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Probabilistic risk attitudes and local risk aversion: a paradox

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Abstract

Prominent theories of decision under risk that challenge expected utility theory model risk attitudes at least partly with transformation of probabilities. This paper shows how attributing local risk aversion to attitudes towards probabilities can produce extreme probability distortions that imply paradoxical risk aversion.

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Notes

  1. Formally, urn \(R_{g}\) is prospect \(\{\$ 900,0;p,1-p\}, p=(g+5)/100\) and urn \({S}_{g}\) is prospect \(\{\$ 900,\$ 200,0;p-1/2n,1/n,1-p-1/2n\}\), \(n = \)10. All prospects R and S considered in this paper are of these types.

  2. The supposition that the safer prospect is weakly preferred to the riskier prospect for all \(g\) from {0, 5,..., 90} is made here for simplicity of exposition. Section 3 provides general results for cases when the weak preference for the safer urn is observed only for some subset of {0,5,..., 90} and strict preference for the riskier urn is observed outside the subset. Note that the latter preferences cannot be rationalized by expected utility.

  3. For a power utility specification, \(x^{r}\) the supposition \(q>1\) is equivalent to \(r>0.461,\) which is plausible (Harrison and Rutström 2008). For smaller values of \(r\), one can construct an example with other prizes. For example, for \(r= 0.3\), the high, middle, and the low prizes that satisfy condition \(q>1\) are $900, $300, and $100.

  4. To be able to construct numerical illustrations for implications of inequality (1), I need to choose a value for \(q\). Prizes used in the example, 900 and 200, are within the range of payoffs in Abdellaoui et al. (2008) study. In my numerical illustrations I use 2 as a lower bound of \(q\) since the value of 900 being at least three times the value of 200 is satisfied for the power estimates in their study. Their reported estimated (mean) power exponent on the gain domain is 0.86.

  5. The supposition \(q>1\) requires that the high prize of €40 is valued at least twice as much as €10, which is arguably plausible; for a power utility specification, \(x^{r}\) this supposition is equivalent with \(r>0.5.\)

  6. For \(q>1, \kappa (q,k^{*}-k,k-k_*)\) approaches infinity as \(k^{*}-k\) (see lemma 5.1 in the appendix). For given probabilities \(p\) and \(p^{*}\), verify that \(k^{*}-k\ge 2n(p^{*}-p)-1;\) so the larger the value of \(n\), the larger the value of \(\kappa (.).\)

  7. Let 0.5M denote $500,000 and use subadditivity of \(v(.)\) and \(f(0.75)-f(0.5)\le 0.00004(1-f(0.5))\) to verify that \(v(0.5M)(f(0.75)-f(0.5))\le 25000v(20)\left( {f(0.75)-f(0.5)} \right) <v(20)(1-f(0.5)).\) Rearrange terms in the last inequality to get \(v(0.5M)f(0.75)<v(0.5M)f(0.5)+v(20)(1-f(0.5));\) hence, $0.5 million or $20 with equal probability is preferred over $0.5 million or $0 with probabilities 3/4 and 1/4.

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Acknowledgments

Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (Grant Number SES-0849590). The author is grateful to James C. Cox, Glenn W. Harrison, Peter P. Wakker, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Vjollca Sadiraj.

Appendix: Proof of the Theorem

Appendix: Proof of the Theorem

We first prove one proposition and one Lemma. Then we use these two results to prove the main theorem.

Let set \(\Psi (k_*,k^{*})=\{k_*/2n,(k_*+1)/2n,..., k^{*}/2n\}\) be defined for any given two integers \(k_*,k^{*}\in N\) such that \(1\le k_*<k^{*}\le 2n-1.\) For any given non-negative prizes \(h>m>\ell \) let \(q\) denote \((v(h)-v(m))/(v(m)-v(l))\).

Proposition 5.1

Let \(n\in N\) and non-negative prizes \(h>m>\ell \) be given. Suppose that \(q>1\) and \(S_i \;{\succeq }\;R_i ,\) for all \(p_i \in \Psi (k_*,k^{*})\). Then \(\forall \hbox {k}\in \Psi (k_*,k^{*})\)

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) \le \frac{1}{\kappa }\left[ {f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) } \right] , \end{aligned}$$
(5.1)

where \(\kappa =\kappa (q,k^{*}-k,k-k_*)\).

Proof

If \(S_i \;{\succeq }\;R_i \) for some \(i\in \{k_*,\ldots , k^{*}\}\) then according to statement (2), the agent has revealed

$$\begin{aligned}&v(h)f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) +v(m)\left( {f\left( \frac{i+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) } \right) +v(\ell )\left( {1-f\left( \frac{i+1}{2n}\right) } \right) \nonumber \\&\quad \ge v(h)f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) +v(\ell )\left( {1-f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) } \right) , \end{aligned}$$
(5.2)

for all\(\;\;i=k_*,\ldots , k^{*}\). Adding and subtracting \(v(m)f(i/2n)\) on the left-hand-side of the above inequality, rearranging terms and using notation \(q=(v(h)-v(m))/(v(m)-v(\ell ))\), one has

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{i+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) \ge q\left( {f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) } \right) ,\quad i=k_*,\ldots , k^{*}.\quad \quad \end{aligned}$$
(5.3)

If \(S_j \;{\succeq }\;R_j \) for all \(j=i,\ldots , i+t\) where \(i,i+t\in \{k_*,\ldots , k^{*}\},\) then application of inequality (5.3) \(t\) times gives

$$\begin{aligned}&f\left( \frac{i+t+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i+t}{2n}\right) \ge q\left( {f\left( \frac{i+t}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i+t-1}{2n}\right) } \right) \nonumber \\&\quad \ge ... \ge q^{t+1}\left( {f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) } \right) . \end{aligned}$$
(5.4)

