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Mind the notebook

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Abstract

According to the Extended knowledge dilemma, first formulated by Clark (Synthese 192:3757–3775, 2015) and subsequently reformulated by Carter et al. (in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Extended epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 331–351, 2018a), an agent’s interaction with a device can either give rise to knowledge or extended cognition, but not both at the same time. The dilemma rests on two substantive commitments: first, that knowledge by a subject requires that the subject be aware to some extent of some features of that knowledge’s sources and, second, that cognitive processes can only be extended if the subject is mostly unaware of the external object. The overwhelming response to the dilemma by proponents of extended knowledge has been to reconcile the demands of knowledge with the requirement that genuine extended cognition must lack any conscious encountering of the external artifact that features in the putative extended cognitive process. My approach, thus far unexplored, will be the opposite: I show how extended cognition can be made compatible with a wide range of agential attitudes, including an active form of epistemic hygiene. Consequently, I open the door for a new way of vindicating the possibility of extended knowledge, and call into question some assumptions that lie at the core of extended cognition theory.

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Notes

  1. See the essays in Menary (2010) for a thorough overview.

  2. Knowledge extends—in the relevant sense that involves extended cognitive processes—in various ways. For example, by endorsing virtue reliabilism, one could claim that knowledge extends when an artifact is part of the cognitive abilities that reliably produce/justify an agent’s true belief (Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014a, b). The literature also mentions a further possible variety of extended knowledge, according to which knowledge is extended through the belief component (Adams 2018). This claim typically relies on the more controversial thesis of the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998), according to which mental states (for instance, dispositional beliefs) can be extended. In this paper, I will only be concerned with extended knowledge in the sense of knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes, and will remain neutral with regard to extended knowledge qua knowledge that involves extended mental states.

  3. See Pritchard (2010), Menary (2012), Carter et al. (2014), Kelp (2014) and Palermos (2014a, b), and the essays in Carter et al. (2018b) for a comprehensive sample of the state of the art.

  4. Although the case of Otto provides the usual starting point for discussions of the extended mind hypothesis, my focus here is with using it to discuss extended knowledge qua knowledge that results from extended cognition. Notice, indeed, that the extended knowledge dilemma was originally formulated in terms of Otto’s interaction with the notebook (Clark 2015). In this respect, it is crucial to bear in mind that the extended knowledge dilemma targets Otto’s knowledge-producing process rather than Otto’s state of knowledge. In other words, Otto’s knowledge would be extended (if it is) because the physical realizers of his cognitive processes include the notebook. That is why the dilemma, although focusing on the case of Otto, targets extended knowledge through extended cognition. As mentioned in footnote 2, in this paper, I will not deal with the question of whether knowledge can be extended by means of involving an extended mental state. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this point.

  5. Clark (2008b) relies on common-sense functionalism, as formulated by Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2006). See also Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Clark (2008a, b).

  6. As Clark remarks, this route for extended cognition is built from an “extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before).” (Clark 2008b: p. 57).

  7. Care is needed in specifying the sensitivity condition in such a way that it does not lead to skepticism. Perhaps the way to specify this is as a sensitivity to defeaters (Palermos 2014a, b).

  8. This can be explained in terms of meta-incoherence. As Jonathan Kvanvig remarks, what goes wrong in cases like that of Truetemp is “a lack of coherence between the understanding a person has of the reliability of various ways of forming and holding beliefs and how the beliefs are formed in these cases” (2003: p. 454).

  9. Notice that the equivocity of what is meant by “a conscious encounter” might carry with it a substantial problem: if it turns out that the kind of conscious encounter that explains the rationale behind each horn of the dilemma is different, then the dilemma is not a dilemma but a fallacy. To stifle this potential line of criticism, a unified account is a pressing need.

  10. “External” here simply means external to the organic boundary.

  11. Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008a, b, 2010) and Wheeler (2010, 2011). For rejections of this argument against extended cognition, see Sprevak (2009), Sutton (2010) and Wadham (2016).

  12. Clark (2008a, b, 2010).

  13. See Clark (2008b: p. 37). See also Wheeler (2010, 2011).

  14. Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008a, b), Carter and Kallestrup (2016) and Heersmink and Carter (2017).

