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In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations

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Abstract

This article examines contemporary China-Iran relations, focusing on the economic and strategic ties that have helped solidify the relationship since 1979. We begin with an overview of the arms and technology transfers that mark the early years of the relationship, analyzing the benefits each side gained from these transactions. In addition to discussing the short-term financial benefits behind forging stronger ties, we examine how the regional ascent of both states has also presented several long term factors that helped motivate their cooperation. These developments shed light on the important role the U.S. has played, both in terms of where it has tried to intervene and what success it has had influencing the Sino-Iranian relationship.

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Notes

  1. See [1]; [2]; [3].

  2. See [4]; [5]; [6]; [7]; [8].

  3. An examination of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data from 2005 on conventional weapons transfers shows that China was eleventh in terms of global recipients, and that it was ranked sixth as a global supplier for the period 1976-2004.

  4. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 79.

  5. Remarks made by Premier Wen Jiabao when addressing a conference in Beijing commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (June 28, 2004).

  6. Sales to Iraq were done through Jordan and Egypt; while those to Iran were transferred through Pakistan and North Korea. See Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, p. 32; and Guang, “China’s Success in the Middle East,” 1997, p.38.

  7. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 81.

  8. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 81.

  9. Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, p. 29.

  10. Data from Garver as obtained from SIPRI, Arms Transfer Databese, data fom Dr. Siemon Wezeman, and Direction of Trade Statistics. See Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 179.

  11. Data is reported from the SIPRI arms transfer database (1996) and is measured in constant 1990 dollars. See [11].

  12. Calabrese, “Peaceful or Dangerous,” 1992, p. 482.

  13. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers,” 2002, p. 51.

  14. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 171.

  15. [12]. Bin Huwaidin argues the Chinese criticized Soviet attempts to take advantage of the changing relationship between Iran and the U.S. after the fall of the Shah and they were concerned about expansionist efforts by the Soviet Union.

  16. Garver claims that Russia was Iran’s “preferred military partner, during the post-1988 period” (see Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 184). Meanwhile, Grimmett argues China maintained the number one position even after the Iran-Iraq war, though it is clear China was supplying Iran with Russian technology and weapons (see Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers,” 2002, pp. 42–44, 51–52), and Bin Huwaidin shows China in the more prominent position in terms of both deliveries and agreements to Iran between 1983–1990, but that from 1991–1997 Russia surpasses China (see [13]).

  17. Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, p. 29.

  18. Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, p. 30.

  19. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 80.

  20. With regard to China-Iran transfers since 1980, the following weapons or weapons systems are relevant: C-801 ShShM’s and launchers, C-802 ship-to-ship missiles and missile systems, CSA-1 SAM’s and systems, EM-52 s and EM-55 s (water mines), ESR-1 surveillance radar, F-6 and F-7 fighters, F-7 M airguard fighters, Hai Ying-2-L ShShM launchers, Hai Ying-2 ShShM/SShMs (aka “Silkworms”), Hong Jian-73 antitank missiles, Hong Ying-5 portable SAMs, HQ-2B SAM and systems, Hudong-class fast attack craft (M), Oghab SSMs, PL-2A AAMs, PL-7 AAMs, Rice Lamp fire control radar, T-59 main battle tanks, Type 501 APCs, Type 59/1 130 mm towed guns, Type 60 122 mm towed guns, and Type 63 MRLs (see Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, pp. 50-51). Many of the aforementioned acquisitions were to help Iran defend itself from external interference in the Gulf and to withstand “littoral warfare” from the U.S, which includes a variety of tactics used in close confrontation in enemy waters, a type of warfare advocated by the U.S. Navy in the Gulf after the Iran-Iraq war (see Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 182).

  21. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 181.

  22. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 180.

  23. Garver, China & Iran, 2006.

  24. See Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports,” 1998, p. 59.

  25. See Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports,” 1998, pp. 55-70; Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999; Garver, China & Iran, 2006.

  26. Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports,” 1998, p. 58.

  27. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 169.

  28. Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, p. 42.

  29. The Gore-McCain Act addresses countries that supply “destabilizing weapons” to either Iran or Iraq. See Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports,” 1998, p. 60.

  30. Rubin, “China’s Middle East Strategy,” 1999, p. 49.

  31. Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, 1999, p. 39.

