Abstract
The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.
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Notes
Nagel (1970) originally in The Possibility of Altruism, referred to the distinction as one between subjective and objective reasons. The terminology “agent-neutral and agent-relative” was introduced by Parfit (1979). Parfit (1984) explains it in the following passage, where ‘C’ refers to a moral theory:
Since C gives to all agents common moral aims, I shall call C agent–neutral. Many moral theories do not take this form. These theories are agent-relative, giving to different agents, different aims.
Further on, he adds:
/…/When I call some reason agent-relative, I am not claiming that this reason cannot be a reason for other agents. All that I am claiming is that it may not be. (1984:143)
Notice that there is no mention that some reasons are essentially an agent’s reason, and we cannot therefore be certain that we here are dealing with an “essentialist” way of understanding the dichotomy
Another influential view denies that reasons are facts on the following ground: Normative reason-statements express non-cognitive states (e.g., desires). This approach will not be discussed here.
This is not true about Parfit’s approach that does place the issue of quantification at the centre.
For some attempts to clarify the distinction, see McNaughton and Rawling (1991, 2002), and Skorupski (1995). My concern in this paper does not touch these ways of drawing the distinction. For a review of Skorupski’s work, see Broome (1995). Objections to the former are given in Portmore (2001). See also McNaughton and Rawling’s (2002) reply to Portmore (2001).
“Reason statement” is ambiguous; typically it will refer to a statement expressing some fact, say, “person x needs help’. But it may also refer to statements, which consist of two parts—one which states that (i) Φ-ing is normatively called for, and the other listing (ii) the reason-making grounds for Φ-ing. Here are some different examples: “Charlie ought to help Mary because she is drowning”, and “There is a reason for Tom to help Mary because she is his daughter”. Whereas the left side of the “because” expresses (i), the right side expresses (ii).
The name I owe to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
See for instance, John Broome (2004), who regards them as facts that explain why the agent ought to do some act”. John Skorupski, in his turn, has suggested (in correspondence) that reasons might be understood as “facts plus modes of presentation thereof”. See also Derek Parfit’s (circulating manuscript) Climbing the mountain.
‘Fact’ and “obtaining state of affairs” will be considered as synonyms.
See here Persson (2005).
To take a statement (e.g., “y’s daughter is drowning”) as expressing an agent-relative or neutral reason does not show that the statement expresses a truth about reasons, merely that it expresses an apparent reason. The issue discussed earlier, whether a statement expresses an agent-relative or neutral reason depending on the person to whom it is addressed, is an issue about apparent reasons, and not one about real reasons.
Again, the explanation why Pn cannot contain a reference to the agent is the following: suppose it does express a fact that involves the agent. But in that case Pn cannot be logically equivalent with any other statement that does not contain a reference to the very same agent, and hence Pn would in that case be expressing an agent-relative reason.
Pettit in (1988) suggests that with regard to agent-neutral reasons “there will have to be an indexical involvement of the agent, as he is the one to be moved. But that involvement will come only in the minor premises of the deliberation, not in the major” (p. 165). But notice that his way of meeting the challenge does not work if you regard reasons as facts or true propositions (see e.g., note 16). Pettit, as may be recalled, regards reasons as propositions “which may appear in the major premises of a practical syllogism”. In fact, this way of differentiating between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons might not work for all views on motivating reasons. Since the major premise in both cases is universal (i.e., there is no mention of any specific agent, only of agents with certain properties), it seems clear that also in the agent-relative case, the indexical involvement will be in the minor premise. On the other hand, if we regard Pettit’s account in terms of the distinction between real and apparent reasons, and take him to be referring to apparent reasons he may have a point.
For a recent attempt to distinguish value period from value for, see Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007).
Suppose (a) ‘helping x’ is one kind of act, and (b) ‘helping x if you can’ is a different kind of act. The reason for performing (a) must somehow be a fact that among other things involves that you are able to help x. Thus, the fact that, say, x is in need of help, is an incomplete reason for performing the act in (a). The fact that x is in need, together with the fact that you can help x, is a reason for you to perform the act mentioned in (a). However, the former fact is not obviously incomplete when it comes to the act in (b). That is, it might be argued that the fact that x is in need is sufficient to be a reason for performing the act in (b). Hence, there seem to be facts that are reasons which do not necessarily involve the person, who will have a reason to act.
