Abstract
Drawing on the institutional sociology framework of coercive isomorphism, the study explores the effects of upward hierarchical accountability on the program outcomes of NGOs in Bangladesh. The study uses a qualitative case study method involving two NGOs. The findings from the case studies suggest that NGOs which depend on foreign funding spend more time and resources in fulfilling their upward hierarchical accountabilities compared to NGOs which are funded from their own sources. As a result, the accountability obligations of foreign-funded NGOs are not met as effectively as NGOs which are funded from their own sources.
Résumé
S’appuyant sur le cadre institutionnel sociologique de l’isomorphisme coercitif, l’étude examine les conséquences de la responsabilité hiérarchique ascendante dans les résultats des programmes des ONG au Bangladesh. Cette étude utilise une méthode d’étude de cas qualitative portant sur deux ONG. Les résultats des études de cas indiquent que les ONG qui dépendent des financements étrangers passent plus de temps et dépensent plus de ressources pour s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités hiérarchiques ascendantes que les ONG financées par leurs propres sources. Par conséquent, les obligations de responsabilité des ONG financées par l’étranger ne sont pas satisfaites aussi efficacement que les ONG financées par leurs propres sources.
Zusammenfassung
Die Studie untersucht auf der Basis des institutionellen soziologischen Rahmens der erzwungenen Isomorphie, wie sich die Rechenschaftspflichten gegenüber hierarchisch höher Gestellten auf die Programmergebnisse nicht-staatlicher Organisationen in Bangladesch auswirken. Es wird eine qualitative Fallstudienmethode angewandt, die zwei nicht-staatliche Organisationen einbezieht. Die Ergebnisse der Fallstudien lassen darauf schließen, dass die nicht-staatlichen Organisationen, die auf ausländische Finanzierungen angewiesen sind, vergleichsweise mehr Zeit und Ressourcen aufbringen, um ihren Rechenschaftspflichten gegenüber hierarchisch höher Gestellten nachzukommen, als nicht-staatliche Organisationen, die sich aus eigenen Quellen finanzieren. Folglich werden die Rechenschaftspflichten der nicht-staatlichen Organisationen, die aus dem Ausland finanziert werden, nicht so effektiv erfüllt wie die der eigenfinanzierten nicht-staatlichen Organisationen.
Resumen
Recurriendo al marco del isomorfismo coercitivo de la sociología institucional, el presente estudio explora los efectos de la rendición de cuentas jerárquica de arriba-abajo sobre los resultados del programa de ONG en Bangladesh. El presente estudio utiliza un método de estudio de caso cualitativo que implica a dos ONG. Los hallazgos de los estudios de casos sugieren que las ONG que dependen de la financiación extranjera dedican más tiempo y recursos a cumplir con su rendición de cuentas jerárquica de arriba-abajo en comparación a las ONG que se financian con sus propios recursos. Como resultado, las obligaciones de rendición de cuentas de las ONG financiadas externamente no son satisfechas de manera tan efectiva como las ONG que se financian con sus propios recursos.
摘要
在制度社会学框架的强制性同构基础上,本研究探索了向上等级责任对于孟加拉国非政府组织项目结果的影响。本研究对两个非政府组织进行了定性案例分析。案例分析的研究发现,相比较与自负盈亏的非政府组织来说,那些依赖于外国资金的非政府组织需要更多的时间和资源来履行其向上等级责任。因此,那些外资援助的非政府组织在完成责任义务时没有自负盈亏的非政府组织效率高。
ملخص
بالإعتماد على إطار مؤسسي إجتماعي من التشابه بالقوة، تفحص الدراسة آثار المساءلة الهرمية التصاعدية على نتائج برنامج المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) في بنجلاديش. تستخدم الدراسة منهج دراسة الحالة النوعية التي تنطوي على منظمتين غير حكوميتين (NGOs). تشير النتائج من دراسات الحالة أن المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) التي تعتمد على تمويل أجنبي تستخدم مزيد من الوقت والموارد في تحقيق المساءلة الهرمية التصاعدية بالمقارنة مع المنظمات الغيرحكومية (NGOs) التي تمول من مصادر خاصة بهم. نتيجة لذلك لم يتم الوفاء بإلتزامات مساءلة المنظمات الغيرحكومية (NGOs)التي يتم تمويلها بتمويل أجنبي بفعالية مثل المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) التي تمول من مصادر خاصة بهم.
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Notes
NGOAB requires (see NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh, 2009e) are simply a list of expenditure headings. Some of these headings are clearly relatable to social and economic development objectives, health, education, water, infrastructure, etc. but it seems to be all input reporting, not outputs let alone outcomes.
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Mir, M., Bala, S.K. NGO Accountability in Bangladesh: Two Contrasting Cases. Voluntas 26, 1831–1851 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-014-9513-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-014-9513-7