  15. For instance, as Heersmink and Carter (2017) point out, the correct functioning of biomemory might sometimes require a maintenance rehearsal where a subject needs to repeat some information out loud several times so that it remains longer in her short-term memory. Also, a more demanding level of processing is plausibly needed for information to be transferred from short-term to long-term memory storage (Heersmink and Carter 2017: pp. 6–7). This, however, is not included in the common-sense functional role usually attributed to memory, since it is not definitive of that role.

  16. This has been dubbed the differences argument (Rowlands 2009: p. 635). It is championed by Adams and Aizawa (2001) and Rupert (2004).

  17. See e.g. Clark (2008a: pp. 91–93) and Rowlands (2009: pp. 630–635).

  18. Differences between intracranial and extracranial processes have motivated a second-wave approach to extended cognition, which downplays the importance of functional similarity and focuses on the complementary relation between internal and external elements (Rowlands 2009; Sutton 2006, 2010; Menary 2007). Also, Wheeler (2010) has advocated a scientifically-oriented functionalism.

  19. The requirement for automaticity is usually addressed as one criteria of the three criteria usually known as the “glue and trust” (Clark and Chalmers 1998). In the next section, I will give further support against the view according to which cognitive abilities should always we exercised automatically.

  20. Best 2003.

  21. It might be worth noting that the fact that the same coarse-grained functional role is realized by the cognitive systems of Careful Otto, Careful Inga, and their oblivious versions, does not mean that they are entirely cognitively on a par. By means of exercising epistemic care, Careful Otto and Inga exhibit epistemically significant cognitive traits, that may well have epistemically relevant consequences (e.g., in terms of what and how they know). However, as I have shown, such traits not only are not included in a coarse-grained functional characterization of cognitive processes, but also do not prevent this role from being realized (by whichever physical entities turn out to realize it). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this.

  22. Experiments such as those performed by Maravita and Iriki (2004) have found several neural changes as a result of training macaques to use a tool. This has been interpreted as the incorporation of the tool into the monkey’s body schema (cf. Makin et al. 2017).

  23. There are other dimensions of integration but incorporation is the one that Clark (2015) refers to when introducing the Extended Knowledge Dilemma. See Heersmink (2014) for a comprehensive account of the different conditions for integration.

  24. The time and practice required might vary depending on the cognitive profile of the agent and the properties of the technologies.

  25. Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008a), Rowlands (2009), Menary (2010, 2012), Chalmers (2019 and Clowes 2015).

  26. Heersmink (2014: pp. 588–590) calls this procedural and informational transparency.

  27. See Clark (2008a: p. 80) and Heersmink (2014: p. 589).

  28. Fitts and Posner (1967), Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) and Dreyfus (2002).

  29. Here I follow Sutton et al. (2011) and Geeves et al. (2014).

  30. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this aspect further.

  31. The relevant features which an agent might pay attention to or be cognitively aware of will vary depending on the type of skill being exercised and the activity at hand. As Montero (2016: pp. 38–41) indicates, the type of thoughts that are advantageous in action (as well as the type that are detrimental) varies depending on the skill in question (e.g. it is dramatically different if the agent who engages in self-directed thoughts is a chess player or a ballet dancer).

  32. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.

  33. See Fridland (2017).

  34. This entails investigating other features such as, for instance, feelings of fluency and intimacy. See Palermos (2014a, b) for an account of fluency and cognitive integration.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to J. Adam Carter, Samuele Chilovi, Richard Menary and Jesús Vega for extensive discussions on the topics of this paper, and for providing insightful feedback on previous drafts. For comments, I would also like to thank Javier González de Prado, John Horden, Abraham Sapien, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Universities of Glasgow, Queensland, and Nova de Lisboa. My gratitude also extends to Andy Clark for discussing this work with me. This work was funded by the research grants ‘Material Cultures, Epistemic cultures. Standards, Cognitive Practices and Knowledge’ (FFI2013-45659-R, MINECO/FEDER, EU) and ‘Intellectual autonomy in environments of epistemic dependence,’ (FFI2017- 87395-P, MINECO/FEDER, EU).

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    Gloria Andrada

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Andrada, G. Mind the notebook. Synthese 198, 4689–4708 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02365-9

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