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Investor relations: a comprehensive overview

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Abstract

This paper reviews the existing literature on investor relations. The purpose of investor relations is consistently to provide market participants with decision-relevant information as a result of either mandatory or voluntary information-disclosure policies. A causation chain between investor relations and stock prices is established through the liquidity hypothesis with respect to the depth of analyst coverage. Though a positive association is documented, it is not perfectly linear. After presenting the taxonomy of corporate disclosures, we elaborate on how well the full-disclosure and the discretionary disclosure models fit into reality. In addition, the extant theoretical and empirical literature reports that investor relations policies vary over time, across firms and jurisdictions.

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Artikel gibt einen Überblick über die existierende Literatur zu Investor Relations. Informationsasymmetrien und Agency-Konflikte zwischen Managern und Investoren rechtfertigen das Betreiben von Investor Relations Aktivitäten. Investor Relations zielt darauf ab, Kapitalmarktteilnehmer mit entscheidungsrelevanten Informationen zu versorgen. Liquidität und die Abdeckung des Unternehmens durch Analysten (analyst following) werden u. a. in der vorherrschenden Literatur als treibende Faktoren für das Betreiben von Investor Relations Abteilungen genannt. Allerdings besteht kein linearer Wirkungszusammenhang zwischen Investor Relations und Aktienkursen. Die Offenlegung von Informationen wird häufig anhand theoretischer Modelle (u. a. dem Theorem der vollständigen Offenlegung von Informationen) erläutert. Investor Relations Aktivitäten hängen von diversen Variablen ab, von denen die gesetzlichen und institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen als wichtig eingestuft werden. Letztere bestimmen auch den Grad der gesetzlich vorgegebenen Informationsoffenlegungen und den daraus resultierenden freiwilligen Offenlegungen von Informationen. Darüber hinaus spielt die kulturelle Komponente eines Landes eine wichtige Rolle für die Offenlegung.

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Bassen, A., Basse Mama, H. & Ramaj, H. Investor relations: a comprehensive overview . J Betriebswirtsch 60, 49–79 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-009-0057-7

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