Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A critical discussion of Prior’s philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom

  • S.I. : Real Possibilities, Indeterminism and Free Will
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper is a critical discussion of A.N. Prior’s contribution to the modern understanding of indeterminism and human freedom of choice. Prior suggested that these ideas should be conceived in terms of his tense logic. It can be demonstrated that his approach provides an attractive formalization that makes it possible to discuss indeterminism and human freedom of choice in a very precise manner and in a broader metaphysical context. It is also argued that Prior’s development of this approach was closely linked to his very personal struggles with fundamental religious and metaphysical questions. In his opinion, holding the doctrine of divine foreknowledge together with the doctrine of human freewill gives rise to difficult logical and philosophical problems. It appears that Prior, rather early on, decided to support what was later known as the Peircean solution, although he also analysed what he considered to be the most important alternative solution—the Ockhamist solution. This paper offers a discussion of some of Prior’s published books and papers as well as some of the papers in his Nachlass.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I owe this observation to the anonymous reviewer of Synthese.

References

  • Belnap, N., & Green, M. (1994). Indeterminism and ‘The Thin Red Line’. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 365–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Belnap, N., Perloff, M., & Xu, M. (2001). Facing the future. Agents and choices in our indeterminist world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig, W. L. (1989). Middle knowledge: A Calvinist–Arminian rapprochement? In C. H. Pinnock (Ed.), The grace of God, the will of man (pp. 141–164). Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grimshaw, M. (2002). The prior Prior: Neglected early writings of Arthur N. Prior. The Heythrop Journal, 43(4), 480–495.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hasker, W. (1998). God, time, and knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasle, P. (2012). The problem of predestination: As a prelude to A.N. Prior’s tense logic. Synthese, 188(3), 331–347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jakobsen, D. (2016). An illusion close to life. Synthese, 1, 1–11. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1076-2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kenny, A. (1971). Arthur Norman Prior (1914–1969) (pp. 321–349). Proceedings of the British Academy, LVI.

  • Kripke, S. (2014a). Letter from Kripke to Prior 03.09.1958. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Kripke, S. (2014b). Letter from Kripke to Prior 13.10.1958.The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1673). Confessio philosophi. Eng. Translation: A Philosopher’s Creed, Wikisource, the free online library. Retrieved from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Confessio_philosophi.

  • Mates, B. (1953). Stoic logic. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ockham, W. (1969). Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents. New York: Translated by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann.

  • Øhrstrøm, P. (1981). Problems regarding the future operatorin an indeterministic tense logic. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 18, 81–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Øhrstrøm, P. (1983). Time and free choice. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 20, 55–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Øhrstrøm, P. (2014). What William of Ockham and Luis de Molina would have said to Nuel Belnap: A discussion of some arguments against ‘The Thin Red Line’. In T. Müller (Ed.), Nuel Belnap on indeterminism and free action (Vol. 2, pp. 175–190). Outstanding contributions to logic, Berlin: Springer.

  • Øhrstrøm, P., & Hasle, P. (1995). Temporal logic., From Ancient ideas to artificial intelligence Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Øhrstrøm, P., & Hasle, P. (2006). A.N. Prior’s logic. In D. M. Gabbay & J. Woods (Eds.), The handbook of the history of logic (pp. 399–446). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Øhrstrøm, P. & Hasle, P. (2011, Revised 2015). “Future contingents”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/future-contingent.

  • Plantinga, A. (1986). On Ockham’s way out. Faith and Philosophy, 3(3), 235–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ploug, T. & Øhrstrøm, P. (2011). Branching time, indeterminism and tense logic—unveiling the Prior–Kripke letters. Synthese, 188, 367–379 (Nr. 3, 1.10.2012).

  • Prior, A. N. (1934a). Athanasius contra mundum. Open Windows, 4, 6–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1934b). Christ and human history. Open Windows, 1, 18–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1935). Logic and dogma. Open Windows, 5, 19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1953). Three-valued logic and future contingents. Philophical Quarterly, 1953, 317–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1957). Time and modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1966). Postulates for tense-logic. American Philosophical Quarterly, 3(2), 153–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (1967). Past, present and future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (2003). In P. Hasle, P. Øhrstrøm, T. Braüner, & J. Copeland (Eds.), Papers on time and tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014a). Diary entry 25 March 1942. The Nachlass of A.N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk/.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014b). Determinism in philosophy and in theology. The Nachlass of A.N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk/.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014c). Of God’s plan and purpose. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk/.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014d). Some free thinking about time. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014e). Postulate sets for tense logic. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014f). First things in logic. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prior, A. N. (2014g). Letter from Prior to Kripke 10.09.1958. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014h). Letter from Prior to Kripke 27.10.1958. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

  • Prior, A. N. (2014i). Letter from Prior to Mates, 06.08.1954. The Nachlass of A. N. Prior. Retrieved from http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Rendsburggade 14, 9000, Aalborg, Denmark

    Peter Øhrstrøm

Authors
  1. Peter Øhrstrøm
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Øhrstrøm.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Øhrstrøm, P. A critical discussion of Prior’s philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom. Synthese 196, 69–85 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1149-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1149-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation