Abstract
Many of the world’s largest and most impactful transnational NGOs are registered in the United States where they engage in significant fundraising activities to support their global operations. Their reliance on the external environment for financial support exposes them to resource dependence and the possibility of external control. However, as civil society organizations organized as firms, transnational NGOs attempt to maintain operational independence from the donors upon which they rely for funding. This article contributes to resource dependence theory by identifying the strategies that transnational NGOs employ in response to resource dependence, explaining the emergence of strategic response, and exploring the conditions under which NGOs are capacitated to preserve organizational autonomy. The responses transnational NGOs employ include alignment, subcontracting, perseverance, diversification, commercialization, funding liberation, geostrategic arbitrage, specialization, selectivity, donor education, and compromise. Elements of this strategic repertoire empower NGOs to resist external control, even circumventing and influencing donor preferences. Findings are based on in-depth, face-to-face interviews with top organizational leaders from a diverse sample of transnational NGOs registered in the United States.
Résumé
Nombre des plus grandes et des plus influentes ONG transnationales sont enregistrées aux Etats-Unis où elles développent d’importantes activités visant à collecter des fonds pour soutenir leurs opérations à travers le monde. Parce qu’elles dépendent de leur environnement extérieur pour leur financement, ces ONGs s’exposent à la dépendance des ressources et à la possibilité d’une prise de controle extérieure. Cependant, en tant qu’organisations de la société civile organisées en entreprises, les ONG transnationales cherchent à maintenir leur indépendance opérationnelle vis-à-vis des donateurs qui les soutiennent financièrement. Cette article contribue à la théorie de la dépendance des ressources en identifiant les stratégies que les ONG transnationales déploient pour faire face à la dépendance des ressources, et en explorant les conditions dans lesquelles les ONG se donnent les moyens de préserver leur autonomie organisationnelle. Les stratégies qu’emploient les ONG incluent l’alignement, la sous-traitance, la persévérance, la diversification, la commercialisation, l’affranchissement financier, l’arbitrage géostratégique, la spécialisation, la sélectivité, l’éducation des donateurs, et le compromis. Cet éventail de stratégies permet aux ONGs de résister au controle extérieur, et même de contourner ou d’infléchir les préférences de leurs donateurs. Les résultats de cette étude sont fondés sur des entretiens en profondeur et en tête-à-tête avec les haut-dirigeants d’un échantillon varié d’ONG transnationales enregistrées aux Etats-Unis.
Zusammenfassung
Viele der weltweit größten und einflussreichsten transnationalen nicht-staatlichen Organisationen haben ihren Sitz in den USA, wo sie zur Unterstützung ihrer globalen Operationen große Spendenaktionen durchführen. Durch ihre Abhängigkeit von der Außenwelt zu ihrer finanziellen Unterstützung besteht für sie die Gefahr der Ressourcenabhängigkeit und einer möglichen externen Kontrolle. Trotzdem versuchen die transnationalen nicht-staatlichen Organisationen, die als Bürgergesellschaftsorganisationen wie Unternehmen organisiert sind, ihre betriebliche Unabhängigkeit von ihren Spendern zu wahren, auch wenn sie finanziell von diesen abhängig sind. Die vorliegende Abhandlung leistet einen Beitrag zur Ressourcenabhängigkeitstheorie. Es werden in diesem Zusammenhang die von den transnationalen nicht-staatlichen Organisationen angewandten Strategien für den Umgang mit der Ressourcenabhängigkeit identifiziert, die Entwicklung strategischer Reaktionen erläutert und die Bedingungen, unter denen die nicht-staatlichen Organisationen in der Lage sind, ihre organisatorische Autonomie zu wahren, erforscht. Die Strategien dieser Organisationen schließen unter anderem Folgendes ein: Anpassung, Auftragsvergabe, Beharrlichkeit, Diversifikation, Kommerzialisierung, Mittelfreigabe, geostrategische Arbitrage, Spezialisierung, Selektivität, Spenderaufklärung und Kompromissschließung. Ihr strategisches Repertoire ermöglicht es ihnen, der externen Kontrolle standzuhalten und dabei Spenderwünsche sogar zu umgehen oder zu beeinflussen. Die Ergebnisse beruhen auf eingehende, persönliche Befragungen mit Spitzenführungskräften aus einer diversen Stichprobe transnationaler nicht-staatlicher Organisationen in den USA.