  32. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, pp. 191-3. The incident was also notably before China had even ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  33. Some of the developments contributing to the improved relations with the Soviet Union included the end to the Soviet’s efforts in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet support for Vietnam’s efforts in Cambodia, both of which China had indicated strong opposition. See [17]; and Calabrese, “Peaceful or Dangerous,” 1992, pp. 471-485, for a further discussion of the shifting tripolar relationship in the 1980s.

  34. Operation Staunch was a U.S.-led effort to impose an international arms embargo on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

  35. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 86.

  36. The Chinese view is that it has not engaged in any expansionist policies in the contemporary era, since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Other powerful states such as the U.S., Japan, and Western European states had colonial experiences well into the 21st century that have given them a more negative image as colonizers in comparison.

  37. Garver, China& Iran, 2006, p. 161.

  38. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s comment on China as a “responsible stakeholder” as quoted in Bader, Jeffrey A. and Richard C. Bush III “China’s Stake in Iran,” Wall Street Journal (Feb 06, 2006).

  39. See Rubin, “China’s Middle East Strategy,” 1999, pp. 46-54; [19]; Jin, “Energy First,” 2005; [20]; [21], <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/the_new_axis_of_oil> (accessed December 12, 2006); [22].

  40. Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region has received more publicity in the Western world, largely as a result of support by Western Celebrities (i.e. Richard Gere and the “Free Tibet” campaigns) for some of these issues with regard to religious restrictions on Buddhism, the exile of the Dalai Lama, and crackdowns on Tibetan separatist activities. But Xinjiang has been of greater interest to states in Central Asia and the Middle East; considering the cultural, linguistic, and religious ties they share.

  41. Even though 45% of Xinjiang’s population is Uyghur, economic and political power has predominantly been controlled by China’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. Moreover, efforts at cultural assimilation have been met with resistance. The Uyghurs are Caucasian and have Turkish linguistic roots, but have been forced to adopt Han ways and learn Chinese to get economic and political positions of importance.

  42. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, pp. 60-8, 136-8.

  43. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 132.

  44. Garver, China & Iran, 2006, p. 133.

  45. Jin, “Energy First,” 2005, p. 4.

  46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004, SCO Cooperation Areas.

  47. Dorraj and Currier, “Lubricated with Oil,” 2008.

  48. Sultan, “Iran, Proliferation Magnet,” 2005, p. 126.

  49. Shen, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 2006, p. 63.

  50. United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 1696, July 31, 2006, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm> (accessed December 12, 2006).

  51. Nazila Fathi, “Iran Leader Calls Nuclear Sanctions Ineffective,” New York Times, February 2, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/02/world/middleeast/02iran.html> (accessed February 2, 2007).

  52. Nasser Karimi, “Iran Rebuffs U.N., Vows to Speed Up Uranium Enrichment.” Washington Post, December 25, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/24/AR2006122400158.html> (accessed December 25, 2006).

  53. Elaine Sciolino and Katrin Bennhold, “Chirac Strays from Assailing a Nuclear Iran,” New York Times, February 1, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/world/europe/01france.html> (accessed February 1, 2007).

  54. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Official Publishes Rebuke of Bush.” New York Times, February 2, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/world/asia/02china.html>

  55. Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Engagement,” 2006, p. 331.

  56. Peter Ford and Donald Kirk, “Tenuous Deal for North Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 2007, < http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0214/p01s04-woap.html> (accessed February 14, 2007).

  57. Ahrari, “Iran, China and Russia,” 2001, p. 462.

  58. Bill Powell, “The New Power in the Persian Gulf – Forget the U.S. and Europe. China is the key player in the Iranian nuclear crisis,” Time, January 22, 2006, < www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901060130-1151752,00.html> (accessed December 12, 2006).

  59. “Multipolarity Plays Key Role in World Peace: Chinese Vice President,” People’s Daily Online, November 6, 2001, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200111/05/eng20011105_83945.html> (accessed July 30, 2008).

  60. Hu Jintao, “Written Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations’ 60th Session,” September 15, 2005, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t213091.htm> (accessed July 30, 2008).

  61. “President Hu Jintao had a Collective Meeting with the Leaders of India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico,” Embassy Press Release, June 8, 2007, <http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/NewsPress/t329817.htm> (accessed July 30, 2008).

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  1. Department of Political Science, Texas Christian University, TCU Box 297021, Fort Worth, TX, 76129, USA

    Carrie Liu Currier & Manochehr Dorraj

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  1. Carrie Liu Currier
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Correspondence to Carrie Liu Currier.

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Currier, C.L., Dorraj, M. In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 15, 49–69 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-009-9082-6

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