Abstract
Social service contracting to nongovernmental organizations is popular form of privatization across the world. Although nonprofits are preferable social service providers for legal and normative reasons, governments in the United States increasingly rely on for-profit organizations to deliver social services. This trend warrants further exploration about whether nonprofits or for-profits perform according to theoretical expectations when they exist in the same market. This study employs qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how sector-public, nonprofit, and for-profit-combines with structural variables to produce acceptable contract performance in juvenile justice programs. QCA is a discovery-oriented research tool that determines whether combinations of variables within cases produce a specific outcome and whether those combinations are consistent across cases. I find sector is not a necessary or sufficient predictor of acceptable performance on its own. Rather it combines with market factors to lead to acceptable contract performance. Combinations vary by sector, indicating that sectors behave differently in similar circumstances. The primary theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a nuanced account of contract performance in mixed sector markets.
Résumé
Externaliser les services sociaux à des organisations non gouvernementales est une forme populaire de privatisation dans le monde entier. Bien que des organismes à but non lucratif soient des prestataires sociaux préférables pour des raisons juridiques et normatives, les gouvernements des États-Unis font de plus en plus appel aux organisations à but lucratif pour fournir les services sociaux. Cette tendance mérite une étude plus poussée pour savoir si les organisations à but non lucratif ou à but lucratif répondent aux attentes théoriques lorsqu’elles existent sur le même marché. Cette étude utilise une analyse comparative comparée (QCA) pour examiner comment le secteur public, les organisations à but non lucratif et à but lucratif se combinent avec des variables structurelles pour produire une exécution acceptable de contrats dans les programmes de justice pour mineurs. La QCA est un outil de recherche axé sur les découvertes qui détermine si les combinaisons des variables dans un cas produisent un résultat spécifique et si ces combinaisons sont cohérentes d’un cas à l’autre. Selon moi, le secteur n’est pas, à lui seul, un indicateur nécessaire ou suffisant de performance acceptable. Il se combine, plutôt, avec des facteurs de marché pour conduire à une exécution acceptable des contrats. Les combinaisons varient selon le secteur, indiquant que les secteurs se comportent différemment dans des conditions comparables. La principale contribution théorique de cet article est de présenter un bilan nuancé de l’exécution des contrats sur les marchés mixtes.
Zusammenfassung
Die Vergabe von Aufträgen über die Bereitstellung von Sozialdienstleistungen an nicht-staatliche Organisationen ist eine weltweit beliebte Form der Privatisierung. Zwar werden gemeinnützige Organisationen für die Bereitstellung von Sozialdienstleistungen aus rechtlichen und normativen Gründen bevorzugt; doch sind die Regierungsbehörden in den USA immer mehr auf gewinnorientierte Organisationen für die Erbringung von Sozialdienstleistungen angewiesen. Dieser Trend rechtfertigt weitere Untersuchungen dazu, ob die Leistungen der gemeinnützigen bzw. gewinnorientierten Organisationen den theoretischen Erwartungen entsprechen, wenn sie im gleichen Markt operieren. Die vorliegende Studie wendet die qualitative vergleichende Analyse (qualitative comparative analysis, QCA) an, um zu untersuchen, wie sich der Sektor - sei es der öffentliche, gemeinnützige oder gewinnorientierte Sektor - mit strukturellen Variablen verknüpft, um eine akzeptable Vertragserfüllung in Jugendjustizprogrammen zu bewirken. Die QCA ist ein erkenntnisorientiertes Forschungsinstrument, mithilfe dessen bestimmt wird, ob die Kombinationen von Variablen in einem Fall zu einem spezifischen Ergebnis führen und ob diese Kombinationen in allen Fällen konsistent sind. Ich komme zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Sektor allein keinen relevanten oder ausreichenden Prädiktor für eine akzeptable Leistungserfüllung darstellt. Stattdessen kombiniert er sich mit Marktfaktoren und führt so zu einer akzeptablen Vertragserfüllung. Die Kombinationen variieren je nach Sektor, was darauf hinweist, dass sich die Sektoren unter ähnlichen Umständen unterschiedlich verhalten. Der primäre theoretische Beitrag dieser Abhandlung ist die Bereitstellung einer nuancierten Darstellung der Vertragserfüllung in Märkten mit verschiedenen Sektoren.