To show statement (5.1) and complete the proof it suffices to show that \(\forall k\in \{k_*,..., k^{*}\},\)

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) \le \left( {f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k-1}{2n}\right) } \right) \sum _{j=0}^{k-k_*} {q^{-j}}, \end{aligned}$$
(5.5)

and

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) \ge \left( {f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k-1}{2n}\right) } \right) \sum _{j=0}^{k^{*}-k} {q^{j+1}} \end{aligned}$$
(5.6)

because the last two inequalities imply that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{\sum _{j=0}^{k-k_*} {q^{-j}} }\left( {f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) \!-\!f\left( \frac{k_*\!-\!1}{2n}\right) } \right) \le \frac{1}{\sum _{j=0}^{k^{*}-k} {q^{j+1}} }\left( {f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) \!-\!f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) } \right) ; \end{aligned}$$

rearrange terms and use notation \(\kappa =1+\sum _{j=0}^{k^{*}-k} {q^{j+1}} /\sum _{j=0}^{k-k_*} {q^{-j}} \) to obtain statement (5.1)

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) \le \frac{1}{\kappa }\left[ {f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) } \right] . \end{aligned}$$

Inequality (5.5) follows directly from inequality (5.4) and some rearrangement of terms

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right)&= \sum _{i=k_*}^k {\left( {f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) } \right) }\\&\le \left( {f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k-1}{2n}\right) } \right) \sum _{j=0}^{k-k_*} {q^{-j}}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for inequality (5.6) verify that

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right)&= \sum _{i=k+1}^{k^{*}+1} {\left( {f\left( \frac{i}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{i-1}{2n}\right) } \right) }\\&\ge \left( {f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k-1}{2n}\right) } \right) \sum _{j=0}^{k^{*}-k} {q^{j+1}}. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square \)

Lemma 5.1

If \(q>1\) then \(\mathop {\hbox {lim}}\limits _{t\rightarrow \infty } \kappa \left( {q,t,s} \right) =\infty \)

Proof

It follows from \(\kappa (q,t,s)=1+\sum _{j=0}^t {q^{j+1}} /\sum _{i=0}^s {q^{-i}} =\frac{q^{2+t+s}-1}{q^{1+s}-1}>q^{1+t}\)

\(\square \)

Proof of the Theorem

Part a. Suppose that \(S_i \;{\succeq }\;R_i ,\) for all \(p_i =i/2n\in (p_*,p^{*})\) for some \(n\in N.\) Let \(p\in (p_*,p^{*})\) be given. Without any loss of generality let \(p_*\) be written as \(p_*=(k_*-1)/2n\) for some \(k_*\in N.\) Let \(k\) denote the smallest integer larger than 2np, that is \(k=\left\lceil {2np} \right\rceil \) and \(k^{*}\) denote the largest integer smaller than 2np \(^{*}-1\), that is \(k^{*}=\left\lfloor {2np^{*}-1} \right\rfloor .\) By the supposition in the theorem and the construction of \(k,k_*,k^{*}\) one has \(S_i \;{\succeq }\;R_i ,\) for all \(p_i \in \Psi (k_*,k^{*})\). By Proposition 5.1 and construction one has

$$\begin{aligned} f(p)-f(p_*)\le f\left( \frac{k}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right)&\le \frac{1}{\kappa }\left[ {f\left( \frac{k^{*}+1}{2n}\right) -f\left( \frac{k_*-1}{2n}\right) } \right] \\&\le \frac{1}{\kappa }\left[ {f(p^{*})-f(p_*)} \right] , \end{aligned}$$

where \(\kappa =\kappa (q,k^{*}-k,k-k_*),\) which completes the proof.

Part b. For any given \(\varepsilon \in (0,p^{*}-p_*),G\in N\) and \(q>1\) take \(n^{*}\ge \left( {1+\ln G/\ln q^{2}} \right) /\varepsilon \). Let \(n\ge n^{*}\) be given and suppose that \(S_i \;{\succeq }\;R_i\), for all \(p_i =i/2n\in [p_*,p^{*}].\) Construct \(k=\left\lceil {2np} \right\rceil ,p=p^{*}-\varepsilon \) and \(k^{*}=\left\lfloor {2np^{*}-1} \right\rfloor ,\)and apply Lemma 5.1 and \(n\ge n^{*}\) to get

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa (q,k^{*}-k,k-1)\ge q^{k^{*}-k+1}\ge q^{2(n\varepsilon -1)}>G. \end{aligned}$$

Next apply subadditivity of \(v(.)\), the last inequality and inequality (*) in part (a) of the theorem to get

$$\begin{aligned} v(zG)(f(p^{*}\!-\!\varepsilon )\!-\!f(p_*))&\le Gv(z)(f(p^{*}\!-\!\varepsilon )\!-\!f(p_*))\!\le \! \kappa v(z)(f(p^{*}\!-\!\varepsilon )\!-\!f(p_*)) \\ \!&\le \! v(z)\left[ {f(p^{*})\!-\!f(p_*)} \right] . \end{aligned}$$

Hence, \(v(zG)f(p^{*}-\varepsilon )\le v(zG)f(p_*)+v(z)\left[ {f(p^{*})-f(p_*)} \right] ,\) which completes the proof for it reveals that

$$\begin{aligned} {\{zG},z,0;p_*,p^{*}-p_*\}\;{\succeq }\;{\{zG,0};p^{*}-\varepsilon \}. \end{aligned}$$

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Sadiraj, V. Probabilistic risk attitudes and local risk aversion: a paradox. Theory Decis 77, 443–454 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9410-3

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