Resumen
Muchas de las ONG transnacionales más grandes y con mayor impacto del mundo están inscritas en los Estados Unidos donde se dedican a actividades significativas de recaudación de fondos para apoyar sus operaciones mundiales. Su dependencia del entorno externo para obtener apoyo financiero las expone a la dependencia de recursos y a la posibilidad de control externo. Sin embargo, a medida que las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se organizaron como firmas, las ONG transnacionales tratan de mantener la independencia operativa de los donantes en los que confían para su financiación. El presente artículo contribuye a la teoría de la dependencia de recursos identificando las estrategias que las ONG transnacionales emplean en respuesta a la dependencia de recursos, explicando el surgimiento de respuestas estratégicas, y explorando las condiciones bajo las cuales las ONG están capacitadas para preservar la autonomía organizativa. Las respuestas que emplean las ONG transnacionales incluyen la alineación, la subcontratación, la perseverancia, la diversificación, la comercialización, la liberación de financiación, el arbitraje geoestratégico, la especialización, la selectividad, la educación de los donantes, y el compromiso. Este repertorio estratégico da poder a las ONG para resistir el control externo, incluso circunvalando e influyendo en las preferencias de los donantes. Los hallazgos se basan en entrevistas en profundidad, cara a cara, con líderes organizativos principales de una muestra variada de ONG transnacionales inscritas en los Estados Unidos.
摘要
许多世界最大型且最具影响力的跨国非政府组织都在美国注册登记,在美国,他们举办重大的基金筹集活动以支持其国际操作活动。对于财务支持外部环境的依赖暴露了他们的资源依赖以及外部控制的可能性。然而,文明社会组织像运营公司那样运转,跨国非政府组织却试图保持操作独立性,不受基金捐赠者的操控。本文确定了跨国非政府组织回应资源依赖时所采用的战略、阐释战略反应的来源,并探讨非政府组织合法取得组织自治权的情形,为资源依赖理论作出了贡献。跨国非政府组织所作出的反应包括结盟、分包、坚持、多样化、商业化、基金自由、地缘政治学套利、特殊化、选择、捐赠教育以及妥协。这些战略技能使得非政府组织抵制外部控制,甚至规避和影响捐赠者的偏好。这些是从与美国注册的跨国非政府组织的高层领导面对面的访谈中发现的。
ملخص
تم تسجيل العديد من المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) في العالم عبر الوطنية الأكبر والأكثر تأثيرا˝ في الولايات المتحدة حيث أنها تشارك في أنشطة جمع أموال هامة لدعم عملياتها العالمية. إعتمادها على البيئة الخارجية للحصول على الدعم المالي يعرضهم إلى الإعتماد على الموارد وإمكانية السيطرة الخارجية. مع ذلك، منظمات المجتمع المدني، نظمت كشركات ، المنظمات الغير حكومية عبر الوطنية تحاول الحفاظ على إستقلالية العمل من الجهات المانحة التي يعتمدون عليها للحصول على التمويل. هذه المقالة تساهم في نظرية الإعتماد على الموارد من خلال تحديد الاستراتيجيات التي توظف المنظمات الغير حكومية عبر الوطنية إستجابة لإعتماد الموارد، موضحا˝ ظهور إستجابة إستراتيجية، وإستكشاف الظروف التي تجعل المنظمات الغير حكومية قادرة على الحفاظ على الإستقلالية التنظيمية. ردود المنظمات الغير حكومية عبر الحدود الوطنية وتشمل توظيف التوافق والتعاقد من الباطن، المثابرة، والتنويع، التسويق، تحرير التمويل، موازنة الجيوستراتيجي، التخصص، الإنتقائية، التعليم من الجهات المانحة، والحلول الوسط. مرجع الإستراتيجية يمكن المنظمات الغير حكومية من مقاومة السيطرة الخارجية، حتى التحايل والتأثير على تفضيلات المانحين. وتستند النتائج على مقابلات عميقة ، وجها لوجه، مع كبار قادة تنظميين من عينة متنوعة من المنظمات الغير حكومية عبر الوطنية المسجلة في الولايات المتحدة.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
These strata were defined by five sectoral, three size (budget), and four financial classifications derived from information provided by Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org). The five sectors were human rights, sustainable development, conflict resolution, environment, and humanitarian relief. The three categories of budget size were small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million), and large (greater than $10 million). The four financial classifications were based on Charity Navigator’s organizational efficiency and capacity ratings, derived from information from IRS Forms 990.
Out of the initial sample of 182 organizations, 123 organizations participated in the study, yielding a response rate of 123/182 = 0.68. Another 29 replacements were subsequently added, yielding a total sample size of 152.
The typology was initially applied to government–NGO relations but has wider applicability.
Data are missing for 23 cases.
The vertical axis has been inverted to facilitate interpretation.
This distribution is analyzed based on a χ2 decomposition indicating the largest differences from expected values.
References
Ahiquist, J. S., & Breunig, C. (2012). Model-based clustering and typologies in the social sciences. Political Analysis, 20(1), 92–112.
Ahmad, M. M. (2006). The partnership between international NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and local NGOs in Bangladesh. Journal of International Development, 18, 629–638.
Barman, E. (2008). With strings attached: Nonprofits and the adoption of donor choice. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(1), 39–56.
