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A comparison of non-transferable utility values

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Abstract

Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler--Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.

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Hart, S. A comparison of non-transferable utility values. Theory and Decision 56, 35–46 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5633-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5633-7

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