Abstract
In his paper, The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician, A.N. Prior considers Hintikka’s theorem, according to which a statement cannot be both impossible and permissible. This theorem has been seen as problematic for the very idea of a logic of obligation. However, Prior rejects the view that the logic of obligation cannot be formalised. He sees this resistance against such a view as an important part of what could be called the obligation of the logician. Prior argues that Hintikka’s theorem should not be seen as something paradoxical. On the contrary, it should be seen as a fully acceptable consequence of a basic and reasonable assumption in deontic logic, namely Hintikka’s rule.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Prior A. (1955) Formal logic. The Clarendon Press, Oxford
Prior A. (1956) Modality and quantification in S5. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 21: 60–62
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Øhrstrøm, P., Zeller, J. & Sandborg-Petersen, U. Prior’s defence of Hintikka’s theorem. A discussion of Prior’s ‘The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician’. Synthese 188, 449–454 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9936-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9936-2