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Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information

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Abstract

We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray’s work, that explicitly incorporating the information, however imprecise, available to the decision maker is relevant, feasible, and fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and whether it matters or not, that it makes it possible to better model and analyze how the decision maker takes into account new information, even when this information is not an event and finally that it is crucial when attempting to identify and measure the decision maker’s attitude toward imprecise information.

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Correspondence to Raphaël Giraud.

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Giraud, R., Tallon, JM. Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information. Theory Decis 71, 23–31 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9197-4

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