Abstract
With the abolition of the double registration regime, on paper Chinese NGOs are more independent from the Government’s bureaucratic commands than ever. Nevertheless, in reality the Chinese Government’s control over Chinese NGOs remains heavy-handed. Through giving NGOs bianzhi and purchasing services from NGOs, the Chinese Government caused and continues to cause the Chinese NGOs to adopt certain attributes of the danwei tradition. Specifically, the Government strives to embed the CPC into the Chinese NGOs and make the Chinese NGOs financially dependent on the Government. The danwei tradition is not merely a lingering legacy of China’s Communist past but also a result that the Government today actively seeks to bring about.
Résumé
Avec l’abolition du régime de double inscription, les ONG chinoises sont, en théorie, plus indépendantes que jamais du pouvoir bureaucratique du gouvernement. Néanmoins, le contrôle du gouvernement chinois sur les ONG chinoises reste en réalité autoritaire. En donnant aux ONG des « bianzhi » et en leur achetant des services, le gouvernement chinois a fait en sorte et continue de faire en sorte que les ONG chinoises adoptent certaines caractéristiques de la tradition de la « danwei » . Plus précisément, le gouvernement s’efforce d’intégrer le PCC (parti communiste chinois) dans les ONG chinoises et de les rendre financièrement dépendantes du gouvernement. La tradition de la « danwei » n’est pas seulement un héritage persistant du passé communiste de la Chine, mais aussi le résultat que le gouvernement cherche activement aujourd’hui à apporter.
Zusammenfassung
Mit der Abschaffung des Doppelregistrierungs-Systems sind chinesische nicht-staatliche Organisationen theoretisch unabhängiger denn je von den bürokratischen Vorschriften der Regierung. Doch tatsächlich übt die chinesische Regierung weiterhin eine große Kontrolle über diese Organisationen aus. Durch die Bereitstellung von bianzhi an die Organisationen und den Bezug von Dienstleistungen von den Organisationen veranlasste bzw. veranlasst die chinesische Regierung die nicht-staatlichen Organisationen noch immer dazu, sich an gewisse Danwei-Traditionen zu halten. Die Regierung ist insbesondere bestrebt, die Kommunistische Partei Chinas in die nicht-staatlichen Organisationen einzubetten und sie finanziell von der Regierung abhängig zu machen. Die Danwei-Tradition ist nicht nur eine fortbestehende Hinterlassenschaft der kommunistischen Vergangenheit Chinas, sondern auch ein Resultat, das die Regierung heutzutage aktiv zuwege bringt.
Resumen
Con la abolición del régimen de doble registro, las ONG chinas sobre el papel son más independientes que nunca de las órdenes burocráticas del Gobierno. Sin embargo, en realidad, el control del gobierno chino sobre las ONG chinas sigue siendo severo. Mediante la concesión a las ONG de servicios de provisión y bianzhi procedentes de ONG, el gobierno chino provocó y sigue provocando que las ONG chinas adopten determinados atributos de la tradición danwei. Concretamente, el Gobierno se esfuerza por arraigar el CPC (Partido Comunista de China) en las ONG chinas y por hacer a las ONG chinas financieramente dependientes del Gobierno. La tradición danwei no es simplemente un legado persistente del pasado comunista de China sino también un resultado que el Gobierno trata activamente de provocar en la actualidad.
摘要
暨双重登记制度取消后, 表面上中国的NGO可以更加独立于政府的行政命令。然而实际上中国政府对NGO的控制措施仍然十分严密。通过为NGO提供编制与政府购买的诱导, 中国政府使得中国的NGO延续了单位制的某些特征。特别体现在政府努力将党建嵌入到中国NGO中, 并让中国的NGO在财务上依赖于政府。从而, 单位制传统不仅是中国共产党的历史传统, 而且是当今政府积极寻求与推动的结果。
ملخص
مع إلغاء نظام التسجيل المزدوج، على الورق المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الصينية هي اكثر إستقلال عن أوامر الحكومة البيروقراطية من أي وقت مضى. مع ذلك، في الواقع الحكومة الصينية سيطرة على المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الصينية لا تزال ثقيلة الوطأة. من خلال إعطاء المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) نظام (bianzhi) وشراء الخدمات من المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) ، تسببت الحكومة الصينية ولا تزال تتسبب في أن المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الصينية تتخذ سمات معينة للتقاليد(danwei).على وجه التحديد، تسعى الحكومة إلى تضمين الحزب الشيوعي الصيني في المنظمات الغيرحكومية (NGOs) الصينية وجعل المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الصينية تعتمد ماليا” على الحكومة. تقاليد(danwei) ليست مجرد إرث ثابت من الماضي الشيوعي الصيني لكن أيضا نتيجة لذلك تسعى الحكومة اليوم بنشاط لتحقيقه.
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Notes
These are the internal documents from the interview, and thus full information cannot be provided. The name of the document will be listed. Yilianban: Shanghaishi Yishituanti lianhe guanli bangongshi gexuexiehui huanjie ji ganbu guanli ruogan zaxing guiding[Interim provisions on change of elections and leaders’ managements of Yilianban’s subordinate medical associations].
These are the internal documents from the interview, and thus full information cannot be provided. The name of the document will be listed. Yilianban: Shanghaishi Yilianban yusuan guanli banfa[Budget management regulation of Yilianban] Yilianban:Shanghaishi Yilianban caizheng xiangmu zijin ji feicaizheng buzhu xiangmu zijin guanli zanxing guiding[Interim provisions on fiscal programs’ and non-fiscal programs’ management of Yilianban]
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Acknowledgments
We thank everyone from the Yilianban, or Shanghai Medical Associations Joint Management Office, for furnishing us with the empirical basis for this paper.
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Xiao, M., Lin, H. Carrots and Sticks: A Case Study of Government-Caused Danwei Tradition in Chinese NGOs. Voluntas 27, 2027–2036 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9608-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9608-9