But this is a strained reply. First, it sets out from an implausible view of what acts are. In what sense does (b) refer to an act? There is no obvious answer to this question. For sure, it is one thing to act on a condition, but so acting is not necessarily doing something different from when we act not on a condition. So what this reply in effect shows is that reasons might perhaps apply to other things than to acts and persons, and that there might in fact be agent-neutral reasons, as long as they are not reasons for acts, but for other things (such as act-on-a-condition). The discussion earlier about the overcrowded boat already suggested something along this line.
See Jonathan Dancy (2004). In this intriguing work he also discusses a third role, intensifiers/attenuators. However, to outline the general idea, I need only to focus on the favourer/enabler distinction.
I owe an anonymous referee for suggesting that Dancy’s distinction refutes the ‘ability argument’, something that I initially doubted.
Dancy (2004), p. 38
Dancy’s account of favourers and enablers raise interpretative issues that there is no space to go into here. Raz, for instance, considers four interpretations. His final one makes room for a notion of a favourer that does not actually favour anything (since there is no enabler present). See Raz (2006, p. 105). Raz might be right that there is textual evidence for this in Dancy’s book. However, the important part of Dancy’s idea, as I take it, is that some features favours on condition, and that it is these features that are reasons.
However, see here note 1 (Dancy 2004), p. 40, where Dancy actually recognizes something to this effect: “Walter Sinnot-Armstrong suggested to me that, in a case where the mere ability to act is a reason, it is also an enabler for itself. I see no reason to deny this amusing possibility”. I am not quite sure what to make of Dancy ‘s admission (see note 24 below, though). If we take facts to be ontological entities on their own, it is hard to see how one and the same “thing” can be its own (condition or) enabler. Metaphysics apart, this note is noteworthy for another reason; if ability can be a favourer (on condition) as well as an enabler, we cannot meet the challenge discussed in this work by claiming that ability only appears as enablers.
For instance, Dancy objects to Roger Crisp’s notion of an “ultimate reason”. In short, Dancy objects to what he thinks is the idea underlying Crisp notion, namely the idea of a full explanation. The notion of a complete reason qua facts that I have outlined is not, in contrast to “explanation” a success notion, and so Dancy’s arguments against Crisp does not in any obvious way affect this idea.
Recall Dancy’s claim (see note 22) that one and the same feature might be a favourer on condition (reason) and its own enabler. Perhaps this should be understood as follows: There are different ways of bringing out what is salient about the ability feature. Given the context, you might want to stress to someone that ability is what favours doing the act, but you might also point out that ability is a condition for doing the act. We are in other words talking about the feature in different ways. However, the fact that a person is able to do something remains the same fact whether or not we invoke it as a favourer or an enabler.
See also Caj Strandberg (2008), who gives such a pragmatic account of the distinction between “what makes objects have moral properties and enablers” (p. 150). Moreover, he thinks it is generalisable to Dancy’s related distinction between favourers and enablers. Strandberg cites the following works as putting forward relatated suggestions: Raz (2000, p. 59); Broome (2004, 32–5) and McKeever and Ridge (2006, pp. 72–5). That a feature may be a favourer in one case and an enabler in another is something that Dancy himself points out (see his discussion of the ability to raise one’s arm, p. 40; see also footnote 1). He also claims that “it is easy to find examples of cases where it is not clear which side of the favouring/enabling distinction a given feature is to fall.” (p. 51)
It should be mentioned that Dancy (2004) does in fact discuss the distinction between favouring/enbabling/intensifing in terms of the different things that “relevant considerations can do” (p. 41).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to David Alm, Johan Brännmark, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Caj Strandberg and Michael Zimmerman for useful comments. I am also indebted to John Skorupski for some stimulating discussions, which helped me see a couple of issues in a new light. Finally, I also owe a referee for posing some tough objections.
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Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37, 227–243 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9164-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9164-2