Abstract
Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers—which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable—fits the bill. After an introduction to the major concepts in cultural psychology and describing causal power realism, we use a case study—the effects of pathogen prevalence on culture and cognition—to show the explanatory capacities of the powers framework.
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Notes
Kitayama (2002, p. 90) makes the same point: “What culture is to humans is what water is to fish.”
For discussion of Sperber’s influence on the development of cognitive anthropology (and cognitive science more broadly) see Boden (2004). Sperber’s position is developed over many papers and books. But if interested parties were looking for a single source to learn about his views, they could do a lot worse than Sperber (1996). There, he cogently lays out a program for a naturalistic investigation of culture that depends on transmission of representations among individuals in a culture. Other papers flesh out details, like his defense of massive modularity (2001, 2005) and the role of cultural attractors in cultural evolution (Claidière et al. 2014; Claidière and Sperber 2007).
The major competitors are Dawkins’ memetics and Richerson and Boyd’s culture-gene coevolution, though there are plenty of other accounts describing the dissemination of cultural attitudes, including those developed within the relatively recent area of network science (cf. Albert Barabási’s open-source textbook at <http://networksciencebook.com/>) and recently applications of computer simulations to cultural psychology (cf. Kashima 2014). It’s worth noting that Sperber, Dawkins, and Richerson and Boyd have much in common. All attempt to identify the mechanisms that make cultural evolution and transmission possible and all work within naturalistic frameworks. Where they differ is in an account of the mechanisms involved. The man himself has an informative and entertaining interview on this in Edge: <https://www.edge.org/conversation/dan_sperber-an-epidemiology-of-representations>.
For Sperber, cultures are causally efficacious in the sense that cultural information enters into ‘cultural causal cognitive chains’ (Sperber 2006).
Thanks to anonymous reviewers for pressing us to clarify this.
Even if we think it is.
See note 8.
These cultural-psychological categories have made appearances elsewhere in recent philosophy. Machery et al. (2004) draw on cultural differences to illustrate that causal-historical theories of reference aren’t culturally universal. Sarkissian et al. (2010) show that people tend to believe in free will across the individualist-collectivist divide. Weinberg et al. (2001) show that epistemological intuitions (specifically, Gettier-related intuitions) vary across culture and socio-economic class.
It’s useful to describe these as ‘categories’ but they’re more like ends on a continuum. Cultures are more or less collectivist or individualist.
One unfortunate vestige of early research on cultural psychology is that the individualism-collectivism split tends to track the geographical West/East split. This is unfortunate because cultural psychologists define culture in terms of information and not in terms of geography. There is, of course, an obvious relationship between the two: if culture is transmitted from agent to agent, then close physical proximity facilitates that. The examples we use in this paper tend to follow the East–West/collectivist–individualist mapping since we rely on well-accepted findings to make our case. Nonetheless, we do a disservice to the notion of ‘culture’ in thinking of it as geographically-bound.
The literature on cultural and cognitive patterns associated with individualist and collectivist cultures is vast. Further, there are many differences among individualist and collectivist cultures. Individualism looks different when comparing American and British culture; and collectivism manifests itself differently when comparing Japanese and Latin American cultures. For an overview, see Triandis (1995), Kim et al. (1996) and Oyserman et al. (2002).
Rowlands (2003, 2010) offers something of a Sartrean view in which consciousness is mirror-like. We don’t mean anything like that here. Cultural psychologists will sometimes talk about “representing” cultural information internally, but that doesn’t square with their rejection of the computational-representational framework. A charitable interpretation would be that minds represent information but without containing representations. But to avoid stacking the deck in favor of or against our proposed explanatory framework, we’ll stick with the mirror-metaphor since it gets the empirical insights without the ontological baggage.
The coding system used was developed, in part, by Ekman and Friesen (1978): the Facial Action Coding System. The system involves relativizing the facial features to the dimensions of the face. So an excited smile (for example) will have greater width and depth relative to that face than a calm smile. The resulting ratios of smile-size to face-size provide a basis of comparison for faces of different sizes and shapes.
Even though the information is present, one might wonder, do the children pick up on it? The answer is “yes.” Taiwanese children preferred images of children with calm smiles and European-American children preferred images with big smiles. Also, both sets of children were presented with stories in which the characters engaged in calm activities (e.g. floating on an inner tube) or rambunctious activities (e.g. splashing in the water). Taiwanese children preferred calm-activity stories and European-American children preferred the rambunctious-activity stories.
Though they’d be ok with late-1980s-and-beyond-Putnam.
