethical Subject and Willing Subject in the Tractatus: an Alternative to the Transcendental Reading. Philosophia 47, 75–95 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9938-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9938-5