Resumen
La contratación de servicios sociales a organizaciones no gubernamentales es una forma popular de privatización en todo el mundo. Aunque las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro son proveedores de servicios sociales preferentes por motivos legales y normativos, los gobiernos en los Estados Unidos confían cada vez más en organizaciones con ánimo de lucro para ofrecer servicios sociales. Esta tendencia garantiza una exploración adicional sobre si las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro o aquellas con ánimo de lucro actúan según las expectativas teóricas cuando existen en el mismo mercado. El presente estudio emplea el análisis comparativo cualitativo (qualitative comparative analysis, “QCA”) para examinar cómo se combinan el sector público,las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro y las organizaciones con ánimo de lucro para producir una ejecución contractual aceptable en programas de justicia juvenil. El QCA es una herramienta de investigación orientada al descubrimiento que determina si las combinaciones de variables dentro de los casos producen un resultado específico y si dichas combinaciones son coherentes en los diferentes casos. Encuentro que el sector no es un pronosticador necesario o suficiente de ejecución aceptable por sí mismo. Más bien, se combina con factores de mercado para llevar a una ejecución contractual aceptable. Los combinaciones varían por sector, indicando qué sectores se comportan de manera diferente en circunstancias similares. La contribución teórica fundamental del presente documento es proporcionar una explicación matizada de la ejecución contractual en mercados con sectores mixtos.
Chinese
社会服务由非政府组织承包是世界各地私有化的流行形式。尽管从法律与规范原因考虑,非营利组织是更为可取的社会服务提供者,但是在美国,政府越来越依赖于营利性组织提供社会服务。 这一趋势使得我们有必要对以下课题进行进一步探究:当非营利性组织与营利性组织同时存在同一市场里,根据理论预期,是非营利性组织表现较为优胜,还是营利性组织更为优胜?本研究运用定性对比分析(qualitative comparative analysis (QCA))的方法对以下方面进行了检验:在青少年司法项目中,部门(公共、非营利、营利)是如何与结构变量相结合以产生可以接受的合约履行的。QCA是一种以发现为导向的研究工具,可以确定变量组合在各种情况中是否能够产生某一特定的结果,以及在不同情况下,这些组合是否是始终一致的。笔者发现,单单是部门,并不能构成一项关于可接受履约的必要或充分预测指标。相反,部门与市场因素相结合则可以产生可接受履约。组合随着不同部门而发生变化,这表示在类似情况下,各部门表现各不相同。本文的主要理论贡献在于:对混合部门市场中的履约进行了细致入微的叙述解释。
Arabic
تعاقد الخدمة الاجتماعية للمنظمات الغيرحكومية هو شكل محبوب من الخصخصة في جميع أنحاء العالم. على الرغم من أن المنظمات الغير ربحية هي أفضل مقدمي الخدمات الإجتماعية لأسباب قانونية ومعيارية ، الحكومات في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تعتمد بشكل متزايد على المنظمات التي تسعى للربح على تقديم الخدمات الإجتماعية. هذا الإتجاه يستحق المزيد من الدراسة حول ما إذا كانت المنظمات الغير ربحية أو التي تسعى للربح يمارسون مهامهم وفقا” لتوقعات نظرية عندما كانت موجودة في نفس السوق. تستخدم هذه الدراسة تحليل مقارن نوعي (QCA) لدراسة كيف قطاع عام ،غير ربحي ، والذي يسعى للربح ينضم مع المتغيرات الهيكلية لإنتاج عقد أداء مقبول في برامج عدالة الأحداث. تحليل مقارن نوعي(QCA) هوالإكتشاف الموجه لأداة البحث التي تحدد ما إذا كان مزيج من المتغيرات في الحالات ينتج نتيجة محددة وإذا كانت تلك هي مجموعات متناسقة عبر الحالات. وجدت القطاع ليس مؤشرضروري أو كافي لأداء مقبول من تلقاء نفسه. بل يجمع مع عوامل السوق لتقود أداء عقد مقبول. مجموعات تختلف حسب القطاع، مشيرا” إلى أن القطاعات تتصرف بشكل مختلف في ظروف مماثلة. المساهمة الأولية النظرية لهذا البحث هو تقديم حساب دقيق لأداء العقد في أسواق القطاع المختلط.
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Carboni, J.L. Combined Effects: The Influence of Organizational Form and Structural Characteristics on Contract Performance in Mixed Sector Markets. Voluntas 27, 1781–1808 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9677-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9677-9