See, for example, Dewey (1896). Another important connection to make in this regard is between ecological psychology and cultural psychology. Ecological psychologists posit affordances (i.e. opportunities for action in an organism’s environment) as a key theoretical entity. Cultural psychologists likewise talk about socio-cultural affordances: e.g. Costall (1995), Reitveld and Kiverstein (2014). Ecological psychologists also trace their intellectual lineage to the American naturalists, cf. Heft 2001. So cultural psychologists borrow conceptual resources from ecological psychologists, who often cite American naturalists as their intellectual parents.
Oyserman’s position is an important exception. She argues that culturally-influenced cognition is a kind of situated cognition. She discusses ‘cultural mindsets’ in terms of representations and schema (e.g. Oyserman 2011, p. 165). Even so, Oyserman is keen to note the back-and-forth causal influence of mind and culture.
The computationalist response here is (to paraphrase Haugeland 1985): take care of the syntax and the semantics will take care of themselves. As long as the contents of the incoming information are in some way reflected in the syntax of the tokened representations, then the computationalist avoids the cultural psychologist’s worry.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
We want to stress that Sperber (2006) believes this too. But the mechanisms he invokes for providing a naturalistic explanation are taken from computational strains in cognitive science, which as we saw puts Sperber in tension with most cultural psychologists.
Sperber uses findings like these to bolster his case for massive modularity and against a ‘blank slate’ view of mind that he finds in Dawkins. See Sperber (2011).
Norenzayan and Heine (2005) sketches a framework for this research.
See footnote 27.
Based on the way we have defined causal power realism, the position is widespread. In fact, the positions defended in all of the following would count as causal power realism: Prior et al. (1982), Armstrong (1983, 1996a, b, c, 1997, 2004, 2005, 2010), Lewis (1986), Martin (1996, 1997, 2007), Martin and Heil (1998, 1999), Ellis (2001, 2002), Molnar (2003), Heil (2003, Heil 2005), Mumford (2004), Psillos (2006), Bird (2007), Marmodoro (2009), Jacobs (2011) and Jaworski (2016). Those familiar with this literature will recognize that the positions defended in this list differ from each other significantly. Still, all are united in rejecting the idea that powers are reducible to counterfactuals.
Martin (2007, Chapter 3) calls them “reciprocal disposition partners.”
Mumford and Anjum (2010) model the causal stew by means of vectors. For a causal power C, there are some powers that promote C’s manifestation and others that inhibit. When there are sufficiently many promoters—and sufficiently few inhibitors—for C, then it manifests its effects.
Pearson’s r = − 0.69, p < 0.001.
Fincher, et al also discuss the effect of per capita GDP as a force shaping degree of individualism and, by extension, cognition. We address this in greater detail below.
The careful reader will notice that Oran is the name in the town in Camus’ The Plague. A fitting name for someone in an area with high prevalence of pathogens.
Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for bringing this objection to our attention.
At this point, we pass the ball to social learning theorists for identifying the mechanisms involved with learning from others, cf. Hoppitt and Laland (2013).
This is just what researchers are finding: for example, in both the US and Japan, there has been a notable decrease in the extent to which individuals value social participation and children’s obedience (Hamamura 2012). Also, the use of first-personal pronouns is on the rise globally (Yu et al. 2016), something cultural psychologists use as a marker of individualism.
A question: are cultural powers something over and above the powers of that culture’s members? Put differently: are cultural powers emergent, or are they reducible to some set of lower-level powers?
That’s an important question, but ultimately an empirical one. We’ve seen that according to causal power realism, powers are empirically-discoverable. So when we are trying to determine which powers there are and which individuals have them, we should look to empirical sources. So just as empirical sources will determine whether (say) biological powers are reducible to chemical powers, so too empirical sources will determine whether cultural powers are reducible to some lower-level set of powers. For our purposes here, it is therefore simply important for us to note that cultures have powers. Whether these powers are emergent is a question that lies beyond our purposes, and indeed, beyond purely philosophical inquiry.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
However, per capita GDP doesn’t account for the predictive power of pathogen prevalence on degree of individualism.
Going even further—these last two manifestations (reinforced xenophobic attitudes and transmission of attitudes to children), what do they empower? Nothing other than the maintenance and transmission of cultural attitudes.
Many thanks to Sam Kampa, Anna Marie Medina, Vinai Norasakkunkit, and Peter Seipel for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for Synthese for their helpful feedback.
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Vukov, J., Lassiter, C. How to power encultured minds. Synthese 197, 3507–3534 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01899-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01899-8