Abstract
I shall introduce at the beginning of the paper a characterization of strong ontological emergence. According to it, roughly, something strongly emerges from some other thing(s) iff the former depends in some respect on the latter and it some independent of it in some other respect. Afterwards, I shall present my own formulation of strong emergence, which is based on the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a causal power. Causal powers are the entities to be primarily taken as emergent. Emergent causal powers depend for their possession on their emergence bases, but they are also independent of the latter (and on further relevantly similar entities) for their activation. This claim will be defended within some more general assumptions about the metaphysics of powers. Finally, I shall compare the power-based formulation of emergence with other formulations. I shall try to demonstrate that the power-based formulation is (all other things being equal) metaphysically less controversial than the other formulations. For the power-based formulation (unlike the other formulations) does not need to defend the additional thesis that the emergents can depend in some relevant respect on their bases and be independent of the latter in some other relevant respect. Indeed, the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a power (and the possibility of having the former without the latter) is inscribed in the nature of powers themselves.
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Notes
Of course, if one aims at understanding the emergence of still higher-level entities, she needs to satisfy the “relevantly similar” clause by adding further details. Assume that one wishes to characterize the strong emergence of biological properties from chemical ones in accord with (E3). In this case, she needs to rule out that the novel causal powers conferred by biological properties can be conferred by chemical properties and that they can be conferred by physical properties. My formulation schemes have two interesting consequences. First, weak emergence turns out to be compatible with strong emergence, i.e., one and the same phenomenon can be both a phenomenon of weak and of strong emergence. Secondly, both weak and strong emergence can be compatible with micro-physicalism (roughly, the view that everything depends on the micro-physical). Everything hinges on how one formulates the latter. I discuss these consequences in my (2018).
See, for example, Martin (2008).
See Molnar (2003).
See also Marmodoro (2017) for an interesting refinement of this view.
It can be replied that the vector model accounts for further phenomena, e.g., that certain causings do not take place. If the threshold is not reached, the radiator does not switch on. However, the same phenomena can be accounted for without the vector model. For instance, one could invoke negative causings (e.g., the window, being closed, prevents the radiator’s switching on) or positive causings that result in preventing something (e.g., the window, exercising the power of blocking the cold wind, prevents the radiator from switching on).
“K” and “KP” are variables respectively ranging over conditions in the universe and over powers. Please notice that a non-basic power can be activated in virtue of the joint obtaining of some K and of the activation of some KP. Moreover, more than one condition and/or more than one power can be involved in the activation of one and the same non-basic power.
My analysis here is purely hypothetical. If one believes in libertarian free will, decisions do not take place in virtue of anything else. Therefore, there is only the basic power to decide to move to Berlin. On the contrary, on a deterministic view, decisions always take place in virtue of something else. Thus, there are only the aforementioned non-basic powers.
See Lewis (1997).
See also Vetter (2013).
Here I use “An”, “Fn” and “Mn” as variables ranging over values of acceleration, magnitude of a force and mass (i.e., they must be read as “having some value or another”). On the contrary, “na”, “nf” and “nm” are the exact values of the acceleration, the magnitude of the force and the mass in the relevant circumstances.
There is also another concern, namely, that some powers are individuated by non-existent and non-occurrent manifestations. I deal with it in my (2016a).
My emergent powers differ from Shoemaker (2007, pp. 71–79)’s micro-latent powers and Molnar (2003, pp. 144–145)’s derivative powers for at least one reason. Shoemaker’s micro-latent powers just manifest in special circumstances, as well as Molnar’s derivative powers (their manifestations are nothing but the joint exercises of many component powers standing in special relations). On the contrary, the manifestation of my emergent powers cannot be due to special lower-level circumstances, nor to lower-level powers in special relations/circumstances.
In addition to R’s being a condition K for the activation of the non-basic power to cause p in virtue of R, in my (2017) I also consider the possibility of R’s being a necessary condition C for the activation of some basic power(s) in the base. For the sake of simplicity, I shall set aside this possibility here.
For more details on my account, see Paolini Paoletti (2016b, 2017). In my (2016c, 2017), I also defend the view that the activation of emergent powers can be reduced to no lower-level “surrogate”, namely, to the activation of no lower-level power and to no lower-level circumstance. Please note that the emergence base only causes the possession of the emergent power. The emergent power still is novel with respect to its activation. For it cannot be activated by its base—nor by any other lower-level entity.
One could point out that, if powers are universal, then there is only one non-basic power here (i.e., the power to cause p in virtue of R) that is borne by many electrons. Yet, there would still be many power-instances of that power. When I claim that each electron has its own non-basic power to cause p in virtue of R, I use “power” in order to refer to a power-instance.
Moreover, if one claims that the only properties are powers, then R itself should be conceived of as a power. On the other side, doing without R would create some troubles. For one should then explain why the powers in the emergence base do not give rise to the emergent power when they float free in the universe, i.e., when they do not stand in R. The possibility of joint potentialities is explored by Vetter (2015).
For more on this point, see my (2017).
Of course, this conception should deal with the aforementioned problems concerning R in a pure powers ontology. Moreover, it should define or substitute levels of composition. In my (2017) I also consider the possibility of reformulating (EP) within a reductionist conception of powers.
Moreover, considering the theoretical virtue of explanatory power, it seems that (EP) is at least as powerful as all the other formulations of strong emergence. For whatever can be explained through fundamentality, novel causings, properties/fused substances conferring/exercising novel powers can also be explained through emergent powers.
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Funding
Funding was provided by Durham Emergence Project (Grant No. ID0EONAE321).
