Abstract
In this paper I argue that the growing block theory of time has rather surprising, and hitherto unexplored, explanatory benefits when it comes to certain enduring philosophical puzzles concerning death. In particular, I claim the growing block theorist has readily available and convincing answers to the following questions: (i) Why is it an evil to be dead but not an evil to be not yet born? (ii) How can death be an evil for the dead if they no longer exist to suffer it? (iii) When is death an evil for the one who dies? The ability to give such answers is a significant, but by no means decisive, advantage for the growing block view of time.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For the purposes of simplicity by ‘death’ in this article I will mean complete and permanent annihilation, so that we need not concern ourselves with complications such as whether we will, or even can, persist beyond our deaths either as persons via some kind of afterlife or merely as corpses or even scattered collections of particles.
This is not to deny that factors such as the death’s being an extremely painful one or the deceased having a large and loving family might make matters even worse.
While this solution itself is novel the idea that we can solve puzzles relating to death by appeal to particular theories of time is not. Silverstein (1980) famously argued that the evil of death can only be properly dealt with by adopting a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of the nature of time. Silverstein’s arguments are criticised in numerous places, for instance Bradley (2004) and Rosenbaum (1986), but I will not engage with them here as my primary intention is to propound the growing block view rather than to criticise the views of others. It is worth noting, though, that previous discussions of the relationship between the evil of death and the metaphysics of time typically (and sometimes explicitly as in Sider (2013)) ignore the growing block view in favour of discussing the relative merits of presentism and B-theoretic eternalism.
The growing block theory, as such, is neutral as to whether there are objects (God, numbers, possibilia etc.) which exist outside of time altogether and are therefore neither past nor present.
For a complete description and defence of one form of the growing block view see Tooley (1997).
See Englert (2003) Book 3.
Again, stipulating away any worries about whether we exist before our births as foetuses or in some platonic realm.
Or will be, or were etc. the appropriate tense of the verb will vary depending on the account offered.
A point that supporters of the Epicurean argument discussed below are keen on making but, if I am right, with insufficient attention to the sense of existence in play.
For more on the different versions of the symmetry problem see Sorensen (2013).
I thank an anonymous referee for the journal for pushing me to clarify this point.
For a discussion of various aspects of the Epicurean problem (and some responses to them) see Warren (2004).
Excluding far-fetched scenarios involving time travel, backwards causation etc.
I am not qualified to comment as to whether this view was actually held by the historical Epicurus but if not then all the better for my position. Those interested in the nature of Epicurus’ actual views should read Warren (2004).
From his Letter to Menoeceus. For one translation see Epicurus (1966).
I do not mean to suggest that there are two numerical distinct individuals here. Rather I am making a distinction between the properties which a single individual (Socrates) atemporally has as part of the growing block and those which he once possessed when he was a present object. This distinction may seem very strange but it is worth noting that it closely parallels other claims which a growing blocker must typically make. For instance, that the day of Socrates’ birth as it now atemporally exists as part of the growing block is past (since it is no longer at the cutting edge of the growing block) but that it was present.
Presentists will deny that Socrates exists in any sense. B-theorists are committed to denying the kind of change in what is atemporally true which is required to make the distinction.
Though such views are not without adherents, Feldman (1991) advocates the view that someone’s death is bad for them at all times and Nagel (1970) the view that it is timelessly bad for them. I wish to suggest merely that there is something prima facie implausible about such views, not that this implausibility is in any way insurmountable.
One partial exception is worth mentioning here. Those who hold stage theoretic accounts of persistence (see Sider 2001:190–206) will generally claim that ‘I’ refers to an instantaneous stage rather than a persisting object. As such they will likely wish to replace my later talk of e.g. ‘having consciousness’ with ‘having a temporal counterpart who is conscious’ (see ibid. 193–208 for an explication of the notion of temporal counterparts). Adopting such a view would require more significant alterations to the letter of my account but would still be perfectly consistent with its spirit.
Assuming for the purposes of simplicity, as Bradley himself does, that all times at which an individual is dead have zero value for that individual.
See Bradley (2004:20–21) for an attempted response to this kind of objection.
For a fascinating account of the history of these debates see the introduction to Le Poidevin (1998).
References
Adams, R. M. (1974). Theories of actualitys. In M. Loux (Ed.), The possible and the actual. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
Barnes, E., & Cameron, R. (2009). The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology. Philosophical Studies, 146, 291–309.
Bourne, C. P. (2002). When am I? A tense time for some tensed theorists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 359–71.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004). How do we know it is now now? Analysis, 64, 199–203.
Bradley, B. (2004). When is death bad for the one who dies? Noûs, 38, 1–28.
Bradley, B. (2009). Well-being and death. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burley, M. (2008). Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death? Ratio, 21, 260–72.
Button, T. (2006). There’s no time like the present. Analysis, 66, 130–35.
Button, T. (2007). Every now and then no-futurism faces no sceptical problems. Analysis, 67, 325–32.
Englert, W. (2003),Lucretius, on the nature of things. Newburyport, Mass: Focus
Epicurus. (1966). Letter to menoeceus. In J. Saunders (Ed.), Greek and roman philosophy after Aristotle. New York: Free Press.
Feldman, F. (1991). Some puzzles about the evil of death. In J. M. Fischer (Ed.), The metaphysics of death. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Forrest, P. (2004). The real but dead past: a reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis, 64, 358–62.
Forrest, P. (2005). Uniform grounding of truth and the growing block theory: a reply to heathwood. Analysis, 66, 161–63.
Heathwood, C. (2005). The real price of the dead past: a reply to Forrest and to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis, 65, 249–51.
Heller, M. (2003). The immorality of genuine modal realism, or: how I learned to stop worrying and let the children drown. Philosophical Studies, 114, 1–22.
Hudson, H. (2001). A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Johansson, J. (2013). The timing problem. In B. Bradley, F. Feldman, & J. Johansson (Eds.), The oxford handbook of philosophy of death. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Time, death and the Atheist. Cogito, 9, 145–52.
Le Poidevin, R. (1996). Arguing for Atheism. London: Routledge.
Le Poidevin, R. (1998). The past, present and future of the debate about tense. In R. Le Poidevin (Ed.), Questions of time and tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Luper, S. (2009). The philosophy of death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Noûs, 4, 73–80.
Parfit, D. (1986). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon.
Prior, A. N. (1959). Thank goodness that’s over. Philosophy, 34, 12–17.
Rosenbaum. (1986). How to be dead and not care: a defense of Epicurus. American Philosophical Quarterly, 23, 217–25.
Sider, T. (2001). Four dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2013). The evil of death: what can metaphysics contribute? In B. Bradley, F. Feldman, & J. Johansson (Eds.), The oxford handbook of philosophy of death. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silverstein, H. S. (1980). The evil of death. Journal of Philosophy, 77, 401–24.
Sorensen, R. (2013). The symmetry problem. In B. Bradley, F. Feldman, & J. Johansson (Eds.), The oxford handbook of philosophy of death. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tallant, J. (2007). There have been, are (Now), and will Be lots of times like the present in the hybrid view of time. Analysis, 67, 83–86.
Tooley, M. (1997). Time, tense and causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warren, J. (2004). Facing death: Epicurus and his critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Carl Baker, Mikel Burley, Ross Cameron, David Efird, Nikk Effingham, Ali Kay, Robin Le Poidevin, Pendaran Roberts and a number of anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Robson, J. A-Time to Die: A Growing Block Account of the Evil of Death. Philosophia 42, 911–925 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9547-5
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9547-5