Abstract
Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.
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Barrett, J.A. The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games. Theory Decis 67, 223–237 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9064-0