Batley, R. (2011). Structures and strategies in relationships between non-government service providers and governments. Public Administration and Development, 31, 306–319.
Batley, R., & Rose, P. (2011). Analysing collaboration between non-governmental service providers and governments. Public Administration and Development, 31, 230–239.
Bob, C. (2005). The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bob, C. (2010). The market for human rights. In A. Prakash & M. K. Gugerty (Eds.), Advocacy organizations and collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2004). Partnerships between international donors and non-governmental development organizations: Opportunities and constraints. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70(2), 253–270.
Carroll, D. A., & Stater, K. J. (2008). Revenue diversification in nonprofit organizations: Does it lead to financial stability? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(4), 947–966.
Child, C. D., & Grønbjerg, K. A. (2007). Nonprofit advocacy organizations: Their characteristics and activities. Social Science Quarterly, 88(1), 259–281.
Cooley, A., & Ron, J. (2002). The NGO scramble: Organizational insecurity and the political economy of transnational action. International Security, 27(1), 5–39.
Deflin, F. G., Jr., & Tang, S.-Y. (2008). Foundation impact on environmental nongovernmental organizations: The grantees’ perspective. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(4), 603–625.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160.
Eikenberry, A. M., & Kluver, J. D. (2004). The marketization of the nonprofit sector: Civil society at risk? Public Administration Review, 64(2), 132–140.
Feiock, R. C., & Jang, H. S. (2009). Nonprofits as local government service contractors. Public Administration Review, 69(4), 668–680.
Fowler, A. F. (2000). Beyond partnership: Getting real about NGO relationships in the aid system. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 31(3), 1–13.
Froelich, K. A. (1999). Diversification of revenue strategies: Evolving resource dependence in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(3), 246–268.
Gerstbauer, L. C. (2010). The whole story of NGO mandate change: The peacebuilding work of World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, and Mennonite Central Committee. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39(5), 844–865.
Hafsi, T., & Thomas, H. (2005). Strategic management and change in high dependency environments: The case of a philanthropic organization. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 16(4), 329–351.
Hodge, M. M., & Piccolo, R. F. (2005). Funding source, board involvement techniques, and financial vulnerability in nonprofit organizations: A test of resource dependence. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 16(2), 171–190.
Hudock, A. C. (1995). Sustaining southern NGOs in resource-dependent environments. Journal of International Development, 7(4), 653–667.
Lister, S. (2000). Power in partnership? An analysis of an NGO’s relationships with its partners. Journal of International Development, 12, 227–239.
Magidson, J., & Vermunt, J. K. (2003). Latent class models. Belmont, MA: Statistical Innovations Inc.
McCutcheon, A. L. (1987). Latent Class Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Mcloughlin, C. (2011). Factors affecting state-non-governmental organization relations in service provision: Key themes from the literature. Public Administration and Development, 31, 240–251.
Mitchell, G. E., & Schmitz, H. P. (2012). Principled instrumentalism: A theory of transnational NGO behavior. Syracuse, NY: Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs.
Molenaers, N., Dewachter, S., & Dellepiane, S. (2011). Moving into the new aid approach, dilemmas for NGOs: The Belgian case. Public Administration and Development, 31, 188–204.
Moulton, S., & Eckerd, A. (2011). Preserving the publicness of the nonprofit sector: Resources, roles, and public values. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, XX(X), 1–30.
Najam, A. (2000). The four-Cs of third sector-government relations: Cooperation, confrontation, complementarity, and co-optation. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10(4), 375–396.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Prakash, A., & Gugerty, M. K. (2010). Advocacy organizations and collective action: An introduction. In A. Prakash & M. K. Gugerty (Eds.), Advocacy organizations and collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rauh, K. (2010). NGOs, foreign donors, and organizational processes: Passive NGO recipients or strategic actors? McGill Sociological Review, 1(January), 29–45.
Rose, P. (2011). Strategies for engagement: Government and national non-government education providers in south Asia. Public Administration and Development, 31, 294–305.
Sanyal, B. (1997). NGOs’ self-defeating quest for autonomy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 554(November), 21–32.
Tsasis, P. (2009). The social processes of interorganizational collaboration and conflict in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 20(1), 5–21.
Verbruggen, S., Christiaens, J., & Milis, K. (2011). Can resource dependence and coercive isomorphism explain nonprofit organizations’ compliance with reporting standards? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(1), 5–32.
Vermunt, J. K., & Magidson, J. (n.d.). Factor analysis with categorical indicators: A comparison between traditional and latent class approaches.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679 (Agents of Change: Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance, Leadership, and Effectiveness) and the Transnational NGO Initiative at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mitchell, G.E. Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence Among Transnational NGOs Registered in the United States. Voluntas 25, 67–91 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-012-9329-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-012-9329-2